International Business Machines Corporation

Illinois Tool Works Inc.

National Gypsum Properties, LLC

Duramax, Inc.

William C Martin

Donald B Johnson

Stephen M Matyas

John D Wilkins

An V Le

Rostislaw Prymak

William S Rohland

Eli Stav

Eric J Martini

Pierce A Pillon

Matthew E Morris

Matthew J Plante

Mercedita S Whitmire

Maryn L Heermann

Jerald L Glatz

Gene D Rohrer

Maryn Heermann

A nonflammable aerosol cleaning composition is formulated with trans 1,2 dichloroethylene, 1,1,1,2,2,3,4,5,5,5-decafluoropentane, 1,1,1,3,3 pentafluoropropane, HFC-134a, and carbon dioxide. The aerosol cleaning composition is formulated for heavy duty, high pressure, and high output cleaning applications for cleaning aviation parts, such as jet engines located about 10 feet away from a user.

Aerosol cleaning composition

A coalescing additive is used in the manufacturing process for gypsum wallboard. Such an additive increases the surface area and density of the slurry at the paper to core interface by coalescing the foam cells away from the paper core interface. This permits a stronger paper to core bond to form and increases the compressive strength of the gypsum wallboard as compared to standard wallboards made from slurries with reduced water levels.

Gypsum wallboard and method of making same

A photoluminescent safety accessory for attachment to walls, floors, stairs, handrails, ceilings or the like located along emergency egress routes. The accessory is comprised of a nonluminescent material and a photoluminescent material integrally formed with and molecularly bonded to the nonluminescent material, the luminous material becoming illuminated upon the extinguishing of the ambient light. A coextrusion system for integrally extruding the photoluminescent safety accessory is also disclosed.

Photoluminescent emergency egress accessory

A computer apparatus, program and method function in a data processing system to replicate a cryptographic facility. The system includes a first cryptographic facility containing a portable part which personalizes the first cryptographic facility. The system also includes a second cryptographic facility which is linked to the first cryptographic facility by a public key cryptographic system. The portable part of the first cryptographic facility is encrypted and transferred to the second cryptographic facility, where it is decrypted and used to personalize the second cryptographic facility to enable replication of the first cryptographic facility. In one application, personalization of the second cryptographic facility can be in response to the detection of a failure in the first cryptographic facility. In another application, multiple cryptographic facilities can be brought on-line for parallel operation in the data processing system.

Cryptographic facility environment backup/restore and replication in a

A data processing system, method and program are disclosed, for managing a public key cryptographic system. The method includes the steps of generating a first public key and a first private key as a first pair in the data processing system, for use with a first public key algorithm and further generating a second public key and a second private key as a second pair in the data processing system, for use with a second public key algorithm. The method then continues by assigning a private control vector for the first private key and the second private key in the data processing system, for defining permitted uses for the first and second private keys. Then the method continues by forming a private key record which includes the first private key and the second private key in the data processing system, and encrypting the private key record under a first master key expression which is a function of the private control vector. The method then forms a private key token which includes the private control vector and the private key record, and stores the private key token in the data processing system. At a later time, the method receives a first key use request in the data processing system, requiring the first public key algorithm. In response to this, the method continues by accessing the private key token in the data processing system and checking the private control vector to determine if the private key record contains a key having permitted uses which will satisfy the first request. The method then decrypts the private key record under the first master key expression in the data processing system and extracts the first private key from the private key record. The method selects the first public key algorithm in the data processing system for the first key use request and executes the first public key algorithm in the data processing system using the first private key to perform a cryptographic operation to satisfy the first key use request.

