Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC

Wei-Quiang Michael Guo

Wei Jiang

Yordan Ivanov Rouskov

Iulian Doroftei Calinov

Arnold Neil Blinn

Ismail Cem Paya

Lynn Ayres

Kok Wai Chan

Raja Pazhanivel Perumal

Adam Back

John D Whited

Geoffrey John Hulten

Baskaran Dharmarajan

Kristofer Noel Iverson

Ryan W Battle

John Hal Howard

Lin Huang

Christopher E Mitchell

David W Bailey

Rui Chen

Neelamadhaba Mahapatro

Pui-Yin Winfred Wong

Weisheng Li

Sarah Faulkner

Vikas Rajvanshy

Usman Ahmed Shami

Tore L Sundelin

Danpo Zhang

Steven M Cellini

Sean Christian Wohlgemuth

Gilbert Martin McQuillan

Tarek Bahaa El-Din Mahmoud Kamel

Christopher N Peterson

Colin Chow

Sanjeev M Nagvekar

Ying-Kin Tony Yip

Jonathan P Horton

Ravi Kiran R Poluri

Rammohan Nagasubramani

Sylvia K Mollerstrom

Jeff Steinbok

Mrigankka Fotedar

Vikrant Minhas

David J Steeves

Orville C Mcdonald

Embodiments of authenticating linked accounts are presented herein. In an implementation, an authentication service provides functionality to form links between a plurality of user accounts. A client may then authenticate by providing credentials for one account in a group of linked accounts, and is permitted access to each account in the group of linked accounts based upon the linking. Thus, a single sign-in of a client to one account may permit the client to obtain services for service providers corresponding to multiple linked accounts, without an individual sign-in to each account.

Authenticating linked accounts

Scalable session management is achieved by generating a cookie that includes an encrypted session key and encrypted cookie data. The cookie data is encrypted using the session key. The session key is then signed and encrypted using one or more public/private key pairs. The encrypted session key can be decrypted and verified using the same private/public key pair(s). Once verified, the decrypted session key can then be used to decrypt and verify the encrypted cookie data. A first server having the private/public key pair(s) may generate the cookie using a randomly generated session key. A second server having the same private/public key pair(s) may decrypt and verify the cookie even if the session key is not initially installed on the second server. A session key cache may be used to provide session key lookup to save public/private key operations on the servers.

Session key cache to maintain session keys

Spammers, and other abusers of web services, may be deterred in their attempts to sign up for these services at large scale by making changes to the service registration procedure, where the changes are designed to break the spammer's infrastructure. In one example, a procedure to register for a web service involves presenting a Human Interaction Proof (HIP, or 'captcha') to the user, and gating access to the service upon receipt of a correct solution. If spammers use botnets and/or image capture techniques to initiate registration processes and to transport the HIPs to human or automated solvers, then the registration procedure can be changed in a way that is incompatible with capturing these images, or in a way that is incompatible with receiving HIP solutions from someplace other than the location at which registration was initiated.

Preventing abuse of services through infrastructure incompatibility

Systems, computer-implemented methods, and computer-readable media for establishing an online account with a resource provider are provided. An authentication token including identification of a user from an authentication server is received. The identification of the user from the authentication token is utilized to establish an online account for the user with the resource provider. Additional credentialing information from the user for the online account is received. The additional information received from the user is associated with the online account for the user with the resource provider.

Identity ownership migration

Providing services within a network of service providers sharing an authentication service and a set of business rules. A central server receives a first request from a first server to provide a first service to a user via a client without forcing the user to present credentials. In response to the received first request, the central server stores data identifying the first service on the client. The central server further receives a second request from a second server to provide a second service to the user via the client after the user presents the credentials to the second service. After receiving the second request and the presented credentials, the central server allows the user access to the second service. In response to allowing the user access to the second service, the central server further allows the user access to the first service as a result of the stored data.

Cross-domain authentication

Scalable session management using an encrypted session key

A reputation server associates feedback from previous network transactions with an account of a user in a network. A reputation score for the user is calculated based on the feedback to indicate the probability the user will abuse the network. When an online service receives a request to perform a transaction from the user, the online service performs the transaction based on the user's reputation score. Additionally, a server generates a reputation packet including the reputation score for a user for use by an online service when the user requests the online service to perform a transaction. The online service may authenticate the reputation packet with the server and, if the reputation packet is authenticated, the online service performs the transaction based on the user's reputation score.

Cross-network reputation for online services

Exchanging information in a multi-site authentication system. A network server receives, from an authentication server, a request by a client computing device for a service provided by the network server along with an authentication ticket. The authentication ticket includes: a session key encrypted by a public key associated with the network server, message content encrypted by the session key, and a signature for the encrypted session key and the encrypted message content. The signature includes address information of the network server. The network server identifies its own address information in the signature to validate the signature included in the authentication ticket and verifies the authentication ticket content based on the signature included in the authentication ticket. The network server decrypts the encrypted session key via a private key associated with the second network server and decrypts the encrypted message content via the decrypted session key.

Session key security protocol

Scalable session management

A computerized method and system for routing between network servers. A central database coupled to a central server on a data communication network stores information for identifying locations of a plurality of network servers on the network. Each network server provides at least one service via the network. The central server receives a request from the user for a selected service including a carry through keyword for controlling routing of the user to the selected service. The central server retrieves location information from the central database to identify the location of the network server providing the selected service and attaches the carry through keyword to the retrieved location information. The central server then routes the user with the carry through keyword to the network server, which directs the user to the selected service based on the carry through keyword.

Service routing and web integration in a distributed, multi-site user authentication system

A user profile having consent information regarding a network server for a second party is created. Such consent information is received from a first party and stored in the user profile of the second party. The second party may access the network server if the consent information stored in the user profile of the second party shows that the first party has provided consent. The second party may not access the network server if the consent information stored in the user profile of the second party shows that the first party has denied consent.

Parental consent service

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Bellevue, WA, United States of America

Wei-Quiang Michael Guo