Hewlett-packard Development Company, L.p.

Wei Ze Liu

Jeffrey Kevin Jeansonne

Rosilet Retnamoni Braduke

Lan Wang

Monji G Jabori

Sumit Kumar

Kimon Berlin

James Robert Waldron

ChengKai Yeh

Christopher Charles Mohrman

Dallas M Barlow

Quoc P Pham

Khoa Dang Huynh

Srinath Balaraman

Rajesh A Shah

Christian Pena

Xianglong Du

Gregory L Hubbard

Terri L Dunlap

Examples of electronic devices are described herein. In some examples, an electronic device includes a memory and a controller. In some examples, the controller is to enable a basic input/output system (BIOS) safe mode in response to an authentication procedure. In some examples, the controller is to provide access to back-up variable service region in the memory storing default BIOS data. In some examples, the controller is to start a modified BIOS based on the default BIOS data in response to enablement of the BIOS safe mode.

Bios safe mode update with secure authentication when implementing modified bios or original bios

An example computing device includes a non-volatile memory to store Basic Input/Output Systems (BIOS) data of the computing device, an audio codec, and a controller. The controller is to: receive a command from a provisioning device at the audio codec; and transfer a copy of the BIOS data between the controller and the memory based on the command.

BIOS configurations via provisioning devices

Examples of electronic devices are described herein. In some examples, an electronic device includes a flash memory. In some examples, the electronic device includes a host memory to store an access control structure to access the flash memory. In some examples, the electronic device includes a first circuitry coupled to the host memory and the flash memory. In some examples, the first circuitry is to read the access control structure in the host memory to determine when to access the flash memory.

Access control structure for shared memory

An example apparatus can receive a DMA request from a device, where the DMA request comprises an address and an ID of the device that uniquely identifies the device and wherein the device is a bus mastering device. The example apparatus can access a range of addresses using the ID of the device. An example apparatus can determine whether the address is in the range of addresses and can process the DMA request responsive to verifying that the address is in the range of addresses.

Address verification for direct memory access requests

An example of a first computing device may include firmware, a controller, and a processor. The processor may be to generate a trust state message, to be sent to the controller, indicating the firmware of the first computing device is operating a trusted environment and utilize the firmware to validate an update within the trusted environment. The controller may be to assert, responsive to receiving the trust state message, a trust state signal to a second computing device indicating the firmware of the first computing device is operating the trusted environment The assertion of the trust state signal may be to enable the second computing device to install the validated update.

Update signals

An example computing device includes a controller to control operation of a firmware subsystem of the computing device. The controller is separate from a main processor of the computing device. A memory stores subsystem data that is useable by the controller. The subsystem data includes recovery information executable by the controller to initiate recovery of the subsystem. The computing device further includes recovery coordination instructions. The recovery coordination instructions determine integrity of the recovery information as stored on the memory and. In response to determining that the recovery information lacks integrity, the recovery coordination instructions initiate recovery of the firmware subsystem using a backup of the recovery information and perform recovery of the firmware subsystem using an update to the firmware subsystem.

Recovery via backups of recovery information

Examples associated with password updates are described. One example method includes receiving a request to modify an administrator password in a basic input/output system (BIOS). The administrator password may be updated. A first password tied to the administrator password may be identified. A first updated password is generated by concatenating a character string to the administrator password. The character string may be generated based on a password policy for the first password. The first password may then be updated to the first updated password.

Password updates

In some examples, an electronic device comprises a multiplexer, a first device interface coupled to the multiplexer, a second device interface coupled to the multiplexer, a storage controller coupled to the multiplexer, and a controller coupled to the first device interface. The storage controller is to control a storage device. The controller is to determine a mode based on a command for the controller to access the storage controller and, based on the mode, cause the multiplexer to adjust access of the second device interface to the storage controller.

Multiplexed storage accesses

A storage may store machine-readable instructions for execution by a processor. Execution of the machine-readable instructions may cause the processor to receive an update capsule via a firmware update interface. The update capsule may include a device identifier and a payload. The payload may include data that is different from a firmware update. Execution of the machine-readable instructions may cause the processor to execute a virtual device handler, based on the device identifier, to process the payload.

Virtual device handlers to process update capsule payloads

In some examples, a system includes a memory resource, a communication channel to allow a bus mastering capable device to access the memory resource, and a controller to block the system from responding to a request from the bus mastering capable device for accessing the memory resource until the controller has authorized the bus mastering capable device.

Blocking systems from responding to bus mastering capable devices

A computer device includes a network interface to connect to a computer network, memory, and a processor connected to the network interface and the memory. The processor is to execute instructions stored in the memory. The instructions are to establish a connection with an auxiliary computer device and start a proxy to forward network communications between the auxiliary computer device and the computer network. The instructions are further to start the proxy in response to the computer device receiving a captive portal from the computer network.

Computer devices to establish network connections

In some examples, an embedded controller in a system monitors a basic input/output system (BIOS) policy stored in a non-volatile storage, and executes a management action with respect to the BIOS policy, where the monitoring and the executing are performed by the embedded controller independent of instructions executed by a processor in the system.

Management with respect to a basic input/output system policy

A method of protecting basic input/output system (BIOS) code. The method includes, with a relocation information tool executed by a processor, refactoring a number of data sections within a number of handlers of the BIOS code to tag a number of variables within the handlers. The tags indicate which of the variables should be protected at runtime. The method further includes generating a relocation file comprising a number of relocation addresses identifying locations of a number of dynamic variables that change at runtime. The relocation addresses point to a location within the handlers different from an original location. The method further includes, with a loader, loading at runtime the relocation file as part of a BIOS firmware image and adjusting data access to the dynamic variables in handler code to identify the location of the dynamic variables based on the relocation file.

Protecting basic input/output (BIOS) code

A method of tamper-resistant control comprising reading a flag of an electronic device with firmware, the flag indicating a provision enable/disable state of the electronic device and provisioning a management processor of the electronic device to facilitate communications between the management processor and a server in response to reading the flag indicating a provision enable/disable state.

System and method of tamper-resistant control

A media access control (MAC) address management system, comprises logic configured to generate a MAC address for at least one network device of a computing device based on a MAC address of another network device of the computing device.

Growing community of inventors

Spring, TX, United States of America

Wei Ze Liu