Koninklijke Philips Corporation N.v.

Philips Lighting Holding B.v.

Koninklijke Philisp N.v.

Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.v.

Walter Dees

Johannes Arnoldus Cornelis Bernsen

Franciscus Antonius Maria Van De Laar

Koen Johanna Guillaume Holtman

Lucas Jacobus Franciscus Geurts

Vincentius Paulus Buil

Maurice Herman Johan Draaijer

Paul Anthony Shrubsole

Luca Tiberi

Oscar Garcia Morchon

Michael Petrus Franciscus Verschoor

Franciscus A Van De Laar

Vignesh Raja Krauppiah Ramachandran

Henricus Theodorus Johannus Antonius Gerardus Van Der Sanden

Mirjam Van Laarhoven

Pieter Joseph Mathias Custers

Ton Brouwer

Vignesh Raja Karuppiah Ramachandran

Michael P F Verschoor

A device arranged for wireless communication according to a communication protocol has a processor to execute a connection sequence according to a discovery protocol. The connection sequence includes determining a current cluster identity and a current discovery window timing used by the device. Next, at least one other device within wireless range is detected, while further determining a detected cluster identity and a detected discovery window timing of the detected other device. Then it is detected whether the detected device is operating in a different cluster than the device by comparing the current cluster identity with the detected cluster identity or comparing the current discovery window timing with the detected discovery window timing. Finally, upon detecting said different cluster, a security process is executed, which may warn the user or abort the connection sequence. Thereby, a malicious device trying to manipulate the connection sequence is detected.

Device for wireless communication with other devices

A wireless device (S) includes a radio (R) for communicating via a wireless communication protocol which employs messages constructed as layer 2 MAC frames each including a layer 2 MAC header and a payload. The wireless device is configured to operate in (i) a first mode in which the wireless device transmits messages (N0, . . . , Nn) via the radio each including an IPv6 packet header and an upper layer protocol data unit encapsulated within the payload of a layer 2 MAC frame, and (ii) a second mode in which the wireless device transmits messages (M0, . . . , Mn) via the radio each including an upper layer protocol data unit encapsulated within the payload of a layer 2 MAC frame without including the IPv6 header. A relay device (T) comprises a radio for communicating via the wireless communication protocol which employs messages constructed as layer 2 MAC frames each including a layer 2 MAC header and a payload. In one power-saving aspect, the relay device is configured to perform a header insertion service (I) in which the relay device receives messages (M0, . . . , Mn) via its radio from the wireless device (S), each including an upper layer protocol data unit encapsulated within the payload of a layer 2 MAC frame without including the IPv6 header. The header insertion service inserts header information (A') into the messages (M0, . . . , Mn) received from the wireless device (S) and retransmits the messages with complete headers as messages (M0′, . . . , Mn′). In another power-saving aspect, the relay device additionally or alternatively applies an acknowledgement detection criterion to filter out acknowledgements received from the server, and forwards the filtered out acknowledgements to the wireless device (S) via the radio at a reduced rate.

Low power IPV6 system and device

A cellular communication system supports a Network Relay Function () for managing the indirect connections. A mobile device () may send a request message to a relay device (), the request message including a relay service code (associated with a set of privacy sensitive PDU session parameters). The relay device receives the request message and sends a transfer request message to the cellular communication system indicating a request to transfer data via an indirect connection and including the requested relay service code. The Network Relay Function receives the transfer request message, determines a different relay service code to be used instead of the requested relay service code; and sends a transfer response message including the different relay service code in an encrypted manner that allows it to be decrypted by the mobile device, but not the relay device; and forwarding by the relay device the encrypted different relay service code to the mobile device in a response to the request message.

Privacy of relay selection in cellular sliced networks

A wireless communication system comprises a host device () and mobile devices () arranged for wireless communication and for distance () measurement. The host device has a user interface () comprising a connect button (), and is arranged to execute a connection sequence upon a user activating the connect button. The connection sequence first determines respective distances between the host and respective mobile devices. A first mobile device is identified exhibiting a movement. Then a connection action is executed regarding a connection between the first mobile device and the host device. The mobile device is arranged for executing a ranging protocol and, upon subsequently receiving a connection message, executing a connection action regarding a connection between the first mobile device and the host device. Effectively a connection may be established upon the user of a mobile device pressing a single button on a selected host device and moving the mobile device.

Wireless communication system

A mobile device () and an emergency entity () in a mobile network () accommodate emergency calls. The network is coupled to a medical database () comprising respective electronic health records (EHR) regarding respective persons. The mobile device is arranged to obtain the encrypted medical identifier of a user of the device; and, upon establishing that the user may be a victim of the emergency, to include the encrypted medical identifier in the emergency message during an emergency call. The emergency entity is arranged to retrieve the encrypted medical identifier from the emergency message, and to access the medical database to retrieve at least one electronic health record based on the encrypted medical identifier for enabling forwarding of information from the electronic health record to responders to an emergency.

