Cisco Technology, Inc.

Nds Corporation

Yigal Shapiro

Reuven Elbaum

Yonatan Shlomovich

Zvi Shkedy

Lior Amarilio

Uri Bear

Itsik Mantin

Yaacov Belenky

Steve Epstein

Chaim Shen-Orr

Stephanie Wald

Reuben Sumner

Yaakov (Jordan) Levy

Chaim D Shen-Orr

Yaakov Belenky

Yaakov Levy

Eli Hibshoosh

A method for data transfer includes receiving a control signal triggering a transfer of a secret value into an element () of a circuit (). In response to the control signal, a dummy value () and the secret value are inserted in succession into the element of the circuit.

Preventing data extraction by side-channel attack

An electronic device () includes an array () of memory cells, which are configured to store data values. One or more sense amplifiers () have respective inputs for receiving signals from the memory cells and are configured to output the data values corresponding to the received signals. Switching circuitry () is coupled between the array of the memory cells and the sense amplifiers and is configured to receive an indication of a temporal pattern and to route the signals from the memory cells among the inputs of the sense amplifiers in accordance with the temporal pattern.

Preventing unauthorized data extraction

A method for hindering detection of information unintentionally leaked from a secret held in a memory unit is described, the method including receiving a triggering event waiting for at least a first amount of time to pass after the receipt of the triggering event, the memory unit being in a non-operational state during the at least a first amount of time after the at least a first amount of time has passed, changing at least one first condition under which the memory unit operates, thereby causing the memory unit to enter an operational state, waiting for a second amount of time to pass after the changing at least one first condition, and changing, after the second amount of time, at least one second condition under which the memory unit operates, thereby causing the memory unit to enter the non-operational state, wherein access to the secret information is enabled only during the second amount of time, and detection of secret information unintentionally leaked is limited during the first amount of time. Related apparatus and methods are also described.

Security within integrated circuits

An integrated circuit device () includes a plurality of memory cells (), which are configured to store data. Multiple P-N junctions () are arranged so that a single, respective P-N junction is disposed in proximity to each memory cell and is configured to emit optical radiation during readout from the memory cell with a wavelength matching an emission wavelength of the memory cell.

Protection of stored data using optical emitting elements

Circuitry for protection of an integrated circuit () which includes operational-circuits () formed on a chip (). The circuitry includes a plurality of detectors (), integrally formed on the chip as part of the integrated circuit and dispersed among the operational-circuits on the chip. The detectors are adapted, in response to radiation incident on the chip, to trigger a security measure so as to prevent tampering with the integrated circuit.

Prevention of tampering in electronic devices

Growing community of inventors

Zichron Yaakov, Israel

Yigal Shapiro