Intel Corporation

Mcafee, Inc.

Vedvyas Shanbhogue

Ravi L Sahita

Gilbert A Neiger

Barry E Huntley

Jason W Brandt

Carlos V Rozas

Francis X Mckeen

Ittai Anati

Vincent R Scarlata

Ilya Alexandrovich

Uday R Savagaonkar

Simon P Johnson

Rebekah M Leslie-Hurd

Siddhartha Chhabra

Baiju V Patel

Deepak K Gupta

David M Durham

Krystof C Zmudzinski

Michael A Goldsmith

Wesley Hamilton Smith

Michael Lemay

Raghunandan Makaram

Utkarsh Y Kakaiya

Abhishek Basak

Rajesh M Sankaran

Somnath Chakrabarti

Andrew V Anderson

Arvind A Kumar

Mona Vij

Ned M Smith

David A Koufaty

Asit K Mallick

Purushottam Goel

Scott Dion Rodgers

Xiaoning Li

Rupin H Vakharwala

Reshma Lal

Pradeep M Pappachan

Ioannis T Schoinas

Venkateswara Rao Madduri

Willard M Wiseman

Gideon Gerzon

Manohar Ruben Castelino

Vinodh Gopal

Wajdi K Feghali

David J Harriman

Shay Gueron

Hormuzd M Khosravi

Prashant Dewan

Geoffrey S Strongin

David W Grawrock

Sreenivas Subramoney

Sanjay Kumar

Joseph Nuzman

Philip R Lantz

Robert S Chappell

Jayesh Gaur

Jacob Doweck

Robert Valentine

Mark Jay Charney

Kapil Sood

Michael E Kounavis

Kun Tian

Karanvir S Grewal

Jr-Shian Tsai

Wei Ey Li

Igor Tatourian

H Peter Anvin

Bin Xing

Vadim Sukhomlinov

Stanislav Shwartsman

Luis S Kida

David M Lee

Alpa Narendra Trivedi

Sanjoy K Mondal

Steffen Schulz

Patrick Koeberl

Balaji Vembu

Muthaiah Venkatachalam

Bret L Toll

Manoj R Sastry

Wei Wang

Jesse R Walker

Raanan Sade

Santosh Ghosh

Avinash N Ananthakrishnan

Koichi Yamada

Nitin V Sarangdhar

Ron Gabor

Eugene Gorbatov

Ravi Rajwar

Ashok Raj

Russell Jerome Fenger

Dan Baum

Raghu R Kondapalli

Stephen R Van Doren

Steven L Grobman

Belliappa Manavattira Kuttanna

Paul Caprioli

Ofer Levy

Techniques for copying a subset of status flags from a control and status register to a flags register in response to an instruction are described. An exemplary instruction includes a field for an opcode, the opcode to indicate execution circuitry is to copy from a first register a saturation flag value, an overflow value, and a carry value to a second register into one or more instructions of a different instruction set.

Copy a subset of status flags from a control and status register to a flags register

An embodiment of an integrated circuit comprises circuitry to share page tables associated with a page between a processor memory management unit (MMU) and an input/output memory management unit (IOMMU), store a page table entry in the memory associated with the page, and separately control access to the page from a processor and from a direct memory access (DMA) request based on one or more fields of the stored page table entry. Other embodiments are disclosed and claimed.

Independently controlled DMA and CPU access to a shared memory region

System, method, and apparatus embodiments for creating, using, and managing protected cryptography keys are described. In an embodiment, an apparatus includes a decoder, an execution unit, and a cache. The decoder is to decode a single instruction into a decoded single instruction, the single instruction having a first source operand to specify encrypted data and a second source operand to specify a handle including a first including ciphertext of an encryption key, an integrity tag, and additional authentication data. The execution unit is to execute the decoded single instruction to perform a first check of the integrity tag against the ciphertext and the additional authentication data for any modification to the ciphertext or the additional authentication data, perform a second check of a current request against one or more restrictions specified by the additional authentication data of the handle, decrypt the ciphertext to generate an encryption key only when the first check indicates no modification to the ciphertext or the additional authentication data and the second check indicates the one or more restrictions are not violated, decrypt the encrypted data with the encryption key to generate unencrypted data, and provide the unencrypted data as a result of the single instruction. The cache is to store the handle, wherein only a portion of the integrity tag is to be used in a lookup of the handle.

