Intel Corporation

Other

Vincent R Scarlata

Carlos V Rozas

Simon P Johnson

Francis X Mckeen

Vedvyas Shanbhogue

Uday R Savagaonkar

Ittai Anati

Ilya Alexandrovich

Gilbert A Neiger

Rebekah M Leslie-Hurd

Michael A Goldsmith

Wesley Hamilton Smith

Mona Vij

Barry E Huntley

Krystof C Zmudzinski

Siddhartha Chhabra

Somnath Chakrabarti

Reshma Lal

Willard M Wiseman

Ned M Smith

Raghunandan Makaram

Alok Kumar

Ravi L Sahita

Pradeep M Pappachan

Bin Xing

Alpa Narendra Trivedi

David M Durham

Prashant Dewan

Steven Bernard McGowan

Kapil Sood

John I Garney

Ernie F Brickell

Howard C Herbert

Gary L Graunke

Dion Rodgers

Gideon Gerzon

Stephen R Van Doren

Stalinselvaraj Jeyasingh

Shay Gueron

Scott Dion Rodgers

Francesc Guim Bernat

Balaji Vembu

Hormuzd M Khosravi

Wei Wang

Baiju V Patel

Jesse R Walker

Scott R Janus

Jason Martin

Daniel Nemiroff

Micah James Sheller

Rameshkumar G Illikkal

Alex Berenzon

Amy L Santoni

Faraz A Siddiqi

Tasneem Brutch

Bo A Zhang

Francis McKeen

James D Beaney, Jr

Asher M Altman

Eduardo Cabre

Piotr Zmijewski

Vladimir Beker

Joseph Frank Cihula

Stephen J Tolopka

Bernard Lint

Don Alan Van Dyke

Anjo Lucas Vahldiek-Oberwagner

Rebekah Leslie

William Colin Wood

Jiang Tao Li

Nikhil M Deshpande

Rinat Rappoport

Dror Caspi

Anand Rajan

Vinay Phegade

Murari Kumar

Wei Shen

Brandon Baker

Eric Innis

Anton Ivanov

Haidong Xia

Michael Steiner

Barrey E Huntley

Kalpana M Roge

Alexander Iliev

Marcela S Melara

Jiangtao Li

Ernest F Brickell

Baruch Chaikin

Xiaozhu Kang

Jun Nakajima

Arumugam Thiyagarajah

Bing Zhu

Abhishek Das

Salessawi Ferede Yitbarek

Isaku Yamahata

Thomas Adelmeyer

Sudha Krishnakumar

Willard M (Monty) Wiseman

Sharon Yaniv

Attestation of operations by tool chains is described. An example of a storage medium includes instructions for receiving source code for processing of a secure workload of a tenant; selecting at least a first compute node to provide computation for the workload; processing the source code by an attestable tool chain to generate machine code for the first compute node, including performing one or more conversions of the source code by one or more convertors to generate converted code and generating an attestation associated with each code conversion, and receiving machine code for the first compute node and generating an attestation associated with the first compute node; and providing each of the attestations from the first stage and the second stage for verification.

Attestation of operations by tool chains

Techniques for migration of a source protected virtual machine from a source platform to a destination platform are descried. A method of an aspect includes enforcing that bundles of state, of a first protected virtual machine (VM), received at a second platform over a stream, during an in-order phase of a migration of the first protected VM from a first platform to the second platform, are imported to a second protected VM of the second platform, in a same order that they were exported from the first protected VM. Receiving a marker over the stream marking an end of the in-order phase. Determining that all bundles of state exported from the first protected VM prior to export of the marker have been imported to the second protected VM. Starting an out-of-order phase of the migration based on the determination that said all bundles of the state exported have been imported.

Methods, apparatus, systems, and instructions to migrate protected virtual machines

A processor includes a decode unit to decode an instruction that is to indicate a page of a protected container memory, and a storage location outside of the protected container memory. An execution unit, in response to the instruction, is to ensure that there are no writable references to the page of the protected container memory while it has a write protected state. The execution unit is to encrypt a copy of the page of the protected container memory. The execution unit is to store the encrypted copy of the page to the storage location outside of the protected container memory, after it has been ensured that there are no writable references. The execution unit is to leave the page of the protected container memory in the write protected state, which is also valid and readable, after the encrypted copy has been stored to the storage location.

Processors, methods, systems, and instructions to support live migration of protected containers

An integrated circuit includes protected container access control logic to perform a set of access control checks and to determine whether to allow a device protected container module (DPCM) and an input and/or output (I/O) device to communicate securely through one of direct memory access (DMA) and memory-mapped input/output (MMIO). The DPCM and the I/O device are allowed to communicate securely if it is determined that at least the DPCM and the I/O device are mapped to one another, an access address associated with the communication resolves into a protected container memory, and a page of the protected container memory into which the access address resolves allows for the aforementioned one of DMA and MMIO. In some cases, a Security Attributes of Initiator (SAI) or security identifier may be used to obtain a DPCM identifier or attest that access is from a DPCM mapped to the I/O device. In some cases, a determination may be made that a type of access is compatible with one or more allowed access types for the page as represented in a protected container page metadata structure.

