Hewlett-packard Development Company, L.p.

Emc Corporation

State Grid Corporation of China

China Electric Power Research Institute Company Limited

Hewlett-packard Company

Vmware, Inc.

State Grid Shandong Electric Power Research Institute

Beijing Lianshi Networks Technology Co., Ltd.

Wenbo Mao

Jiantao Liu

Jun Li

Liqun Chen

Ziye Yang

Jing Zhou

Haibo Chen

Jianguo Yao

Yaping Li

Jingcheng Zhang

Shengchun Yang

Xiaorui Guo

Gang Wang

Feng Li

Ke Fei Wang

Gadiel Seroussi

Yong Wang

Peng Xu

Graeme John Proudler

Lei Chang

Jun Liu

Mark Taylor Smith

Kenneth Graham Paterson

Ying Jian He

Junping Du

Caroline Belrose

Lingling Pan

Long Wen

Yijun Yu

Jiahao Yan

Taiyou Yong

Liwen Wang

Kedong Zhu

Jian Geng

Shuhai Feng

Dan Zeng

Xiaoyong Bai

Provided an intermittent characteristic-based demand-side resource coordination control method and system. The method includes: receiving a control request, where the control request is used for requesting control of demand-side resources having an intermittent characteristic; determining a target total control quantity of demand-side resources; determining a coordination strategy of multiple demand-side resources and an action quantity of each of the multiple demand-side resources; and performing coordinated control on the multiple demand-side resources based on the target total control quantity of demand-side resources, the coordination strategy, and the action quantity of each of the multiple demand-side resources.

Intermittent characteristic-based demand-side resource coordination control method and system

A method of and apparatus for executing a cryptographic cipher is described. The method includes acts of receiving a first finite field of data and key value represented by a first encryption standard including a first and second operation, transforming the first finite field of data and key value into a second finite field of data and key value represented by a second encryption standard, transforming the first operation and the second operation into a first modified operation and a second modified operation represented by the second encryption standard, executing the first modified operation on the second finite field of data and key value to generate a third finite field of data, executing the second modified operation on the third finite field of data to generate a fourth finite field of data, which is transformed into a fifth finite field of data represented by the first encryption standard.

Methods and apparatus for secure and efficient implementation of block ciphers

A Demand Response (DR) physical potential evaluation method for a feeder line is provided, which includes that: a load curve of a part to be identified in a load curve of a feeder line to be evaluated is acquired; a load database is created on the basis of a historical load curve of loads of predefined types; load types and total number of the loads to be identified are determined on the basis of the load curve of the part to be identified and the load database; a physical potential of the loads of each of the types is acquired according to the load types of the loads to be identified; and an overall aggregated physical potential of the loads to be identified is obtained according to the physical potential of the loads of each of the types and a number of the loads of each of the types.

Method, device and storage medium for evaluating physical potential of demand response for feeder line

A software trusted platform module (sTPM) operates in a hypervisor, receives trust assurances from specialized hardware, and extends this trust such that the hypervisor performs trust attestation. The hypervisor receives a startup sequence validation from a TPM, or Trusted Platform Module. The TPM performs bus monitoring during a boot sequence of the computer system, records the startup sequence from the bus, and performs a hash on the sequence. The TPM performs an authentication exchange with the hypervisor such that the hypervisor authenticates the attestation of the computer system from the TPM, and the hypervisor, now delegated with trust assurances from the TPM, provides assurances to users via an authentication chain. The ATCB then performs the attestation of the computer system according to the attestation protocol much faster than the TPM. In this manner, the hypervisor operates as a software delegate of the TPM for providing user assurances of trust.

Software trusted computing base

Example embodiments of the present invention relate to a system, apparatus and methods for preserving the integrity of a code to prevent it from being modified, maliciously or inadvertently, while it is in execution in the RAM of a computer platform. This method also may be referred to as code hardening. Code to be hardened in example embodiments of the present invention may be referred to as protected code. Example embodiments of the present invention are able to externally detect unauthorized stoppage of the hypervisor by employing () a launch-time metric of the protected code; () a run-time metric of the protected code; and () a liveliness indicator of the protected code.

