Apple Inc.

Xiangying Yang

Dawei Zhang

Li Li

Wei Zeng

Haijing Hu

Yuchul Kim

Jerrold Von Hauck

Shu Guo

Huarui Liang

Johnson O Sebeni

Zhu Ji

Yang Li

Fangli Xu

Yuqin Chen

Jean-Marc Padova

Christian W Mucke

Wei Zhang

Arun Godfrey Mathias

Beibei Wang

Jia Tang

Sami M Almalfouh

Tianyan Pu

Lijia Zhang

Christopher Brooke Sharp

Yousuf H Vaid

Haitong Sun

Vijay Venkataraman

David T Haggerty

Li Su

Avinash Narasimhan

Kevin P McLaughlin

Ahmer Ali Khan

Najeeb M Abdulrahiman

Hyewon Lee

Zhibin Wu

Tarik Tabet

Yannick L Sierra

Ralf Rossbach

Sudeep Manithara Vamanan

Samuel David Post

Ben-Heng Juang

Qian Sun

Mona Agnel

Lanpeng Chen

Hao Duo

Martijn T Haring

Yushu Zhang

Chunhai Yao

Krisztian Kiss

Vikram Bhaskara Yerrabommanahalli

Rohan C Malthankar

Raj S Chaugule

Anish Kumar Goyal

Chandiramohan Vasudevan

Elliot S Briggs

Rajeev Verma

Clark P Mueller

Stanley M Mayalil

Robert K Kitchens

Ben Juang

Pinki Gyanchandani

David I Ahn

Chris Sharp

Kevin P Mclaughlin

Kevin Mclaughlin

This application sets forth techniques for authenticating a mobile device with a cellular wireless network without electronic Subscriber Identity Module (eSIM) credentials by using an Extensible Authentication Protocol Transport Layer Security (EAP-TLS) procedure. The mobile device authenticates with an Authentication Server Function (AUSF) of the cellular wireless network using an embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card (eUICC) certificate. Processing circuitry of the mobile wireless device external to the eUICC implements the EAP-TLS procedure and authenticates validity of the AUSF. In some embodiments, the eUICC provides key generation and storage for a session key for communication between the mobile device and the cellular wireless network. In some embodiments, a third-party managed Unified Data Management (UDM) broker authenticates the mobile device based on knowledge of the eUICC certificate and provides a session key to the cellular wireless network for subsequent communication with the mobile device, upon successful authentication of the mobile device.

Mobile device authentication without electronic subscriber identity module (eSIM) credentials

This Application sets forth techniques for managing communication with wireless devices that have been flagged due to certain activity. In particular, the techniques effectively eliminate unnecessary interactions and enable enhanced user feedback when wireless devices that have been flagged are attempting to interact with mobile network operators (MNOs). The techniques can be implemented by a variety of entities to achieve different and efficient results under various scenarios. Such entities can include, for example, i) equipment identity registries that track unique identifiers of wireless devices that have been flagged due to certain activity, ii) MNO servers, such as SM-DP+ servers, and iii) wireless devices. Additionally, individual components within wireless devices can implement the techniques variously, including using issuer security domain root (ISD-R) components, local profile assistants (LPAs), electronic subscriber identity module (eSIM) components, and/or baseband components included in the wireless devices.

Techniques for managing communication with wireless devices flagged for certain activity

Techniques are disclosed relating to authenticating a user with a mobile device. In various embodiments, a mobile device receives a request to provision the mobile device with identification information from an identification document issued by an authority to a user for establishing an identity of the user. In response to the received request, the mobile device issues a request for verification information signed by the authority and usable to verify the identification information. The issued request identifies multiple public keys of the mobile device, each having a respective corresponding private key for generating a signature usable to verify the identification information. The mobile device receives and stores the signed verification information, the signed verification information including the plurality of public keys. In some embodiments, the mobile device receives a request provide, at least, a portion of the identification information and selects one of the private keys to generate a signature.

Multiple-key verification information for mobile device identity document

Techniques for managing logical channel communication for multiple electronic subscriber identity module (eSIM) profiles installed on an embedded universal integrated circuit card (eUICC), including mapping of logical channel identifier values between different logical channel labeling schemes are described herein. In a first scheme, logical channels are identified using logical channel values alone. In a second scheme, logical channels are identified using a combination of eSIM port value and channel values. An interpreter in the eUICC and/or in processing circuitry external to the eUICC can map between the logical channel labeling schemes to allow internal state machines in the eUICC and/or the processing circuitry to use the first scheme for identifying logical channels.

Logical channel management for multiple eSIM profiles

A user equipment (UE) may attempt to access an edge data network. The UE generates a first credential based on a second credential, the second credential generated for a procedure between the UE and a cellular network, generating an identifier corresponding to the first credential, and generates a multi-access edge computing (MEC) authorization parameter. The UE then transmits an application registration request message to a server associated with an edge data network, the application registration request message including an indication of the first credential, the identifier corresponding to the first credential and the first authorization parameter. The UE then receives an authentication accept message or an authentication reject message from the server associated with the edge data network.

