Qualcomm Incorporated

Xu Guo

David Merrill Jacobson

Brian Marc Rosenberg

Xiaochun Zhu

Yafei Yang

Seung Hyuk Kang

Matthew Michael Nowak

Kangho Lee

Steven Mark Millendorf

Adam J Drew

Liang Cai

Ron Keidar

Steven Douglas Laver

Liangguo Shen

Xinmu Wang

Aydin Aysu

Yau Chu

Steven M Millendorf

Brian M Rosenberg

Brain Marc Rosenberg

An authentication device is provided that authenticates an electronic device based on the responses from distinct types of physically unclonable functions. The authentication device receives a device identifier associated with the electronic device. It then sends one or more challenges to the electronic device. In response, the authentication device receives one or more responses from the electronic device, the one or more responses including characteristic information generated from two or more distinct types of physically unclonable functions in the electronic device.

Applying circuit delay-based physically unclonable functions (PUFs) for masking operation of memory-based PUFs to resist invasive and clone attacks

Techniques for operating a computer system for a vehicle are provided. An example method according to these techniques includes observing usage of at least one component of the computer system by an application to generate an application usage log for the application, deriving behavior vectors from the application usage log, determining whether the application is a distracting application by comparing the behavior vectors to one or more application safety rules, and limiting execution of the application responsive to determining that the application is a distracting application and based on status information associated with the vehicle.

Behavior-based distracting application detection on vehicles

Disclosed is an apparatus and method to securely activate or revoke a key. For example, the apparatus may comprise: a storage device to store a plurality of pre-stored keys; a communication interface to receive an activate key command and a certificate associated with one of the pre-stored keys; and a processor. The processor may be coupled to the storage device and the communication interface and may be configured to: implement the activate key command to reboot the apparatus with the pre-stored key and the certificate; and determine if the reboot is successful.

Computing device to securely activate or revoke a key

One feature pertains to generating a unique identifier for an electronic device by combining static random access memory (SRAM) PUFs and circuit delay based PUFs (e.g., ring oscillator (RO) PUFs, arbiter PUFs, etc.). The circuit delay based PUFs may be used to conceal either a challenge to, and/or response from, the SRAM PUFs, thereby inhibiting an attacker from being able to clone a memory device's response.

One feature pertains to a method for extracting a secret key during a secure boot flow of an integrated circuit. Specifically, the secure boot flow includes powering ON a first volatile memory circuit to generate a plurality of initial logical state values, deriving secret data based on the plurality of initial logical state values, storing the secret data in a secure volatile memory circuit that is secured by a secure execution environment (SEE), clearing the plurality of initial logical state values in the first volatile memory circuit, executing a cryptographic algorithm at the SEE to extract a secret key based on the secret data, and storing the secret key in the secure volatile memory circuit. The secure boot flow controls access to the first volatile memory circuit to secure the secret data and the plurality of initial logical state values from the insecure applications.

Key extraction during secure boot

One feature pertains to a computing device that includes an input interface, a communication interface, and a processing circuit that is adapted to receive a request from an application to authorize an action and generate a dynamic access code associated with the action. The processing circuit also transmits a message to a secondary display device that includes information data associated with the action and the dynamic access code for display on a display of the secondary display device. The processing circuit authorizes the action received from the application if the dynamic access code is entered into the input interface. Multiple, unique dynamic codes may also be associated with different actions the application may make requests for, which are also transmitted to the secondary display device for display.

Apparatuses and methods for secure display on secondary display device

One feature pertains to a near field communication (NFC) target device comprising a memory circuit adapted to store sensitive data, an NFC interface adapted to transmit and receive information using NFC protocols, and a processing circuit. The processing circuit receives a plurality of provider identification (PID) numbers from a plurality of providers, where each PID number is associated with a different provider. The processing circuit also stores the PID numbers at the memory circuit, and assigns a privilege mask to each PID number received and stored. The NFC target device may also include a physical unclonable function (PUF) circuit. The processing circuit may additionally provide one or more PID numbers as input challenges to the PUF circuit, and receive one or more PUF output responses from the PUF circuit, where the PUF output responses are different from one another and are associated with different providers.

Security protocols for unified near field communication infrastructures

A method includes coupling a first magnetic tunnel junction (MTJ) element and a second MTJ element to a comparison circuit. The method also includes comparing, at the comparison circuit, a first resistance of the first MTJ element to a second resistance of the second MTJ element. The method further includes generating a first physical unclonable function (PUF) output bit based on a result of comparing the first resistance to the second resistance.

