Apple Inc.

Wade Benson

Jerrold Von Hauck

Michael Brouwer

Yannick L Sierra

Mitchell David Adler

Marc Jason Krochmal

John Joseph Iarocci

Alexander R Ledwith

Andrew Roger Whalley

Thomas P Mensch

Libor Sykora

Arthur Mesh

David P Finkelstein

Conrad Sauerwald

Eric Brandon Tamura

John Garvey

Vratislav Kuzela

Josh P De Cesare

Pierre Olivier Martel

Gregory B Novick

Fabrice L Gautier

Noah Witherspoon

Petr Kostka

Charles Edward Gray

Kaiehu Kaahaaina

Samuel Gosselin

Kumar Saurav

Joshua P De Cesare

George R Dicker

Ahmer Ali Khan

Michael J Smith

Roberto G Yepez

Ronnie G Misra

Anand Dalal

Pierre-Olivier J Martel

Kyle C Brogle

Andrew S Terry

Jeremy C Andrus

Oren M Elrad

Austin G Jennings

Jeffrey C Lee

Jacques Fortier

Ananthakrishna Ramesh

Sean P Devlin

Anthony J Chivetta

Timothee Geoghegan

Lucie Kucerova

Xeno S Kovah

Anish C Trivedi

Alan M Dunn

Nikolaj Schlej

Jiri Margaritov

Pierre Oliver Martel

John J Dong

Robert C Graham

Robert Yepez

D J Capelis

Tomislav Suchan

Embodiments described herein provided techniques to enable peripherals configured to provide secure functionality. A secure circuit on a peripheral device can be paired with a secure circuit on a host device outside of a factory environment without compromising security by verifying silicon keys that are embedded within the secure circuit during manufacturing.

Pairing protocol for peripherals with a secure function

Techniques are disclosed relating to securely storing file system metadata in a computing device. In one embodiment, a computing device includes a processor, memory, and a secure circuit. The memory has a file system stored therein that includes metadata for accessing a plurality of files in the memory. The metadata is encrypted with a metadata encryption key that is stored in an encrypted form. The secure circuit is configured to receive a request from the processor to access the file system. In response to the request, the secure circuit is configured to decrypt the encrypted form of the metadata encryption key. In some embodiments, the computing device includes a memory controller configured to receive the metadata encryption key from the secure circuit, retrieve the encrypted metadata from the memory, and decrypt the encrypted metadata prior to providing the metadata to the processor.

File system metadata protection

Techniques are disclosed relating to securely storing data in a computing system. In some embodiments, a computing system performs a boot sequence that includes generating ephemeral key data and preventing the generated ephemeral key data from being stored in a non-volatile storage including persisting the generated ephemeral key data in the volatile storage. The boot sequence further includes creating, in the non-volatile storage, an ephemeral data volume and encrypting the ephemeral data volume by using the ephemeral key data persisted in the volatile storage.

Ephemeral data storage

A method of unlocking a second device using a first device is disclosed. The method can include: the first device pairing with the second device; establishing a trusted relationship with the second device; authenticating the first device using a device key; receiving a secret key from the second device; receiving a user input from an input/output device; and transmitting the received secret key to the second device to unlock the second device in response to receiving the user input, wherein establishing a trusted relationship with the second device comprises using a key generated from a hardware key associated with the first device to authenticate the device key.

Method of using one device to unlock another device

Some embodiments of the invention provide a method for a trusted (or originator) device to modify the security state of a target device (e.g., unlocking the device) based on a securing ranging operation (e.g., determining a distance, proximity, etc.). The method of some embodiments exchanges messages as a part of a ranging operation in order to determine whether the trusted and target devices are within a specified range of each other before allowing the trusted device to modify the security state of the target device. In some embodiments, the messages are derived by both devices based on a shared secret and are used to verify the source of ranging signals used for the ranging operation. In some embodiments, the method is performed using multiple different frequency bands.

Modifying security state with secured range detection

Techniques are disclosed relating to maintaining device security associated with reduced power modes. In some embodiments, a computing device receives a request to place the computing device in a reduced power mode in which a first memory of the computing device is powered off. Based on the request, the computing device offloads a memory page from the first memory to a second memory such that the offloading includes encrypting the memory page. Based on a request to resume from the reduced power mode, the computing device restores the memory page from the second memory to the first memory such that the restoring includes decrypting the encrypted memory page. After initiating the restoring, the computing device presents a user authentication prompt asking for a user credential.

Secure reduced power mode

Techniques are disclosed relating to securing computing devices during boot. In various embodiments, a secure circuit of a computing device generates for a public key pair and signs, using a private key of the public key pair, configuration settings for an operating system of the computing device. A bootloader of the computing device receives a certificate for the public key pair from a certificate authority and initiates a boot sequence to load the operating system. The boot sequence includes the bootloader verifying the signed configuration settings using a public key included in the certificate and the public key pair. In some embodiments, the secure circuit cryptographically protects the private key based on a passcode of a user, the passcode being usable by the user to authenticate to the computing device.

Securely signing configuration settings

Techniques are disclosed relating to relating to a public key infrastructure (PKI). In one embodiment, an integrated circuit is disclosed that includes at least one processor and a secure circuit isolated from access by the processor except through a mailbox mechanism. The secure circuit is configured to generate a key pair having a public key and a private key, and to issue, to a certificate authority (CA), a certificate signing request (CSR) for a certificate corresponding to the key pair. In some embodiments, the secure circuit may be configured to receive, via the mailbox mechanism, a first request from an application executing on the processor to issue a certificate to the application. The secure circuit may also be configured to perform, in response to a second request, a cryptographic operation using a public key circuit included in the secure circuit.

Secure circuit for encryption key generation

Techniques are disclosed relating to securely storing data at a computing device that is managed by an external entity. In some embodiments, a computing device maintains a first file system volume having data that is accessible to a user of the computing device and that is not managed by an entity external to the computing device. The computing device receives, from the entity external, a first request to configure the computing device to store data that is accessible to the user and managed by the external entity. In response to the first request, the computing device creates a second distinct file system volume to store the data managed by the external entity. In response to a second request from the external entity, the computing device subsequently removes the second file system volume.

Separation of managed and unmanaged data in a computing device

Embodiments described herein provide for a system, method, and apparatus to provision domains in a secure enclave processor to support multiple users. One embodiment provides for an apparatus comprising a first processor to receive a set of credentials associated with one of multiple user accounts on the apparatus and a second processor including a secure circuit to provide a secure enclave, the secure enclave to receive a request from the first processor to authenticate the set of credentials, the request including supplied credentials and an authentication type, where the secure enclave is to block the request from the first processor in response to a determination that the user account has exceeded a threshold number of successive failed authentication attempts for the authentication type.

Provision of domains in secure enclave to support multiple users

Embodiments described herein enable multi-user storage volume encryption via a secure enclave processor. One embodiment provides for a computing device comprising a first processor to execute a first operating system having one or more user accounts; a second processor to execute a second operating system, the second processor to receive a first encrypted key from the first processor and decrypt a volume encryption key via a key encryption key derived from the first encrypted key, the first encrypted key derived via the secure enclave without user-provided entropy; and a non-volatile memory controller to access encrypted data within non-volatile memory using the volume encryption key.

Multi-user storage volume encryption via secure processor

Growing community of inventors

San Jose, CA, United States of America

Wade Benson