User equipment authentication and authorization procedure for edge data network

Embodiments described herein relate to eligibility checking for transfer of one or more electronic subscriber identity modules (eSIMs) between two mobile wireless devices. Eligibility to transfer an eSIM to an eUICC of a target device can depend on whether the eUICC of the target device satisfies certain security requirements for the eSIMs to be transferred. The mobile wireless devices can obtain a transfer eligibility result based on communication with one or more network-based servers that can determine compatibility for eSIM transfer.

Electronic subscriber identity module transfer eligibility checking

The described embodiments set forth techniques for securely transferring a cellular wireless service subscription associated with an electronic subscriber identity module (eSIM) profile from a source wireless device to a target wireless device via communication with servers of a mobile network operator (MNO). An MNO provisioning server encrypts an activation code, used for transfer of the cellular wireless service subscription, with a session key generated based on a one-time-use eUICC public key and a one-time-use server private key. The encrypted activation code is protected from malicious third parties, as only the eUICC of the source wireless device can perform the decryption required by generating an identical session key to recover the activation code. The eUICC of the source wireless device deletes the eSIM profile from the eUICC before providing the activation code to the target wireless device to protect against eSIM profile cloning.

Secure eSIM subscription transfer

Embodiments are presented herein of apparatuses, systems, and methods for a user equipment device (UE) and/or cellular network to resume a connection. To resume the connection, the UE may transmit a fully protected connection resume message, e.g., which may include protection for a resume cause field.

Use of a fully protected connection resume message by a base station (BS) and user equipment device (UE)

Apparatuses, systems, and methods for a wireless device to perform substantially concurrent communications with a next generation network node and a legacy network node. The wireless device may be configured to stablish a first wireless link with a first cell according to a RAT, where the first cell operates in a first system bandwidth and establish a second wireless link with a second cell according to a RAT, where the second cell operates in a second system bandwidth. Further, the wireless device may be configured to perform uplink activity for both the first RAT and the second RAT by TDM uplink data for the first RAT and uplink data for the second RAT if uplink activity is scheduled according to both the first RAT and the second RAT.

TDM transmission for inter-RAT dual connectivity UE

A downlink control information (DCI), such as a blanking DCI (bDCI) message may be transmitted by a base station (e.g., eNB) and received by a mobile device (e.g., UE). The bDCI may indicate that the eNB will not transmit a subsequent DCI to the UE for a duration of time. The UE may be in continuous reception mode or connected discontinuous reception (C-DRX) mode. The UE may therefore determine to enter a sleep state or take other action. The bDCI may specify an explicit blanking duration, or an index indicating a blanking duration from a lookup table, and/or the blanking duration (and/or a blanking duration offset value) may be determined in advance, e.g., semi-statically. When the UE is in C-DRX mode, the UE may be configured such that either the sleep/wake period of the C-DRX mode or the blanking period of the bDCI may take precedence over the other.

Control channel for UE power saving

Apparatuses, systems, and methods for application function (AF) key generation and AF key renewal. A user equipment device (UE) may communicate with an application function (AF) via a radio access network (RAN) using a first AF key and determine that the first AF key has expired. The UE may derive a second AF key based on at least an Architecture for Authentication and Key Management for Applications (AKMA) anchor key (KAKMA) and a counter parameter and communicate with the AF via the RAN using the second AF key. At least one of the UE, the AF, and/or an AKMA Anchor Function (AAnF) may be configured to monitor expiration of the first AF key based on an associated lifetime of the first AF key. The first and second AF keys may be derived using a key derivation function that includes at least one variable parameter.

Application function key derivation and refresh

Techniques discussed herein can facilitate improved security establishment procedures for Vehicle to Everything (V2X) direct connections. Various embodiments are employable at or comprise User Equipment, and can initiate and/or receive V2X security establishment connections wherein a receiving UE can reject the connection based on the initiating UE's capabilities/policy and/or the initiating UE can make the final decision regarding the connection based at least on receiving security policy and capability information from the receiving UE.

Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) security policy negotiation between peer user equipment (UES)

A mobile network operator (MNO) uses a provisioning server to update or install profile content in a profile or electronic subscriber identity module (eSIM). In an exemplary embodiment, the profile is present on a secure element such as an embedded universal integrated circuit card (eUICC) in a wireless device. One or more MNOs use the provisioning server to perform profile content management on profiles in the eUICC. In some embodiments, an MNO has a trust relationship with the provisioning server. In some other embodiments, the MNO does not have a trust relationship with the provisioning server and protects payload targeted for an MNO-associated profile using an over the air (OTA) key.

Embedded universal integrated circuit card (eUICC) profile content management

Growing community of inventors

Cupertino, CA, United States of America

Xiangying Yang