Apple Inc.

Thomas P Mensch

Jerrold Von Hauck

Andrew Roger Whalley

Wade Benson

Dallas Blake De Atley

Michael Brouwer

Libor Sykora

David P Finkelstein

Steven Porter Hotelling

Steve Porter Hotelling

Vratislav Kuzela

Moshe Laifenfeld

Lynn Richard Youngs

Ivan Krstic

Jonathan Pokrass

Anup K Sharma

Thorsten Gernoth

Feng Tang

Michael Ross Malone

Matthew C Waldon

Lucia Elena Ballard

Tal Kaitz

Petr Kostka

Peter Chang

Andrei Kolin

Muralidhar S Vempaty

Deepti S Prakash

Christopher G Zeleznik

Gideon Littwin

Eitan Hirsh

Ziv Hendel

Etai Littwin

Yiqun Zhu

Lucie Kucerova

Tiffany Shih-Yu Fang

Jason D Gosnell

David P Remahl

John Thomas Perry

Bailey E Basile

Pavan Kumar Anasosalu Vasu

Robert M Marini

Edward E Thomas

Venkat V Memula

Kelsey J Skillman

Timothy R Paaske

Josh P De Cesare

Conrad Sauerwald

Julien F Freudiger

Hervé Sibert

Raghunandan K Pai

Kelsey Yukio Ho

Erik C Neuenschwander

Eric Daniel Friedman

Navin Bindiganavile Suparna

Zhimin Chen

Austin G Jennings

Jacques Fortier

Xeno S Kovah

Nikolaj Schlej

John J Dong

Robert C Graham

Pavan Kumar Ansosalu Vasu

Han Jong Yu

Chiye K Kojima

Alan W Yu

Deepti Sunder Prakash

Chris Zeleznik

In some examples, a method comprises determining, at an electronic device having a first component of a first component type, a unique identifier associated with the first component. In some examples, in accordance with a determination that the unique identifier does not match the expected identifier of the component of the first component type in the electronic device, determining that the first component associated with the unique identifier satisfies one or more eligibility criteria. In some examples, in accordance with the determination that the first component associated with the unique identifier satisfies the one or more eligibility criteria, authenticating an association of the first component with the electronic device, including updating an installation counter associated with the first component, and updating the expected identifier for the component of the first type based on the unique identifier of the first component.

Systems and methods for authenticating components on an electronic device

Techniques are disclosed relating to biometric authentication, e.g., facial recognition. In some embodiments, a device is configured to verify that image data from a camera unit exhibits a pseudo-random sequence of image capture modes and/or a probing pattern of illumination points (e.g., from lasers in a depth capture mode) before authenticating a user based on recognizing a face in the image data. In some embodiments, a secure circuit may control verification of the sequence and/or the probing pattern. In some embodiments, the secure circuit may verify frame numbers, signatures, and/or nonce values for captured image information. In some embodiments, a device may implement one or more lockout procedures in response to biometric authentication failures. The disclosed techniques may reduce or eliminate the effectiveness of spoofing and/or replay attacks, in some embodiments.

Biometric authentication techniques

Embodiments described herein provide a system and method for secure delivery of assets to a trusted device. Multiple levels of verification are implemented to enable components of a software update and asset delivery system to verify other components within the system. Furthermore, updates are provided only to client devices that are authorized to receive such updates. In one embodiment, the specific assets provided to a client device during a software update can be tailored to the client device, such that individual client devices can receive updated versions of software asset at a faster or slower rate than mass market devices. For example, developer or beta tester devices can receive pre-release assets, while enterprise devices can receive updates at a slower rate relative to mass market devices.

Secure delivery of assets to a trusted device

Techniques are disclosed relating to securing computing devices during boot. In various embodiments, a secure circuit of a computing device generates for a public key pair and signs, using a private key of the public key pair, configuration settings for an operating system of the computing device. A bootloader of the computing device receives a certificate for the public key pair from a certificate authority and initiates a boot sequence to load the operating system. The boot sequence includes the bootloader verifying the signed configuration settings using a public key included in the certificate and the public key pair. In some embodiments, the secure circuit cryptographically protects the private key based on a passcode of a user, the passcode being usable by the user to authenticate to the computing device.

Securely signing configuration settings

Techniques are disclosed relating to application verification. In various embodiments, a computing device includes a secure circuit configured to maintain a plurality of cryptographic keys of the computing device. In such an embodiment, the computing device receives, from an application, a request for an attestation usable to confirm an integrity of the application, instructs the secure circuit to use one of the plurality of cryptographic keys to supply the attestation for the application, and provides the attestation to a remote computing system in communication with the application. In some embodiments, the secure circuit is configured to verify received metadata pertaining to the identity of the application and use the cryptographic key to generate the attestation indicative of the identity of the application.

Application integrity attestation

Techniques are disclosed relating to relating to a public key infrastructure (PKI). In one embodiment, an integrated circuit is disclosed that includes at least one processor and a secure circuit isolated from access by the processor except through a mailbox mechanism. The secure circuit is configured to generate a key pair having a public key and a private key, and to issue, to a certificate authority (CA), a certificate signing request (CSR) for a certificate corresponding to the key pair. In some embodiments, the secure circuit may be configured to receive, via the mailbox mechanism, a first request from an application executing on the processor to issue a certificate to the application. The secure circuit may also be configured to perform, in response to a second request, a cryptographic operation using a public key circuit included in the secure circuit.

Secure circuit for encryption key generation

Systems and methods for storing and recovering data for a device are described. In one embodiment, factory generated calibration data can be generated, sealed and restored securely even if two sensors in two different devices, such as a first ambient light sensor and a second ambient light sensor have the same sensor identifier. In one embodiment, a device transmits a database key to cause storage or recovery of the calibration data, and the database key includes a sensor identifier and a public cryptographic key of the device.

Factory data storage and recovery

Some embodiments provide a method for recovering user data for a device. To initiate recovery, the method sends to a first server a first request including at least (i) a device identifier and (ii) a first set of cryptographic data for a second set of servers with which the first server communicates. If the first server verifies the device identifier with an attestation authority, the method receives from the second set of servers a second set of cryptographic data generated by the second set of servers. After receiving input of a device passcode for the device, the method sends to the first server a second request comprising at least a third set of cryptographic data for the second set of servers generated based on the device passcode. If the first server verifies the device passcode with the second set of servers, the method receives access to the user data.

Device re-activation

Systems and methods are disclosed for generating one or more hardware reference keys (HRK) on a computing device, and for attesting to the validity of the hardware reference keys. An initial hardware reference key can be a silicon attestation key (SIK) generated during manufacture of a computing system, such as a system-on-a-chip. The SIK can comprise an asymmetric key pair based at least in part on an identifier of the processing system type and a unique identifier of the processing system. The SIK can be signed by the computing system and stored thereon. The SIK can be used to generate further HRKs on the computing device that can attest to the processing system type of the computing device and an operating system version that was running when the HRK was generated. The computing device can generate an HRK attestation (HRKA) for each HRK generated on the computing system.

Silicon key attestation

Techniques are disclosed relating to relating to a public key infrastructure (PKI). In one embodiment, an integrated circuit is disclosed that includes at least one processor and a secure circuit isolated from access by the processor except through a mailbox mechanism. In some embodiments, the secure circuit is configured to generate a public key and a private key for an application, and receive, from the application via an API, a request to perform a cryptographic operation using the private key. The secure circuit is further configured to perform the cryptographic operation in response to the request.

Growing community of inventors

Sunnyvale, CA, United States of America

Thomas P Mensch