Creating, using, and managing protected cryptography keys

Implementations describe a computing system that implements a plurality of virtual machines inside a trust domain (TD), enabled via a secure arbitration mode (SEAM) of the processor. A processor includes one or more registers to store a SEAM range of memory, a TD key identifier of a TD private encryption key. The processor is capable of initializing a trust domain resource manager (TDRM) to manage the TD, and a virtual machine monitor within the TD to manage the plurality of virtual machines therein. The processor is further capable of exclusively associating a plurality of memory pages with the TD, wherein the plurality of memory pages associated with the TD is encrypted with a TD private encryption key inaccessible to the TDRM. The processor is further capable of using the SEAM range of memory, inaccessible to the TDRM, to provide isolation between the TDRM and the plurality of virtual machines.

Scalable virtual machine operation inside trust domains within the trust domain architecture

This disclosure is directed to a system for address mapping and translation protection. In one embodiment, processing circuitry may include a virtual machine manager (VMM) to control specific guest linear address (GLA) translations. Control may be implemented in a performance sensitive and secure manner, and may be capable of improving performance for critical linear address page walks over legacy operation by removing some or all of the cost of page walking extended page tables (EPTs) for critical mappings. Alone or in combination with the above, certain portions of a page table structure may be selectively made immutable by a VMM or early boot process using a sub-page policy (SPP). For example, SPP may enable non-volatile kernel and/or user space code and data virtual-to-physical memory mappings to be made immutable (e.g., non-writable) while allowing for modifications to non-protected portions of the OS paging structures and particularly the user space.

System for address mapping and translation protection

Apparatus and method for role-based register protection. For example, one embodiment of an apparatus comprises: one or more processor cores to execute instructions and process data, the one or more processor cores to execute one or more security instructions to protect a virtual machine or trusted application from a virtual machine monitor (VMM) or operating system (OS); an interconnect fabric to couple the one or more processor cores to a device; and security hardware logic to determine whether to allow a read or write transaction directed to a protected register to proceed over the interconnect fabric, the security hardware logic to evaluate one or more security attributes associated with an initiator of the transaction to make the determination.

Apparatus and method for role-based register protection for TDX-IO

Techniques for migration of a source protected virtual machine from a source platform to a destination platform are descried. A method of an aspect includes enforcing that bundles of state, of a first protected virtual machine (VM), received at a second platform over a stream, during an in-order phase of a migration of the first protected VM from a first platform to the second platform, are imported to a second protected VM of the second platform, in a same order that they were exported from the first protected VM. Receiving a marker over the stream marking an end of the in-order phase. Determining that all bundles of state exported from the first protected VM prior to export of the marker have been imported to the second protected VM. Starting an out-of-order phase of the migration based on the determination that said all bundles of the state exported have been imported.

Methods, apparatus, systems, and instructions to migrate protected virtual machines

A processor includes a decode unit to decode an instruction that is to indicate a page of a protected container memory, and a storage location outside of the protected container memory. An execution unit, in response to the instruction, is to ensure that there are no writable references to the page of the protected container memory while it has a write protected state. The execution unit is to encrypt a copy of the page of the protected container memory. The execution unit is to store the encrypted copy of the page to the storage location outside of the protected container memory, after it has been ensured that there are no writable references. The execution unit is to leave the page of the protected container memory in the write protected state, which is also valid and readable, after the encrypted copy has been stored to the storage location.

