Using source taint analysis to reduce false positives in an advanced persistent threat (apt) protection solution

Abstract

In response to a local Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) agent identifying a potential data exfiltration attack, the binary identified in the attack is sent to a static analysis tool for further analysis. The agent also identifies a source and a sink involved in the potential data exfiltration. The static analysis tool decompiles the binary, and then runs the de-compiled code through a static analysis to identify data flows between the source and the sink, e.g., a data flow from the source that is the method used to read sensitive information, and a data flow to the sink that is the method used to write to the remote system. If there are such data flows, the activity reported by the agent is likely a true exfiltration attack. Based on this flow determination, the static analysis tool returns a response to the agent validating that the activity is an attack.