Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC

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Malcolm Erik Pearson

Duy Lan Nguyen

Lan Duy Nguyen

Carl Melvin Ellison

Thomas Michael Roeder

Mira Belenkiy

Henry Nelson Jerez

Mayukh Ray

Timothy Michael Peters

Alptekin Kupcu

Rahul Verma

Prashant Dewan

Josh D Benaloh

Brian LaMacchia

Niels Thomas Ferguson

Jeffrey B Kay

David Charles LeBlanc

David Michael Robinson

Jason Forrest Mackay

Adam D Barr

Melissa Erin Chase

Ramesh Chinta

Andres Felipe Borja Jaramillo

Alex McKelvey

Christian Paquin

Doug Barlow

Matt Pisut

Jeremy Corley

Daniel Bakalars Shumow

Samantha Schumacher

Fabian Nunez-Tejerina

Muhammed Serdar Soran

Henry Nelson Jerez Morales

Andrew Stewart Tucker

Srinivas Dandu

Robert C Fruth

Trent J Byfield

Peter Ciskowski

Joao Lucas Guberman Raza

Naveen A Palavalli

Henry Jerez Morales

Talha Bin Tariq

Mira Belinkiy

Brian LaMachia

Malcolm Eric Pearson

Michael Stark

Ray S Wang

Avradip Mandal

Validating proof of possession (POP) of a private key by a device. A computer system generates a provisioning package for a device catalog. The provisioning package including a POP challenge. After generating the provisioning package, the computer system receives a device activation request for a device. The device activation request includes a public key, a device identifier, and a signature. The computer system validates POP of a private key corresponding to the public key, including using the public key, the device identifier, and the POP challenge to cryptographically verify the signature. The computer system establishes a trust relationship with the device, including registering the public key and the device identifier into the device catalog.

Proof of possession of private keys for remote devices

A public-private key cryptographic scheme is described for granting authenticating a client to a remote device or service in order to access a secure resource. The client is provided the public key, but the private key is stored in a hardware security module (HSM) that the client is not able to access. The client requests a digital signature be generated from the private key from a secure vault service. The secure vault service accesses the HSM and generates the digital certificate, which is then passed to the client. The digital certificate may be added to a security token request submitted to an identity provider. The identity provider determines whether the digital signature came from the private key. If so, the identity provider provides authenticates the client and provides an access token that is usable by the client for authentication to the remote device with the secure resource

Secure digital signing

A public-private key cryptographic scheme is described for granting authenticating a client to a remote device or service in order to access a secure resource. The client is provided the public key, but the private key is stored in a hardware security module (HSM) that the client is not able to access. The client requests a digital signature be generated from the private key from a secure vault service. The secure vault service accesses the HSM and generates the digital certificate, which is then passed to the client. The digital certificate may be added to a security token request submitted to an identity provider. The identity provider determines whether the digital signature came from the private key. If so, the identity provider provides authenticates the client and provides an access token that is usable by the client for authentication to the remote device with the secure resource.

Concepts and technologies are described herein for sharing encrypted data with enhanced security. In some configurations, an encryption key is generated from a password by the use of a password-based key generation technology. In addition, input data is encrypted using the encryption key. The encrypted data and the generated key may be then shared with a remote computer, such as a server. The encrypted data can then be decrypted at the remote computer by the use of the key. By the use of the technologies described herein, the contents of an encrypted file may be accessed at a remote computer without requiring a user to share the actual password.

Sharing encrypted data with enhanced security by removing unencrypted metadata

Described herein is a system and method for validating short authentication data by a server. Short authentication data associated with a particular user is received and a random number generated. The random number is stored by a client device. The short authentication data is committed by calculating a commitment value using the short authentication data, the generated random number and a secret value known only to the server. The server does not persistently store the short authentication data and/or the generated random number. The commitment value is utilized by the server in conjunction with a conjunction transaction to validate a presented short authentication data associated with a particular user and received random number. If a calculated value associated with the presented short authentication data equals the stored commitment value associated with the particular user, the computer transaction is allowed to occur. Otherwise, the computer transaction is blocked.

Validation of short authentication data with a zero knowledge proof

An execution environment has a deployed virtual machine image. The virtual machine image provides a service that is identified by a role. The execution environment generates a measurement of the virtual machine image and provides it to a key service to request role keys that enable operation of the virtual machine image in the execution environment. The key service determines whether the virtual machine image is mapped to the role and, if so, returns the role keys to the requesting execution environment.

