Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute

Yong-Je Choi

Doo Ho Choi

Ju Han Kim

You Sung Kang

Kyunghee Oh

Taesung Kim

Dae-Won Kim

Byeong-Cheol Choi

Dong-Wook Kang

Seung Kwang Lee

Sang-Su Lee

Cheol Sig Pyo

Jong-Suk Chae

Tae Il Kim

Kyo Il Chung

Ho Won Kim

Ik-Kyun Kim

Hyun Ju Cho

Heyung Sub Lee

Jeong Nyeo Kim

Sang Yeoun Lee

Hyunseok Kim

Jae-Young Jung

Dong-Beom Shin

Yang-Seo Choi

Jin-Yong Lee

Kyung Hee Oh

Disclosed herein are an apparatus for analyzing non-informative firmware and a method using the apparatus. The method includes detecting a target instruction for firmware analysis in a memory map in non-informative firmware, generating an analysis list based on memory map information corresponding to the target instruction, and generating a visualized analysis result corresponding to the firmware by grouping the entries of the analysis list by preset reference bytes.

Apparatus for analyzing non-informative firmware and method using the same

Disclosed herein are an apparatus and method for detecting violation of control flow integrity. The apparatus includes memory for storing a program and a processor for executing the program, wherein the processor multiple branch identifier registers to which identifiers of branch targets are written, a set branch identifier instruction configured to command an identifier of a branch target to be written to a branch identifier register at a predetermined sequence number, among the multiple branch identifier registers, and a check branch identifier instruction configured to command a signal indicating detection of a control flow hijacking attack to be issued based on whether a value written to the branch identifier register at the predetermined sequence number is identical to a value of an identifier of a branch target at the predetermined sequence number, wherein the program detects whether a control flow is hijacked based on the multiple branch identifier registers.

Apparatus and method for detecting violation of control flow integrity

A side channel analysis apparatus based on a profile includes a waveform collection unit configured to collect leaked information from a target device of a side channel analysis; and a preprocessing unit configured to preprocess a waveform data correspond to the leaked information collected from the waveform collection unit before analyzing same. Further, the side channel analysis apparatus includes an analysis unit configured to analyze the waveform data preprocessed in the preprocessing unit; and a profile configuration unit configured to make each process of the waveform collection unit, the preprocessing unit, and the analysis unit into a process and configure a profile for managing each process by connection of each process.

Side-channel analysis apparatus and method based on profile

In accordance with an embodiment, the logical exclusive operation on the random number RAND and the OPc value are performed several times, the logical operation and encryption processing using a random number RAND and logical operation and encryption processing using a random number S are done in any order, which brings an increase of an attack complexity as to whether to calculate the correlation coefficient from the power consumption waveform at any point when analyzing the correlation power, whereby it is possible to defend the CPA attack effectively.

Block encryption method and apparatus

A communication data protection method based on symmetric key encryption, and an apparatus for enabling the method are provided. A communication data protection method using a Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) reader, the method including: receiving, from a tag, tag information including security parameter information and an encrypted Unique Item Identifier (UII); extracting the UII based on the security parameter information; transmitting, to the tag, a request message including a challenge value for replay prevention; and performing a tag authentication by receiving, from the tag, a response message including a handle and the challenge value.

Communication data protection method based on symmetric key encryption in RFID system, and apparatus for enabling the method

A masking addition operation apparatus for prevention of a side channel attack, includes a random value generation unit generating a first random value for a first input, second random value for a second input, and a summation random value. The masking addition operation apparatus includes an operation part performing an operation on the first and second random values, a previous carry input, and first and second masked random values generated based on the first and second random values. The masking addition operation apparatus includes a carry generator generating a carry input using a result of the operation part; and a summation bit generator generating a summation bit using the summation random value, the first and second random values, the previous carry input and the first and second masked random values.

Masking addition operation device for prevention of side channel attack

A masking operation method for a symmetric key encryption system includes, when at least two Substitution-boxes (S-boxes) are input, generating a masking S-box table for one S-box which was input; and performing an operation on one masking S-box by referring to the generated masking S-box table. Further, the masking operation method for the symmetric key encryption system includes performing an operation on a remaining masking S-box for a remaining S-box, which was input, by referring to the masking S-box table.

Masking operation method and device for symmetric key encrypted system

An apparatus for processing an F-function in a SEED encryption system includes: an arithmetic operation masking conversion unit for converting a logical operation mask value obtained by performing a logical operation of a SEED F-function input value and a random mask value into an arithmetic operation mask value; and a masking G-function unit for taking the arithmetic operation mask value from the arithmetic operation masking conversion unit as an input and producing an arithmetic operation output.

Method and apparatus for processing F-function in seed encryption system

Disclosed are a radio frequency identification (RFID) security apparatus and a method thereof. According to the RFID security method, a secure tag reader performs determining an AES key using security information received from a secure tag and generating an output key using the determined AES key, decrypting AES data received from the secure tag using the output key, and encrypting data to be transmitted to the secure tag using the output key and transmitting the data, and a secure tag performs generating an output key using an AES key and security information, and transmitting the security information to a secure tag reader, encrypting data to be transmitted to the secure tag reader using the output key, and transmitting the encrypted data to the secure tag reader, and decrypting data received from the secure tag reader using the output key.

Radio frequency identification (RFID) security apparatus having security function and method thereof

Disclosed is a method for implementing a symmetric key encryption algorithm against power analysis attacks, including: generating and storing an affine transform table; generating and storing a masked inversion table; and operating a masked S-box using the affine transform table and the masked inversion table.

Method for implementing symmetric key encryption algorithm against power analysis attacks

Provided are a secure device and method for preventing a side channel attack. The secure device includes a secure module converting plaintext data received from the outside into ciphertext data to thereby store the converted ciphertext data, or converting stored ciphertext data into plaintext data to thereby output the converted plaintext data, and a side channel attack sensing module sensing a side channel attack upon the secure module, and, according to the sensing result, allowing the secure module to stop operating, inducing malfunctions of the secure module, delaying operations of the secure module, or making the secure module a device having the secure module disabled. The secure device can safely protect an internal security algorithm and data from the side channel attack.

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Daejeon, South Korea

Yong-Je Choi