Magnetic tunnel junction resistance comparison based physical unclonable function

A method is provided for using obtaining a reproducible device identifier from a physically unclonable function. An authentication device may receive a first physically unclonable function (PUF) dataset from the electronic device, the first PUF dataset including characteristic information generated from a physically unclonable function in the electronic device. The authentication device may then identify a pre-stored PUF dataset corresponding to the electronic device. Authentication of the electronic device may be performed by correlating the pre-stored PUF dataset and the first PUF dataset for the electronic device, wherein such correlation is based on a pattern or distribution correlation the pre-stored PUF dataset and the first PUF dataset. Because such correlation is performed on datasets, and not individual points, systematic variations can be recognized by the correlation operation leading to higher correlation than point-by-point comparisons.

Physically unclonable function pattern matching for device identification

A method and apparatus are provided for generating a unique identifier. One or more tests are performed over one or more data-dependent circuit paths for one or more circuits. The one or more tests are then repeated over the one or more data-dependent circuit paths for the one or more circuits while adjusting an operating frequency and/or operating voltage for each of the one or more circuits. A threshold frequency and/or threshold voltage is ascertained for each of the one or more data-dependent circuit paths. An identifier may then be generated based on a plurality of the threshold frequencies and/or threshold voltages ascertained for the one or more data-dependent circuit paths.

Unique and unclonable platform identifiers using data-dependent circuit path responses

One feature pertains to a method of implementing a physically unclonable function. The method includes initializing an array of magnetoresistive random-access memory (MRAM) cells to a first logical state, where each of the MRAM cells have a random transition voltage that is greater than a first voltage and less than a second voltage. The transition voltage represents a voltage level that causes the MRAM cells to transition from the first logical state to a second logical state. The method further includes applying a programming signal voltage to each of the MRAM cells of the array to cause at least a portion of the MRAM cells of the array to randomly change state from the first logical state to the second logical state, where the programming signal voltage is greater than the first voltage and less than the second voltage.

Physically unclonable function based on programming voltage of magnetoresistive random-access memory

One feature pertains to a method of implementing a physically unclonable function that includes providing an array of metal-insulator-metal (MIM) devices, where the MIM devices are configured to represent a first resistance state or a second resistance state and a plurality of the MIM devices are initially at the first resistance state. The MIM devices have a random breakdown voltage that is greater than a first voltage and less than a second voltage, where the breakdown voltage represents a voltage that causes the MIM devices to transition from the first resistance state to the second resistance state. The method further includes applying a signal line voltage to the MIM devices to cause a portion of the MIM devices to randomly breakdown and transition from the first resistance state to the second resistance state, the signal line voltage greater than the first voltage and less than the second voltage.

Physically unclonable function based on breakdown voltage of metal-insulator-metal device

One feature pertains to a method for implementing a physically unclonable function (PUF). The method includes providing an array of magnetoresistive random access memory (MRAM) cells, where the MRAM cells are each configured to represent one of a first logical state and a second logical state. The array of MRAM cells are un-annealed and free from exposure to an external magnetic field oriented in a direction configured to initialize the MRAM cells to a single logical state of the first and second logical states. Consequently, each MRAM cell has a random initial logical state of the first and second logical states. The method further includes sending a challenge to the MRAM cell array that reads logical states of select MRAM cells of the array, and obtaining a response to the challenge from the MRAM cell array that includes the logical states of the selected MRAM cells of the array.

Physically unclonable function based on the initial logical state of magnetoresistive random-access memory

One feature pertains to a method of implementing a physically unclonable function (PUF). The method includes exposing an array of magnetoresistive random access memory (MRAM) cells to an orthogonal external magnetic field. The MRAM cells are each configured to represent one of a first logical state and a second logical state, and the orthogonal external magnetic field is oriented in an orthogonal direction to an easy axis of a free layer of the MRAM cells to place the MRAM cells in a neutral logical state that is not the first logical state or the second logical state. The method further includes removing the orthogonal external magnetic field to place each of the MRAM cells of the array randomly in either the first logical state or the second logical state.

Physically unclonable function based on the random logical state of magnetoresistive random-access memory

One feature pertains to an integrated circuit (IC) that includes a first plurality of ring oscillators configured to implement, in part, a physically unclonable function (PUF). The IC further includes a second plurality of ring oscillators configured to implement, in part, an age sensor circuit, and also a ring oscillator selection circuit that is coupled to the first plurality of ring oscillators and the second plurality of ring oscillators. The ring oscillator selection circuit is adapted to select at least two ring oscillator outputs from at least one of the first plurality of ring oscillators and/or the second plurality of ring oscillators. Notably, the ring oscillator selection circuit is commonly shared by the PUF and the age sensor circuit. Also, the IC may further include an output function circuit adapted to receive and compare the two ring oscillator outputs and generate an output signal.

Growing community of inventors

San Diego, CA, United States of America

Xu Guo