Secure service hosted in a virtual security environment

In aspects of active key rolling for sensitive data protection, a data security system includes memory storage implemented as a data store to maintain a batch of sensitive data instruments each encrypted with a previous encryption key. A data encryption service can receive a request from a client device for data in a sensitive data instrument from the batch of the sensitive data instruments. The data encryption service can decrypt the sensitive data instrument with the previous encryption key making the requested data in the sensitive data instrument available for access by the client device. The data encryption service can then re-encrypt the sensitive data instrument with a new encryption key effective to update the encryption of the sensitive data instrument, the updated encryption being triggered based on the request for the data and the decryption of the sensitive data instrument.

Active key rolling for sensitive data protection

The subject disclosure is directed towards processing requests for accessing a service provider. After examining at least one security token, a public key and a portion of attribute information are identified. An authentication component is accessed and applied to the public key. A unique user identifier is employed in generating the public key. The authentication component is generated using information from at least one revoked security token or at least one valid security token. The authentication component is configured to prove validity of the at least one security token.

Verifying requests for access to a service provider using an authentication component

Techniques for implementing high integrity logs for distributed software services are provided. According to one set of embodiments, a key management service running on a key server can maintain a secret master key. The key management service can further generate, for each of a plurality of distributed software service instances, a service key that is unique to a current lifecycle of the software service instance, the generating being based on the master key; and transmit the service key to the software service instance, where the service key is used by the software service instance in creating a high integrity log.

High integrity logs for distributed software services

Described herein are various technologies pertaining to constructions of a password-based authentication protocol that are configured to allow a user to register with and authenticate to an online service without the online service receiving a password or a deterministic function of the password of the user. When registering with an online service, a client computing device establishes a cryptographically strong random secret and stores an encryption of such secret with a data storage device. The storage device also never receives the password or a deterministic function of the password. When the user wishes to authenticate to the online service, the user employs her password to retrieve the encrypted secret from the storage device, decrypts such secret, and utilizes the decrypted secret to answer a cryptographically strong challenge provided to the user by the online service upon the online service receiving a username pertaining to such user.

Securing passwords against dictionary attacks

Example apparatus and methods provide a device (e.g., smartphone) that is more secure for electronic commerce. An example device includes a trusted platform module (TPM) that stores a public key and a private key. The device is provisioned with account information, user information, and device information. The TPM uses the account, user, and device information to acquire attestation credentials and endorsement credentials. The device uses the account, user and device information along with the attestation credentials and endorsement credentials to acquire limited use keys (LUKs) that are encrypted with the public key. The LUKs will only be decrypted as needed to support an actual transaction at the time of the transaction. Before decrypting an LUK, the TPM will authenticate a user of the device at the time of the transaction using. for example, a personal identification number (PIN), fingerprint, or other personal information.

Trusted platform module (TPM) protected device

The subject disclosure is directed towards credential verification for accessing a service provider. A user may prove to the service provider the validity of the credential by communicating a non-revocation component that is based upon a prime-order cryptographic group without a bilinear pairing. In order to authenticate the user, a verification mechanism within an identity management system applies private cryptographic data, including a verifier-designated private key to the non-revocation component, which proves that the user's identity and therefore, the credential is not revoked. The presentation proof includes a hash value that is computed using the credential's commitment and the prime-order cryptographic group. By verifying that the hash value was computed using that commitment, the verification mechanism validates the credential and permits access to the service provider.

Minimal disclosure credential verification and revocation

The subject disclosure is directed towards a technology by which data is securely distributed using a homomorphic signature scheme and homomorphic network coding signature schemes. A homomorphic signature scheme for signing the data is based upon binary pairing with standard prime order groups. Sets of data are signed based upon dividing a larger block of data into smaller blocks, and separately signing each smaller block. The smaller blocks may be distributed to nodes of a network topology that are configured for network coding. In one alternative, the homomorphic signature scheme protects against changes to the block identifier. Proof data may be provided independent of a random oracle, may be provided by providing parameters for verification in a Groth-Sahai proof system, or may be provided by providing parameters for verification independent of a Groth-Sahai proof system.

Homomorphic signatures and network coding signatures

Implementations for providing role-based distributed key management (DKM) replication are described. A server node receives a request from a requester node to perform a DKM create or update function. The server node determines the role of the requester node based on a public key of the requester node. The server node determines whether the role of the requester node indicates that the requester node is authorized to request the DKM create or update function. If the requester node's role is authorized to request the DKM create or update function, then the server node performs the requested function. The DKM create or update function may involve a replication function. Public key and trust chains may be derived from physical cryptographic processors, such as TPMs.

Role-based distributed key management

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