Processors, methods and systems to allow secure communications between protected container memory and input/output devices

Scalable cloning and replication for trusted execution environments is described. An example of a computer-readable storage medium includes instructions for receiving a selection of a point to capture a snapshot of a baseline trust domain (TD) or secure enclave, the TD or secure enclave being associated with a trusted execution environment (TEE) of a processor utilized for processing of a workload; initiating cloning of the TD or secure enclave from a source platform to an escrow platform; generating an escrow key to export the snapshot to the escrow platform; and exporting a state of the TD or secure enclave to the escrow platform, the state being sealed with a sealing key.

Scalable cloning and replication for trusted execution environments

A processor for supporting secure memory intent is disclosed. The processor of the disclosure includes a memory execution unit to access memory and a processor core coupled to the memory execution unit. The processor core is to receive a request to access a convertible page of the memory. In response to the request, the processor core to determine an intent for the convertible page in view of a page table entry (PTE) corresponding to the convertible page. The intent indicates whether the convertible page is to be accessed as at least one of a secure page or a non-secure page.

Supporting secure memory intent

A processor includes a range register to store information that identifies a reserved range of memory associated with a secure arbitration mode (SEAM) and a core coupled to the range register. The core includes security logic to unlock the range register on a logical processor, of the processor core, that is to initiate the SEAM. The logical processor is to, via execution of the security logic, store, in the reserved range, a SEAM module and a manifest associated with the SEAM module, wherein the SEAM module supports execution of one or more trust domains; initialize a SEAM virtual machine control structure (VMCS) within the reserved range of the memory that is to control state transitions between a virtual machine monitor (VMM) and the SEAM module; and authenticate the SEAM module using a manifest signature of the manifest.

Secure arbitration mode to build and operate within trust domain extensions

Data integrity logic is executable by a processor to generate a data integrity code using a hardware-based secret. A container manager, executable by the processor, creates a secured container including report generation logic that determines measurements of the secured container, generates a report according to a defined report format, and sends a quote request including the report. The defined report format includes a field to include the measurements and a field to include the data integrity code, and the report format is compatible for consumption by any one of a plurality of different quote creator types.

Flexible container attestation

Technologies for trusted I/O attestation and verification include a computing device with a cryptographic engine and one or more I/O controllers. The computing device collects hardware attestation information associated with statically attached hardware I/O components that are associated with a trusted I/O usage protected by the cryptographic engine. The computing device verifies the hardware attestation information and securely enumerates one or more dynamically attached hardware components in response to verification. The computing device collects software attestation information for trusted software components loaded during secure enumeration. The computing device verifies the software attestation information. The computing device may collect firmware attestation information for firmware loaded in the I/O controllers and verify the firmware attestation information. The computing device may collect application attestation information for a trusted application that uses the trusted I/O usage and verify the application attestation information. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Technologies for secure hardware and software attestation for trusted I/O

Technologies for secure authentication and programming of an accelerator device are described. In one example, a computing is disclosed comprising an accelerator device to: provide a unique device identifier to an accelerator services enclave (ASE) of a processor of the computing device; authenticate with the ASE by: performing a secure key exchange with the ASE to establish a shared secret tunnel key; verifying an enclave certificate of the ASE; and providing an attestation response to the ASE indicative of an accelerator device configuration; establish a secure channel with the ASE protected by the shared secret tunnel key; receive bitstream image key and bitstream data key from the ASE via the secure channel; program the accelerator device via the secure channel using the bitstream image key; and exchange data with a tenant enclave of the processor, the data protected by the bitstream data key.

Technologies for secure authentication and programming of accelerator devices

Attestation support in cloud computing environments is described. An example of an apparatus includes one or more processors to process data, including data related to hosting of workloads for one or more tenants; an orchestration element to receive a request for support of a workload of a tenant according to a selected membership policy, the orchestration element to select a set of one or more compute nodes to provide computation for the workload; and a security manager to receive the membership policy and to receive attestations from the selected compute nodes and, upon determining that the attestations meet the requirements of the membership policy, to add the one or more compute nodes to a group of compute nodes to provide computation for the workload.

Attestation support for elastic cloud computing environments

Technologies for secure device configuration and management include a computing device having an I/O device. A trusted agent of the computing device is trusted by a virtual machine monitor of the computing device. The trusted agent executes an attestation algorithm to generate a first secure attestation for the first I/O device and a second secure attestation for the second I/O device, obtains a peer-to-peer communication key, and forwards the peer-to-peer communication key to the first I/O device and a second I/O device to enable secure peer-to-peer communication between the first I/O device and the second I/O device over a communication link secured by the peer-to-peer communication key. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Secure accelerator device pairing for trusted accelerator-to-accelerator communication

Growing community of inventors

Beaverton, OR, United States of America

Vincent R Scarlata