Qualcomm Incorporated

Yavuz Yapici

Tao Luo

Junyi Li

Igor Gutman

Narayan Prasad

Navid Abedini

Tianyang Bai

Jianghong Luo

Danlu Zhang

Mohammad Ali Tassoudji

Giridhar Dhati Mandyam

Yu-Chin Ou

Methods, systems, and devices for wireless communication are described. A first wireless communication device may set parameter(s) corresponding to column(s) of a reconfigurable intelligent surface (RIS) based on a periodic coding sequence. Based on the parameter(s), the first wireless communication device may transmit a first signal to a second wireless communication device in a first direction using a first harmonic frequency, and may transmit a second signal to a third wireless communication device in a second direction using a second harmonic frequency. The second wireless communication device may decode the first signal based on the periodic coding sequence and the first harmonic frequency, and the third wireless communication device may decode the second signal based on periodic coding sequence and the second harmonic frequency. The first wireless communication device may similarly set second parameter(s) of the RIS based on a second periodic coding sequence.

Harmonic division multiplexing for reconfigurable intelligent surfaces

Various aspects of the present disclosure generally relate to wireless communication. In some aspects, a network node may identify a freshness window for a system information block and a signature that corresponds to the system information block, the freshness window having a duration that is less than a duration of a modification period for the system information block. The network node may transmit the system information block and the signature within the freshness window. Numerous other aspects are described.

Freshness window for system information block and signature

Aspects of an apparatus for wireless communication are disclosed for collaboratively assisting a network entity to manage security at the physical (PHY) layer. A user equipment (UE) may transmit a report indicating an unauthorized network node and associated information. In response, the UE may receive from the network entity a message indicating a security measure to be applied for communications between the UE and authorized network nodes. The message may be also received in response to another report from an authorized node that includes further information about the unauthorized node. In other aspects, the network entity may receive the report from the UE and transmit the message indicating the security measure.

Network response against malicious nodes

Methods, systems, and devices for wireless communications are described. A user equipment (UE) and network entity may determine a physical layer (PHY) signature for the network entity to include in one or more wake-up signals (WUSs) transmitted to the UE. The UE may use the determined PHY signature to validate a WUS received during a monitoring occasion. For example, the UE may compare a PHY signature of the received WUS to the determined PHY signature. If the PHY signature of the received WUS matches the determined PHY signature, the UE may wake up in accordance with the WUS. If the PHY signature of the received WUS does not match the determined PHY signature, the UE may remain in a sleep mode. The UE may transmit an indication of an adversarial attack based on the received WUS not including the determined PHY signature or including a different PHY signature.

Physical layer signature for wake-up signals

Methods, systems, and devices for wireless communications are described for security enhancement of physical layer communications through scrambling of transmissions using a hybrid seed to generate a scrambling sequence. The hybrid seed may be determined as a function of a measured channel characteristic of a channel between a user equipment (UE) and network entity, and channel reciprocity may be used to provide that measurements at the UE and the network entity produce the same or similar measured channel characteristics. A hybrid seed may be shared with multiple UEs, in some cases, using unique characteristics of a channel between each UE and the network entity.

Channel scrambling techniques in wireless communications

Methods, systems, and devices for wireless communication are described. In some systems, a second network entity (e.g., a transmitting device) may transmit first signaling to a second network entity (e.g., a receiving device) to indicate one or more frequency domain residual sideband (FDRSB) parameters associated with the second network entity. The FDRSB parameters may be associated with an imbalance between an in-phase component and a quadrature phase component of the first signaling. The second network entity may generate and transmit second signaling that is configured to have the one or more FDRSB characteristics. The first network entity may determine whether the second network entity is a source of the second signaling based on the one or more FDRSB characteristics of the second signaling and the one or more FDRSB parameters indicated by the first signaling.

Communication security based on frequency domain residual sideband characteristics

Systems and techniques are provided for performing wireless communications. In some aspects, a user equipment (UE) may receive from a first wireless node via a first channel, a first transmission comprising a first artificial noise (AN) signal combined with a first data signal, wherein the first AN signal is generated based on channel state information (CSI) of the first channel. The UE may receive, from a second wireless node via a second channel, a second transmission comprising a second AN signal combined with a second data signal, wherein the second AN signal is generated based on CSI of the second channel and is different from the first AN signal. The UE can determine a data message based on the first transmission and the second transmission.