Processors, methods, systems, and instructions to support live migration of protected containers

A processor of an aspect includes a decode unit to decode an instruction. The processor also includes an execution unit coupled with the decode unit. The execution unit, in response to the instruction, is to determine that an attempted change due to the instruction, to a shadow stack pointer of a shadow stack, would cause the shadow stack pointer to exceed an allowed range. The execution unit is also to take an exception in response to determining that the attempted change to the shadow stack pointer would cause the shadow stack pointer to exceed the allowed range. Other processors, methods, systems, and instructions are disclosed.

Processors, methods, systems, and instructions to protect shadow stacks

Embodiments described herein may include apparatus, systems, techniques, or processes that are directed to PCIe Address Translation Service (ATS) to allow devices to have a DevTLB that caches address translation (per page) information in conjunction with a Device ProcessInfoCache (DevPIC) that will store process specific information. Other embodiments may be described and/or claimed.

Method and apparatus to enable a cache (DEVPIC) to store process specific information inside devices that support address translation service (ATS)

Techniques for matrix multiplication are described. In some examples, a single instruction having a format of fields for an opcode, one or more fields to indicate a location of a source/destination operand, one or more fields to indicate a location of a first source operand, and one or more fields to indicate a location of a second source operand is used. Wherein the opcode is to indicate that execution circuitry is to: multiply values from corresponding data elements of the first and second sources, add a first subset of the multiplied values to a first value from the source/destination operand and store in a first data element position of the source/destination operand, and add a second subset of the multiplied values to a second value from the source/destination operand and store in a second data element position of the source/destination operand.

Dual sum of quadword 16×16 multiply and accumulate

Technologies for secure device configuration and management include a computing device having an I/O device. A trusted agent of the computing device is trusted by a virtual machine monitor of the computing device. The trusted agent securely commands the I/O device to enter a trusted I/O mode, securely commands the I/O device to set a global lock on configuration registers, receives configuration data from the I/O device, and provides the configuration data to a trusted execution environment. In the trusted I/O mode, the I/O device rejects a configuration command if a configuration register associated with the configuration command is locked and the configuration command is not received from the trusted agent. The trusted agent may provide attestation information to the trusted execution environment. The trusted execution environment may verify the configuration data and the attestation information. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Technologies for secure device configuration and management

Methods and apparatus relating to an instruction and/or micro-architecture support for decompression on core are described. In an embodiment, decode circuitry decodes a decompression instruction into a first micro operation and a second micro operation. The first micro operation causes one or more load operations to fetch data into one or more cachelines of a cache of a processor core. Decompression Engine (DE) circuitry decompresses the fetched data from the one or more cachelines of the cache of the processor core in response to the second micro operation. Other embodiments are also disclosed and claimed.

Instruction and micro-architecture support for decompression on core

Techniques and mechanisms to efficiently provide features of a secure authentication mode (SEAM) by a processor. In an embodiment, cores of the processor support an instruction set which comprises instructions to invoke the SEAM. One such core installs an authenticated code module (ACM), which is executed to load a persistent SEAM loader module (P-SEAMLDR) in a reserved region of a system memory. In turn, the P-SEAMLDR loads into the reserved region a SEAM module which facilitates trust domain extension (TDX) protections for a given trusted domain. In another embodiment, the instruction set supports a SEAM call instruction with which either of the P-SEAMLDR or the SEAM module is accessed in the reserved region.

Device, system and method to efficiently update a secure arbitration mode module

A processor implementing techniques for processor extensions to protect stacks during ring transitions is provided. In one embodiment, the processor includes a plurality of registers and a processor core, operatively coupled to the plurality of registers. The plurality of registers is used to store data used in privilege level transitions. Each register of the plurality of registers is associated with a privilege level. An indicator to change a first privilege level of a currently active application to a second privilege level is received. In view of the second privilege level, a shadow stack pointer (SSP) stored in a register of the plurality of registers is selected. The register is associated with the second privilege level. By using the SSP, a shadow stack for use by the processor at the second privilege level is identified.

Processor extensions to protect stacks during ring transitions

Growing community of inventors

Austin, TX, United States of America

Vedvyas Shanbhogue