University of Michigan

Timothy Trippel

Kevin Fu

Peter Honeyman

Ofir Weisse

Cyber-physical systems depend on sensors to make automated decisions. Resonant acoustic injection attacks are already known to cause malfunctions by disabling MEMS-based gyroscopes. However, an open question remains on how to move beyond denial of service attacks to achieve full adversarial control of sensor outputs. This work investigates how analog acoustic injection attacks can damage the digital integrity of a popular type of sensor: the capacitive MEMS accelerometer. Spoofing such sensors with intentional acoustic interference enables an out-of-spec pathway for attackers to deliver chosen digital values to microprocessors and embedded systems that blindly trust the unvalidated integrity of sensor outputs. Two software-based solutions are presented for mitigating acoustic interference with output of a MEMS accelerometer and other types of motion sensors.

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Ann Arbor, MI, United States of America

Timothy Trippel