Multi-transmission artificial noise (AN) cancellation

Aspects of the disclosure are directed to an apparatus configured for wireless communication. In certain aspects, the apparatus is configured to obtain, from a network node, a first codeword indicating a first incident direction of a first beam and a first reflected direction of a second beam, the first codeword being one of at least one codeword of a stage-1 codebook. In certain aspects, the apparatus is configured to obtain, from the network node, a second codeword of a stage-2 codebook, the stage-2 codebook being associated with the first codeword, the second codeword indicating a parameter of the second beam. In certain aspects, the apparatus is configured to update the second beam according to the parameter indicated by the second codeword.

Multiple access point (AP) association

A first network node may transmit a first indication of a PHY signature pool including a plurality of PHY signatures to a second network node. The first network node may select at least one PHY signature from the plurality of PHY signatures. The first network node may transmit a second indication of the selected at least one PHY signature to the second network node. The first network node may transmit at least one message to the second network node based on the selected at least one PHY signature. The second network node may demodulate the at least one message based on the at least one PHY signature.

Index modulation for PHY signature selection

A network node may identify at least one adversarial device. The network node may transmit a fake configuration to the at least one adversarial device. The fake configuration may be associated with a PHY technique. The fake configuration may be transmitted to the at least one adversarial device based on a location of the at least one adversarial device. The at least one adversarial device may be identified based on non-possession by the at least one adversarial device of any valid credential. The network node may transmit a correct configuration to a genuine receiving device. The network node may transmit the fake configuration and the correct configuration in parallel or based on time division multiplexing. Accordingly, security of the overall system may be improved as the adversarial device may waste time and power performing algorithmic operations based on the fake configuration.

Intentionally fake configuration transmission

A network entity (e.g., a base station) may transmit, for a network node (e.g., a RIS), a RIS pattern configuration. The network entity may transmit, for the network node, a diode bias voltage configuration for a plurality of diodes or a plurality of RIS elements of the network node. The diode bias voltage configuration may be associated with the RIS pattern configuration. The network node may forward at least one transmission from a first device to a second device via the network node in one of an uplink, a downlink, or a sidelink based on the RIS pattern configuration and the diode bias voltage configuration.

Optimizing bias voltages in RIS aided communications

Methods, systems, and devices for wireless communications are described. Disclosed techniques provide for reliable and secure sharing of configuration parameters over physical layer reference signals. A first network node may transmit a first signal conveying a first phase to a second network node. The second network node may transmit a second signal conveying a second phase, the second phase based on the first phase and an authentication parameter common to the first and second network nodes. The first network node may determine that the second phase is based on the first phase and the authentication parameter. Based on determining that the second phase is based on the authentication parameter, the first network node may transmit a third signal conveying a third phase to the second network node, the third phase indicating a signature parameter. The first network node and the second network node may communicate based on the signature parameter.

Secure configuration sharing over reference signals

Systems and techniques are described herein for mutual authentication in wireless communication. For example, a process may include: transmitting separate authentication requests using separate MIMO channels between network nodes; transmitting an authentication proof from one network node to another; receiving configuration requests based on successful authentication of one network node by the other over the respective MIMO paths; authenticating the configuration requests; and transmitting separate configuration responses via the separate MIMO paths based on the authentication.

Mutual authentication for communications using multiple-input and multiple-output (MIMO) signals

Methods, systems, and devices for wireless communications are described. A network entity may apply pseudo-noise signals to repetitions of a first signal to obtain a set of second signals and transmit each of the set of second signals to a user equipment (UE) during a respective set of different time intervals. Each of the pseudo-noise signals may be associated with a gain and phase parameter, and may be based on a channel state information (CSI) associated with a channel for communications with the UE over the respective time interval. Each gain parameter may cause a power level of the pseudo-noise signal to be within a defined range, and a gain and phase parameter associated with a pseudo-noise signal applied to a subsequent repetition of the first signal may be based on another gain and phase parameter associated with another phase-noise signal applied to a previous repetition of the first signal.

Power control for transmissions with time-based artificial noise

Methods, systems, and devices for wireless communications are described for physical layer signature feedback to enhance security in wireless communications. A user equipment (UE) and a network entity may apply a physical layer signature, such as an artificial physical layer impairment, to one or more physical layer signals that may be measured to identify a physical layer signature of the associated physical layer signal. The UE, upon receipt of a physical layer signal, may check if the identified signal includes a physical layer signature of a set of valid physical layer signatures. If the received physical layer signature matches a valid physical layer signature, the UE may operate in accordance with procedures associated with the signal. If the received physical layer signature does not match a valid physical layer signature, the UE may transmit a message to the network entity that indicates an unmatched physical layer signature.

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Florham Park, NJ, United States of America

Yavuz Yapici