The patent badge is an abbreviated version of the USPTO patent document. The patent badge does contain a link to the full patent document.
The patent badge is an abbreviated version of the USPTO patent document. The patent badge covers the following: Patent number, Date patent was issued, Date patent was filed, Title of the patent, Applicant, Inventor, Assignee, Attorney firm, Primary examiner, Assistant examiner, CPCs, and Abstract. The patent badge does contain a link to the full patent document (in Adobe Acrobat format, aka pdf). To download or print any patent click here.
Patent No.:
Date of Patent:
Sep. 27, 2016
Filed:
Oct. 13, 2014
Norwich University Applied Research Institutes, Northfield, VT (US);
Eric W. Braman, Northfield, VT (US);
Andrew W. Cutts, Henniker, NH (US);
Michael Geilich, Cornish, NH (US);
Dennis McGrath, Hartland, VT (US);
Eric Richardson, Norwich, VT (US);
Jeffrey A. Schmidt, Chicago, IL (US);
Robert Schmidt, Princeton, NJ (US);
Thomas Bernhardt, Logan, UT (US);
Norwich University Applied Research Institutes, Northfield, VT (US);
Abstract
Methods and apparatus for simulating risk tolerance and associated adversary costs in a distributed business process are disclosed. The methods and apparatus simulate an interdependent business process, such as a financial transaction system, in a secure distributed manner. Each business entity that is part of the interdependent business process models itself on a local client device at any chosen level of detail. A simulation server connects the separate client based simulations into one large simulation. Details of each local simulation may be hidden from other simulation participants. However, interruptions in business flow caused by simulated disruptions introduced at the simulation server and/or a client device are propagated to all of the effected simulation participants via the simulation server. In addition, the simulation server receives inputs from users indicative of risk tolerance levels and associated response actions. If the operational costs imposed by a selected response action are greater than a deterrence threshold associated with a particular adversary, the adversary is not deterred from causing a certain disruption to the simulated competitive market environment. If the operational costs imposed by a selected response action are greater than the deterrence threshold the adversary is deterred.