Robert Boschgmbh

Giesecke+devrient Mobile Security Gmbh

Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh

Giesecke+devrient Epayments Gmbh

Sven Bauer

Hermann Drexler

Jürgen Pulkus

Andreas Engelsberg

Holger Kussmann

Michael Wollborn

Peter Siepen

Bernd Schmale

Mathias Wien

Lars Hoffmann

Peter Vogel

Aljoscha Smolic

Henning Moeller

Marco Boltz

Alexander Romanowski

Thomas Wedi

Holger Runge

Jens Rainer Ohm

Guido Heising

Gabriel Goller

Jens Vollmer

Björn Soelch

Bjorn Soelch

A method for setting up a subscriber identity module for agreeing one or several exchange keys, between a subscriber identity module and a provisioning server includes generating one or several exchange keys from keys of the provisioning server and of the subscriber identity module on a production server and are transmitted into the subscriber identity module and stored, so that the subscriber identity module is put particularly into a state as though it had generated the exchange keys itself. In a method for agreeing one or several exchange keys, between a subscriber identity module and a provisioning server, the subscriber identity module sends its public key to the provisioning server, which subsequently generates the exchange keys.

Agreement of exchange keys on the basis of two static asymmetric key pairs

A processor device with a white-box masked implementation of the cryptographic algorithm AES implemented thereon, which comprises a SubBytes transformation. The white-box masked implementation is hardened in that white-box round input values x' are supplied at the round input of rounds instead of the round input values x, said white-box round input values being formed from a concatenation of: (i) the round input values x that are masked by means of the invertible masking mapping A and (ii) obfuscation values y that are likewise masked with the invertible masking mapping A; wherein from the white-box round input values x&#x2032; only the (i) round input values x are fed to the SubBytes transformation T, and (ii) the masked obfuscation values y are not.

White box AES implementation

A processor device has an executable implementation of a cryptographic algorithm implemented thereon, which algorithm is adapted to produce an output text from an input text employing a secret key K. The implementation of the algorithm comprises a key-dependent computing step S which comprises a key combination of input values x derived directly or indirectly from the input text with key values SubK derived directly or indirectly from the key; the key-dependent computing step S is represented by a table which is masked with input masking and/or output masking to form a masked table TabSSubK; and a new masked table TabSKneu is generated in the processor device.

Cryptographic algorithm having a key-dependent masked computing step (SBOX call)

A processor device has an executable implementation of the cryptographic algorithm DES implemented with an XOR linkage operation at the round exit and an implemented computation step S arranged to map expanded right input values r' as computation step entry values x=r&#x2032; onto exit values s=S[x]. The computation step S is implemented as a key-dependent computation step further comprises a key linkage operation for linking input values of the round with key values of the round derived directly or indirectly from the key. The computation step S is implemented as a combined key-dependent computation step T which further comprises: a permutation operation P associated with the round, arranged to be applied to exit values s of the computation step S and to supply the exit values s of the computation step in permutated form to the XOR linkage operation at the round exit.

Alternative representation of the crypto-algorithm DES

The invention provides a processor device having an executable, white-box-masked implementation of a cryptographic algorithm implemented thereon. The white-box masking comprises an affine mapping A, which is so designed that every bit in the output values w of the affine mapping A depends on at least one bit of the obfuscation values y, thereby attaining that the output values w of the affine mapping A are statistically balanced.

Hardened white box implementation 1

Methods are provided for testing and hardening software applications for the carrying out digital transactions which comprise a white-box implementation of a cryptographic algorithm. The method comprises the following steps: (a) feeding one plaintext of a plurality of plaintexts to the white-box implementation; (b) reading out and storing the contents of the at least one register of the processor stepwise while processing the machine commands of the white-box implementation stepwise; (c) repeating the steps (a) and (b) with a further plaintext of the plurality of plaintexts N-times; and (d) statistically evaluating the contents of the registers and the plaintexts, the intermediate results and/or the ciphertexts generated from the plaintexts by searching for correlations between the contents of the registers and the plaintexts, the intermediate results and/or the ciphertexts generated from the plaintexts to establish the secret key.

Method for testing and hardening software applications

A processor device has an executable implementation of a cryptographic algorithm implemented thereon that is white-box-masked by a function f. The implementation comprises an implemented computation step S by which input values x are mapped to output values s=S[x], and which is masked to a white-box-masked computation step T' by means of an invertible function f. As a mapping f there is provided a combination (f=(c1, c2, . . . )*A) of an affine mapping A having an entry width BA and a number of one or several invertible mappings c1, c2, . . . having an entry width Bc1, Bc2, . . . respectively, wherein BA=Bc1+Bc2+ . . . . Output values w are generated altogether by the mapping f. The affine mapping A is constructed by a construction method coordinated with the invertible mappings c1, c2, and etc.