Method and apparatus to harden a software execution in random access memory

Methods and apparatus are disclosed for managing access to data in a data storage system. For example, an apparatus comprises at least one processing platform associated with a distributed virtual infrastructure. The processing platform comprises at least one processing device having a processor coupled to a memory. The processing platform is operative to instantiate a meta data management process that is configured to provide at least one client process with information to allow the client process to perform one or more operations in accordance with one or more data storage devices through a storage area network. The information provided to the client process may comprise one or more data block descriptors. Each of the one or more data block descriptors may comprise path information for at least one of the data storage devices and an offset address in the at least one data storage device. The one or more data block descriptors may correspond to one or more data blocks of a given data file that is stored or storable across the one or more data storage devices.

File system for storage area network

A method is described by which the possessor of a secret certified in a particular manner can prove to a party with which the possessor of a secret needs to interact that it does indeed possess a secret formed in the proper manner. In the context of trusted computing apparatus, this can be used to show that the secret has been provided by a legitimate manufacturer of such apparatus. A method and an architecture for revocation operable in this context is also described.

Use of certified secrets in communication

A data processing system is described wherein use of resources in the system is metered. Metering evidence is generated which is difficult to forge and is, thus, relatively resistant to tampering. Such a system finds application, for example, in the field of metering the amount of time a person spends reading advertisement that are published on the World Wide Web. If reliable, such metering evidence may be used by the owner of the web server that contains the advertisement to bill the originator of the advertisement.

Metering in a data processing system

A method of exchanging digital public-key verification data whereby a first computing entity () enables a second computing entity () to obtain probabilistic evidence that a given public-key number n is the product of exactly two odd primes p and q, not known to the second party, whose bit lengths (l(p), l(q)) differ by not more than d bits. The method provides an efficient proof of knowledge protocol for demonstrating Monte-Carlo evidence that a number n is the product of two odd primes of roughly equal size. The evidence is shown 'in the dark', which means that the structure is verified without the prime factors of n disclosed. The cost of a proof amounts to 12klogn multiplications of integers of size of n where k is the number of the iterations in the proof and relates to an error probability bounded by max(&#xbd;, 24/n).

Verification of the private components of a public-key cryptographic system

A security system based on a tamper resistant badge that becomes deactivated if the badge is removed from the person authorized to wear the badge. The badge has a volatile memory for storing the security clearance information associated with the wearer and a processor having sufficient power to perform encrypted communications. The badge also has an attachment sensor that resets the security clearance information if the badge is removed from the wearer. A secure data processing system utilizing the badges includes an administrative computer, A, and a client computer, C. Computer A has an identity verification system for authenticating the identity of individuals having badges and loading the clearance information into the volatile memory after the badge is attached to the wearer. The C computers access the information in the badge's volatile memory to provide access to the wearer at the access level specified in the volatile memory.

Access control through secure channel using personal identification system

A method of transmitting a message over a network from a sender to a receiver, comprises the steps of: taking a message (Coin) to be signed by the sender; signing the message into a digital signature (e, y) of the sender (steps ), the digital signature being generated as a function of that message using public and secret signature generators (x, r) of the sender, a private key (s) of the sender, and other publicly known values (a, p, q); and transmitting the signed message over the network to the receiver (step ); characterised in that: the message to be signed by the sender incorporates a first value (f(x)) which is a first predetermined function (such as a secure one-way hash function) of the sender's public signature generator (x) (step ). It is thus possible that the incorporation of a proper first value can be verified by a receiver of the message who requires the sender to sign the message using a public signature generator, and furthermore that if a sender signs and transmits the same message more than once, the private key of the sender can be derived from the plurality of signed messages and a relationship between the public and private signature generators.

Transmitting messages over a network

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Beijing, China

Wenbo Mao