Cisco Technology, Inc.

William Michael Hudson, Jr

David A McGrew

Blake Harrell Anderson

Christopher Edwin Pearce

Subharthi Paul

Denise G Caballero-McCann

Stephen Levy

Daniel P Linton

Carleton Moon Luck, Jr

Louis L Pratt

Philip Ryan Perricone

David Delano Ward

Eric Albin Voit

Jakob Heitz

Chris A Shenefiel

Steven Joseph Rich

John D White

David Mcgrew

According to certain embodiments, a method comprises monitoring a request for use of memory requested by a container manager application on behalf of a given one of a plurality of containers during runtime of the given container. The method further comprises determining that the request for use of memory has caused an exception. The exception indicates that the request has requested an invalid operation on a memory table or that the request has requested a previously not seen memory table. In response, the method further comprises determining an action to perform. The action depends on both first trustworthiness information associated with the given container and second trustworthiness information associated with the given container. The first trustworthiness information is obtained from a Third Party Reputation Service (TPRS). The second trustworthiness information is obtained based on monitoring the runtime behavior of the given container.

Runtime container protection

In one embodiment, a device in a network observes traffic between a client and a server for an encrypted session. The device makes a determination that a server certificate should be obtained from the server. The device, based on the determination, sends a handshake probe to the server. The device extracts server certificate information from a handshake response from the server that the server sent in response to the handshake probe. The device uses the extracted server certificate information to analyze the traffic between the client and the server.

Semi-active probing framework to gather threat intelligence for encrypted traffic and learn about devices

A verifier peer system transmits a request to an application of another peer system to obtain integrity data of the application. In response to the request, the verifier peer system obtains a response that includes kernel secure boot metrics of the other peer system and integrity data of the application and of any application dependencies. If the verifier peer system determines that the response is valid, the verifier peer system evaluates the integrity data and the kernel secure boot metrics against a set of Known Good Values to determine whether the integrity data and the kernel secure boot metrics are valid. If the integrity data and the kernel secure boot metrics are valid, the verifier peer system determines that the other peer system is trustworthy.

Attestation-based route reflector

A method to be executed in a session initiation protocol (SIP) environment is provided that includes initiating a conversion process that involves a change from a first communications platform to a second communications platform. One or more routing tables associated with the first communications platform are then dumped. A conversion script is executed such that one or more patterns associated with a dial plan corresponding to the second communications platform are provided in a dial plan format. One or more files associated with the dial plan are loaded into one or more endpoints that are designated to change to the second communications platform.

System and method for providing a dial plan conversion in a session initiation protocol (SIP) environment

Bubble tower

Growing community of inventors

Cary, NC, United States of America

William Michael Hudson, Jr