Access to health information during emergency call

A non-SI device is arranged for wireless communication and cooperates with an SI device having access to a subscriber identity. The non-SI device has a transceiver to communicate in a local network and a processor to establish an association with the SI. A non-SI public key is provided to the SI device via a first communication channel. A verification code is shared with the SI device via a second communication channel. The channels are different and include an out-of-band channel. Proof of possession of a non-SI private key is provided to the SI device via the first or the second communication channel. From the SI device, a certificate is received that is related to the SI and comprises a signature computed over at least part of the non-SI public key. The certificate reliably enables the non-SI device to access the core network via the local network and a gateway between the local network and the core network.

Non-3GPP device access to core network

A non-SI device () is arranged for wireless communication () and cooperates with an SI device () having access to a subscriber identity. The non-SI device has a transceiver () to communicate in a local network and a processor () to establish an association with the SI. A non-SI public key is provided to the SI device via a first communication channel. A verification code is shared with the SI device via a second communication channel. The channels are different and include an out-of-band channel (). Proof of possession of a non-SI private key is provided to the SI device via the first or the second communication channel. From the SI device, security data is received that is related to the SI and is computed using the non-SI public key. The security data reliably enables the non-SI device to access the core network via the local network and a gateway between the local network and the core network.

A device () arranged for wireless communication () according to a communication protocol has a processor () to execute a connection sequence according to a discovery protocol. The connection sequence comprises determining a current cluster identity and a current discovery window timing used by the device. Next, at least one other device (′) within wireless range is detected, while further determining a detected cluster identity and a detected discovery window timing of the detected other device. Then it is detected whether the detected device is operating in a different cluster than the device by comparing the current cluster identity with the detected cluster identity or comparing the current discovery window timing with the detected discovery window timing. Finally, upon detecting said different cluster, a security process is executed, which may warn the user or abort the connection sequence. Thereby, a malicious device trying to manipulate the connection sequence is detected.

A non-SI device () is arranged for wireless communication () and cooperates with an SI device () having access to a subscriber identity. The non-SI device has a transceiver () to communicate in a local network and a processor () to establish an association with the SI. A non-SI public key is provided to the SI device via a first communication channel. A verification code is shared with the SI device via a second communication channel. The channels are different and include an out-of-band channel (). Proof of possession of a non-SI private key is provided to the SI device via the first or the second communication channel. From the SI device, a certificate is received that is related to the SI and comprises a signature computed over at least part of the non-SI public key. The certificate reliably enables the non-SI device to access the core network via the local network and a gateway between the local network and the core network.

Systems, apparatuses, and methods include technology including a headless medical device for performing implementing a medical resource or function in context with a configuration device and an optional host device for locking or unlocking a lock status of the headless medical device respective to action requests relating to the medical resource or function.

Securing headless devices from malicious (re-)configuration

A wireless device (S) includes a radio (R) for communicating via a wireless communication protocol which employs messages constructed as layer 2 MAC frames each including a layer 2 MAC header and a payload. The wireless device is configured to operate in (i) a first mode in which the wireless device transmits messages (N, . . . , Nn) via the radio each including an IPv6 packet header and an upper layer protocol data unit encapsulated within the payload of a layer 2 MAC frame, and (ii) a second mode in which the wireless device transmits messages (M, . . . , Mn) via the radio each including an upper layer protocol data unit encapsulated within the payload of a layer 2 MAC frame without including the IPv6 header. A relay device (T) comprises a radio for communicating via the wireless communication protocol which employs messages constructed as layer 2 MAC frames each including a layer 2 MAC header and a payload. In one power-saving aspect, the relay device is configured to perform a header insertion service (I) in which the relay device receives messages (M, . . . , Mn) via its radio from the wireless device (S), each including an upper layer protocol data unit encapsulated within the payload of a layer 2 MAC frame without including the IPv6 header. The header insertion service inserts header information (A') into the messages (M, Mn) received from the wireless device (S) and retransmits the messages with complete headers as messages (M&#x2032;, . . . , Mn&#x2032;). In another power-saving aspect, the relay device additionally or alternatively applies an acknowledgement detection criterion to filter out acknowledgements received from the server, and forwards the filtered out acknowledgements to the wireless device (S) via the radio at a reduced rate.

Bluetooth-based IPv6 low power networking

A device () arranged for wireless communication () according to a communication protocol has a processor () to execute a connection sequence according to a discovery protocol. The connection sequence comprises determining a current cluster identity and a current discovery window timing used by the device. Next, at least one other device (') within wireless range is detected, while further determining a detected cluster identity and a detected discovery window timing of the detected other device. Then it is detected whether the detected device is operating in a different cluster than the device by comparing the current cluster identity with the detected cluster identity or comparing the current discovery window timing with the detected discovery window timing. Finally, upon detecting said different cluster, a security process is executed, which may warn the user or abort the connection sequence. Thereby, a malicious device trying to manipulate the connection sequence is detected.

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Eindhoven, Netherlands

Walter Dees