Intel Corporation

Xiaozhu Kang

David M Durham

Prashant Dewan

Siddhartha Chhabra

Uday R Savagaonkar

Karanvir S Grewal

Jason Martin

Alpa T Narendra Trivedi

Balaji Vembu

Scott R Janus

Men Long

Uttam K Sengupta

Michael A Goldsmith

Paul S Schmitz

Ravi L Sahita

Carlos V Rozas

Francis X Mckeen

Vincent R Scarlata

Geoffrey S Strongin

Xiaoning Li

Alpa Narendra Trivedi

Xiaoyu Ruan

Biju George

Ken Lueh

Dewan Prashant

Alpha T Narendra Trivedi

Ghayathri V Garudapuram

Ling Huang

Alpha Narendra Trivedi

Generally, this disclosure provides systems, devices, methods and computer readable media for virtualization-based intra-block workload isolation. The system may include a virtual machine manager (VMM) module to create a secure virtualization environment or sandbox. The system may also include a processor block to load data into a first region of the sandbox and to generate a workload package based on the data. The workload package is stored in a second region of the sandbox. The system may further include an operational block to fetch and execute instructions from the workload package.

Virtualization based intra-block workload isolation

Embodiments of an invention for an interface between a device and a secure processing environment are disclosed. In one embodiment, a system includes a processor, a device, and an interface plug-in. The processor includes an instruction unit and an execution unit. The instruction unit is to receive an instruction to create a secure processing environment. The execution unit is to execute an application in the secure processing environment. The device is to execute a workload for the application. The interface plug-in is to provide an interface for the device to enter the secure processing environment to execute the workload.

Interface between a device and a secure processing environment

Various embodiments are generally directed an apparatus and method for processing an encrypted graphic with a decryption key associated with a depth order policy including a depth position of a display scene, generating a graphic from the encrypted graphic when the encrypted graphic is successfully decrypted using the decryption key and assigning the graphic to a plane at the depth position of the display scene when the encrypted graphic is successfully decrypted.

Techniques for enforcing a depth order policy for graphics in a display scene

The entry/exit architecture may be a critical component of a protection framework using a secure enclaves-like trust framework for coprocessors. The entry/exit architecture describes steps that may be used to switch securely into a trusted execution environment (entry architecture) and out of the trusted execution environment (exit architecture), at the same time preventing any secure information from leaking to an untrusted environment.

Entry/exit architecture for protected device modules

In accordance with some embodiments, a protected execution environment may be defined for a graphics processing unit. This framework not only protects the workloads from malware running on the graphics processing unit but also protects those workloads from malware running on the central processing unit. In addition, the trust framework may facilitate proof of secure execution by measuring the code and data structures used to execute the workload. If a part of the trusted computing base of this framework or protected execution environment is compromised, that part can be patched remotely and the patching can be proven remotely throughout attestation in some embodiments.

Secure environment for graphics processing units

Technologies for secure input and display of a virtual touch user interface include a computing device having a security monitor that may protect memory regions from being accessed by untrusted code. The security monitor may use hardware virtualization features such as extended page tables or directed I/O to protect the memory regions. A protected touch filter driver intercepts requests for touch input and allocates a transfer buffer. The transfer buffer is protected by the security monitor. A touch screen controller may write touch input data into the protected transfer buffer. The touch input data may be shared by the touch filter driver with authorized applications through a protected communication channel. A graphical virtual user interface may be generated by trusted code and rendered into a hardware overlay surface. The user interface may include a virtual keyboard. The security monitor may protect the overlay surface. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Technologies for secure input and display of virtual touch user interfaces

Systems and methods for secure delivery of output surface bitmaps to a display engine. An example processing system comprises: an architecturally protected memory; and a processing core communicatively coupled to the architecturally protected memory, the processing core comprising a processing logic configured to implement an architecturally-protected execution environment by performing at least one of: executing instructions residing in the architecturally protected memory and preventing an unauthorized access to the architecturally protected memory; wherein the processing logic is further configured to provide a secure video output path by generating an output surface bitmap encrypted with a first encryption key and storing an encrypted first encryption key in an external memory, wherein the encrypted first encryption key is produced by encrypting the first encryption key with a second encryption key.