Public key cryptosystem key management based on control vectors

Device A in a public key cryptographic network will be constrained to continue to faithfully practice a security policy dictated by a network certification center, long after device A's public key PUMa has been certified. If device A alters its operations from the limits encoded in its configuration vector, for example by loading a new configuration vector, device A will be denied participation in the network. To accomplish this enforcement of the network security policy dictated by the certification center, it is necessary for the certification center to verify at the time device A requests certification of its public key PUMa, that device A is configured with the currently authorized configuration vector. Device A is required to transmit to the certification center a copy of device A's current configuration vector, in an audit record. the certification center then compares device A's copy of the configuration vector with the authorized configuration vector for device A stored at the certification center. If the comparison is satisfactory, then the certification center will issue the requested certificate and will produce a digital signiture dSigPRC on a representation of device A's public key PUMa, using the certification center's private certification key PRC. Thereafter, if device A attempts to change its configuration vector, device A's privacy key PRMa corresponding to the certified public key PUMa, will automatically become unavailable for use in communicating in the network.

Method to establish and enforce a network cryptographic security policy

The patent describes a method and apparatus for securely distributing an initial Data Encryption Algorithm (DEA) key-encrypting key by encrypting a key record (consisting of the key-encrypting key and control information associated with that key-encrypting key) using a public key algorithm and a public key belonging to the intended recipient of the key record. The patent further describes a method and apparatus for securely recovering the distributed key-encrypting key by the recipient by decrypting the received key record using the same public key algorithm and private key associated with the public key and re-encrypting the key-encrypting key under a key formed by arithmetically combining the recipient's master key with a control vector contained in the control information of the received key record. Thus the type and usage attributes assigned by the originator of the key-encrypting key in the form of a control vector are cryptographically coupled to the key-encrypting key such that the recipient may only use the received key-encrypting key in a manner defined by the key originator. The patent further describes a method and apparatus to improve the integrity of the key distribution process by applying a digital signature to the key record and by including identifying information (i.e., an originator identifier) in the control information of the key record. The integrity of the distribution process is enhanced by verifying the digital signature and originator identifier at the recipient node.

Hybrid public key algorithm/data encryption algorithm key distribution

A method and apparatus in a public crypto system, control the use of a public key, based on the level of import integrity for the public key. The method and apparatus generate a control vector associated with the public key, having a history field. The public key and the control vector are transmitted from the location of generation over a communications link to a receiving location, using the selected one of a plurality of levels of import integrity for the transmission. At the receiving location, the public key and the control vector are tested to determine the actual level of import integrity for the transmission. Then, a value is written into the history field of the control vector which characterizes the actual level of import integrity. Thereafter, cryptographic applications for the public key are limited by control vector checking, to only those applications which have a required level of integrity which is not greater than the actual level of import integrity characterized by the history field in the control vector.

Method and apparatus for controlling the use of a public key, based on

The invention includes a control vector checking code respository located either within the same system as the crytographic facility or alternately remotely from the system containing the cryptographic facility. The control vector checking code repository will be linked to the cryptographic facility by one of several means. A first means for linking the repository to the cryptographic facility would include a physically secure data communications link. A second means for connecting the repository to the cryptographic facility would be by using an insecure channel with authentication, wherein either a modification detection code or alternately a message authentication code would be transmitted to the cryptographic facility and then the desired control vector checking code would be transmitted over the link. The cryptographic facility will include a code authorization mechanism to compare the transmitted MAC or MDC with a corresponding value computed from the received control vector checking code. If the two values of the MDC or the MAC compare, then the control vector checking code is authenticated and loaded into the control vector checking unit for carrying out the control vector checking operations desired. The control vector checking code repository can be located in a remote system connected by means of the communications link to the crypto facility, or alternately the repository can reside in the same system as the crypto facility. This provides for the dynamic updating of control vector checking code, where improvements or alterations are made to the control vector checking sequence. This also provides for a reduced memory size in the crypto facility, being sufficiently large to accommodate subsidiary control vector checking applications, with alternate control vector checking applications requiring the reloading of the control vector checking unit from the repository.

Secure key management using programable control vector checking

The present invention employs a method of choosing between the output of two different character recognition systems to improve the rate at which characters are recognized, without significantly increasing the number of undetected substitution errors. If the first recognition system cannot recognize a character, a random probability generator is used to determine whether to use the output of the second recognition system, or alternatively to generate a reject character.

Growing community of inventors

Concord, NC, United States of America

William C Martin