Hardened white box implementation

A processor device has an executable implementation of a cryptographic algorithm implemented being white-box-masked by a function f. The implementation comprises an implemented computation step S by which input values x are mapped to output values s=S[x], and which is masked to a white-box-masked computation step T' by means of an invertible function f. As a mapping f there is provided a combination (f=(c1, c2, . . . )*A) of an affine mapping A having an entry width BA and a number of one or several invertible mappings c1, c2, . . . having an entry width Bc1, Bc2, . . . respectively, wherein BA=Bc1+Bc2+ . . . . Output values w are generated altogether by the mapping f. Multiplicities of sets Mxi, i=1, 2, . . . =Mx11, Mx12, . . . Mx21, Mx22, . . . are formed from the output values a of the affine mapping A.

Hardened white box implementation 2

A method for carrying out an application with the help of a portable data carrier, wherein the data carrier includes two separated communication interfaces. According to the method, a user transmits via a first terminal specified input data for processing by the application to a server via a first data connection between the first terminal and the server. Then, authentication data for authenticating the application based on the input data of the server are transmitted via a second data connection between the server and the data carrier which is connected via the first communication interface with the first terminal. The authentication data are then transmitted from the data carrier via a third data connection to the second terminal. The third data connection is realized by means of the second communication interface. Finally, upon confirmation of the authentication data by the user via the first or second terminal confirmation data to the server are transmitted via at least the first or second data connection, whereupon the server executes the application.

Method for carrying out an application with the aid of a portable data storage medium

A method and a system for checking whether program instructions have been executed by an end device, wherein, the end device calls for program instructions and the program instructions are stored in executable form in a trustworthy entity, in particular a chip card. Subsequently, the program instructions are variably modified in the trustworthy entity such that the modified program instructions vary upon each execution of the method. Through execution of the instructions in the end device there is obtained a check value which is in turn transferred to the trustworthy entity and verified in the trustworthy entity.

Method for checking whether program instructions have been executed by a portable end device

In methods for determining, in a way that is protected against spying, the modular inverse b of a value a in relation to a module n for a cryptographic application, an auxiliary value &#x3b2; and an auxiliary module &#x3b4; are determined at least depending on the value a, the module n and at least one masking parameter r, an auxiliary inverse &#x3b2;' is determined as the modular inverse of the auxiliary value &#x3b2; in relation to the auxiliary module &#x3b4;, and the modular inverse b is determined at least depending on the auxiliary inverse &#x3b2;&#x2032;, the at least one masking parameter r, and the auxiliary value &#x3b2; and/or the auxiliary module &#x3b4;. A computer program product and a portable data carrier have corresponding features. The invention provides a method for modular inversion, secured against spying, which is suitable for applications where security is critical, such as, e.g. cryptographic calculations on a portable data carrier.

Modular inversion that is protected against espionage

In the case of a method for transformation encoding of moving-image sequences, motion vectors are estimated block-by-block, with which said motion vectors a motion compensation is carried out. The prediction error is transformation-encoded. According to the invention, the block size of the transformation encoding is coupled to the block size used in each case for the motion compensation. This measure makes it possible to enhance the efficiency of the encoding of the prediction error in hybrid encoding procedures that use various block sizes.

Method for transformation-coding full motion image sequences

An entertainment device has a control element with which a user may have equivalent data searched for and then played back by the entertainment device. The data currently being played back are examined for characteristic features, so that the search for equivalent data is then possible using these features. In particular, the actuation of the control element may be used to modify a user profile. In addition, it is possible for the data currently being played back to be stored in the entertainment device when the control element is actuated.

Entertainment device

A bus station for connection to a bus in a motor vehicle, including a basic module as well as expansion modules. The basic station can access the expansion and basic modules of other bus stations via the bus for a called-up service. This enables configuration of infotainment systems in motor vehicles according to a modular design.

Bus station in a vehicle

For the description of audio-visual data content in a multimedia environment, a binary representation of description structures is used. A binary identifier (BID) for each specified descriptor (D) and description scheme (DS) as well as a binary description definition language (DDL) represent the components. The advantages of a binary representation are a more compact encoding of description structures and thus savings in storage capacity and/or bandwidth. A faster parsing of the encoded data, especially in the context of dynamically varying descriptions, is thereby achieved.

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Vaterstetten, Germany

Sven Bauer