Secure video ouput path

An apparatus and method for preserving image privacy when manipulated by cloud services includes middleware for receiving an original image, splitting the original image into two sub-images, where the RGB pixel values of the sub-images have a bit value that is less than RGB pixel values of the original image. The sub-images are encrypted by adding a keystream to the RGB pixel values of the sub-images. The sub-image data is transmitted to a cloud service such as a social network or photo-sharing site, which manipulate the images by resizing, cropping, filtering, or the like. The sub-image data is received by the middleware and is successfully decrypted irrespective of the manipulations performed by the cloud services. In an alternative embodiment, the blocks of the original image are permutated when encrypted, and then reverse-permutated when decrypted.

Preserving image privacy when manipulated by cloud services

Various embodiments are directed to a heterogeneous processor architecture comprised of a CPU and a GPU on the same processor die. The heterogeneous processor architecture may optimize source code in a GPU compiler using vector strip mining to reduce instructions of arbitrary vector lengths into GPU supported vector lengths and loop peeling. It may be first determined that the source code is eligible for optimization if more than one machine code instruction of compiled source code under-utilizes GPU instruction bandwidth limitations. The initial vector strip mining results may be discarded and the first iteration of the inner loop body may be peeled out of the loop. The type of operands in the source code may be lowered and the peeled out inner loop body of source code may be vector strip mined again to obtain optimized source code.

Efficient implementation of RSA using GPU/CPU architecture

An automated method for authenticating a proving device to a verifying device involves an elliptic curve formula (ECF) for a predetermined elliptic curve associated with a proving device. According to one example method, the prover sends the verifier a message containing a first proof value (P2). The verifier determines whether P2 is a point on the elliptic curve associated with the proving device. If P2 is not on the elliptic curve, the verifier may determine that the proving device should not be trusted. The message may further comprise a second proof value (K1), and the verifier may automatically determine whether K1 corresponds to P1, based on a previous point (P0) on the elliptic curve. If K1 does not correspond to P1, the verifier may determine that the proving device should not be trusted. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Methods and apparatus for device authentication with one-time credentials

A device and method for securely rendering content on a gesture-enabled computing device includes initializing a secure execution environment on a processor graphics of the computing device. The computing device transfers view rendering code and associated state data to the secure execution environment. An initial view of the content is rendered by executing the view rendering code in the secure execution environment. A gesture is recognized, and an updated view of the content is rendered in the secure execution environment in response to the gesture. The gesture may include a touch gesture recognized on a touch screen, or a physical gesture of the user recognized by a camera. After the updated view of the content is rendered, the main processor of the computing device may receive updated view data from the secure execution environment.

Device and method for secure user interface gesture processing using processor graphics

Cryptographic access control of multimedia video is presented. A method includes generating as metadata an access control policy (ACP) associated with video, the ACP including authorization rules and cryptographic information associated with an encryption policy; encrypting the video according to the encryption policy; and encoding the encrypted video with the authorization rules and the cryptographic information, which may be used to decrypt and render the encoded video. As an example, an authorized receiver device having credentials and/or capabilities matched to the authorization rules may extract the ACP information from the encrypted video and use it to decrypt and properly render the video. The method may further include visually encoding the encrypted video with at least portions of the authorization rules and the cryptographic information, such that the visually encoded video is renderable as the video by an authorized device, but is renderable as visually unintelligible video by an unauthorized device.

Methods and systems for cryptographic access control of video

A password-less method for authenticating a user includes capturing one or more images of a face of the user and comparing the one or more images with a previously collected face template. Randomly selected colored light and randomized blinking patterns are used to capture the images of the user. Such captured images are compared to previously collected face templates, thereby thwarting spoof attacks. A secret image, known only to the user and the device, is moved from one area of the display to another randomly selected area, using the movements of the user's head or face, thereby providing a Turing based challenge. Protected audio video path (PAVP) enabled devices and components are used to protect the challenge from malware attacks.

Turing test based user authentication and user presence verification system, device, and method

A method and device for securely sharing images across untrusted channels includes downloading an encrypted image from a remote server to a computing device. The encrypted image may be encrypted at the time of uploading by another user. The current user of the computing device is authenticated using a facial recognition procedure. If the current user is authenticated and is determined to be authorized to view the decrypted image, the encrypted image is decrypted and displayed to the user. If the user becomes unauthenticated (e.g., the user leaves the computing device or another user replaces the current user), the encrypted image is displayed in place of the decrypted image such that the decrypted image is displayed only for authorized persons physically present at the computing device.

Growing community of inventors

Fremont, CA, United States of America

Xiaozhu Kang