Emc Corporation

Capital One Services, LLC

Emc IP Holding Company LLC

Rsa Security Inc.

Other

William Duane

Kevin Grant Osborn

Srinivasa Chigurupati

Daniel Vernon Bailey

John Gordon Brainard

Yedidya Dotan

Robert S Philpott

Lawrence N Friedman

Michael J O'Malley

Jeffrey Rule

Colin Hart

Paul Y Moreton

Kaitlin J Newman

Daniel Herrington

Wayne David Lutz

Lara Mossler

Todd A Morneau

Ian Prince

James M Ashfield

Gareth Richards

Magnus Nyström

Marco Ciaffi

Eric Anthony Silva

Peter Röstin

Ari Juels

Nikolaos Triandopoulos

Karl Ackerman

Marten Van Dijk

Eric Young

Roy Hodgman

Riaz Zolfonoon

Christopher W Duane

John G Linn

Marten E Van Dijk

Daniel Bailey Vernon

Jeffrey Hamel

Kevin Bowers

John S Harwood

Thomas Earl Linnell

Gregory William Lazar

Derek Lin

John O'Brien

Ronald L Rivest

Dmitri Pal

Samuel Curry

Andrew Nanopoulos

Robert W Griffin

Sean Patrick Doyle

Piers Bowness

Aaron T Katz

Alexander Volanis

Joseph M Pirrotta

James Townsend

Robert Black

Shane D Rice

Markus Jakobsson

Burt Kaliski

Robert S Phipott

Anders Rundgren

Example embodiments of systems and methods for data transmission system between transmitting and receiving devices are provided. In an embodiment, each of the transmitting and receiving devices can contain a master key. The transmitting device can generate a diversified key using the master key, protect a counter value and encrypt data prior to transmitting to the receiving device, which can generate the diversified key based on the master key and can decrypt the data and validate the protected counter value using the diversified key.

Systems and methods for cryptographic authentication of contactless cards

Example embodiments provide systems and methods for increasing the cryptographic strength of an encryption or message-authentication-code-(MAC) generation technique. According to some embodiments, a MAC may be constructed around a shared secret (such as a random initialization number), thereby increasing strength of the MAC against brute force attacks based on the size of the shared secret. The MAC may be combined with randomized data, and may also be encrypted to further bolster the strength of the code. These elements (shared secret, MAC algorithm, and encryption algorithm) may be employed in various combinations and to varying degrees, depending on the application and desired level of security. At each stage, the cryptographic construct operates on the cyptographically modified data from the previous stage. This layering of cryptographic constructs may increase the strength of the group of contrasts more efficiently than applying any one construct with a larger key size or similar increase in complexity.

Systems and methods for amplifying the strength of cryptographic algorithms

Example embodiments of systems and methods for data transmission system between transmitting and receiving devices are provided. In an embodiment, each of the transmitting and receiving devices can contain a master key. The transmitting device can generate a diversified key using the master key, protect a counter value and encrypt data prior to transmitting to the receiving device, which can generate the diversified key based on the master key and can decrypt the data and validate the protected counter value using the diversified key. In an embodiment, the transmitting device can signal an attack or potential attack through the counter value. The attack signaling can further include information relating to the attack or potential attack.

Systems and methods for signaling an attack on contactless cards

Example embodiments provide systems and methods for validating an action using a physical token, such as a near-field-communications (NFC)-capable chip. A server may receive a request to perform the action, and may require validation from the holder of the physical token. The holder of the physical token may log into an application using their log-in credentials, providing a first tier of authentication. The holder may then scan the physical token with a reader on their mobile device, which provides a second tier of authentication. The scan may reveal a value for a counter on the physical token, which may be compared to a counter at the server in order to validate that the physical token has been used as expected. If the server deems it appropriate, a third (or further) tier may be required, such as scanning a photographic identification of the holder.

Systems and methods for cross coupling risk analytics and one-time-passcodes

Example embodiments of systems and methods for data transmission between contactless card and receiving devices are provided. In an embodiment, the contactless card may be configured to create a cryptogram based on a plurality of keys and a counter. The cryptogram may be transmitted to the receiving device. The contactless card may be configured to transmit a one-time password to the client device. The counter value may be adjusted each time the one-time password is generated, and the counter may be configured to increment in a non-monotonic sequence, the sequence associated with one or more cryptographic algorithms.

Example embodiments provide systems and methods for validating an action using a physical token, such as a near-field-communications (NFC)-capable chip. A server may receive a request to perform the action, and may require validation from the holder of the physical token. The holder of the physical token may log into an application using their login credentials, providing a first tier of authentication. The holder may then scan the physical token with a reader on their mobile device, which provides a second tier of authentication. The scan may reveal a value for a counter on the physical token, which may be compared to a counter at the server in order to validate that the physical token has been used as expected. If the server deems it appropriate, a third (or further) tier may be required, such as scanning a photographic identification of the holder.

Growing community of inventors

Westford, MA, United States of America

William Duane