Viasat, Inc.

L3harris Technologies, Inc.

Stuart N Shanken

John R Owens

Richard L Quintana

John C Andolina

Jon E Stearn

Thomas J Allen

Peter C Camana

Sean K Parker

Charles A Wolfe

A Link 16 terminal. The Link 16 terminal includes a red enclave. The red enclave comprises a Link 16 radio. The Link 16 radio is configured to send commands to Link 16 modems. The commands specify time slots when operations in the commands should be performed by the Link 16 modems. The Link 16 terminal further includes a black enclave physically separated from the red enclave. The black enclave includes a Link 16 modem configured to receive commands from the Link 16 radio. The Link 16 terminal further includes a communication channel configured to facilitate communication between the red enclave and the black enclave. The Link 16 radio is configured to dynamically adjust when commands are sent to the Link 16 modem with respect to time slots specified in the commands based on latency between the Link 16 radio and the Link 16 modem.

Split radio tactical data link terminal

A cryptographic device and method are disclosed for processing different levels of classified information. Input and output ports are physically isolated on the cryptographic device. Within the cryptographic device, each port has its packets labeled in such a way that it can be processed differently from other packets by a cryptographic module. High-assurance techniques are used to assure labeling and proper processing of the packets. These labeled packets are intermixed on common pathways regardless of level of classification. Despite intermixing, separation of the packets is assured through the process.

Trusted labeler

A device for high-assurance processing is disclosed. A processing circuit uses an access controller to assure that the processing circuit operates properly. The processing circuit runs software programs and is programmable. The access controller is programmable, but not programmable by the processing circuit. Peripherals or segments of the address space of the processing circuit is regulated. In a particular state, the peripherals that are available are regulated by the access controller. In some embodiments, the transition from state-to-state can also be regulated by the access controller.

Input output access controller

In one embodiment, a method for trusted booting of a cryptographic processor system is disclosed. Default image(s) is loaded into a field-programmable logic chip or circuit (FPLC). The default image(s) cannot perform cryptographic processing, but can perform a first algorithm that is unclassified. A processor, internal or external to the FPLC, can be used with the default image. A multi-layer or multi-part key has portions stored in two different places. A protected image is decrypted with the multi-layer key using the first algorithm and loaded into the FPLC. Cryptographic processing is performed using a second algorithm classified by the government.

Trusted boot

In one embodiment, a method for operating a field-programmable logic chip or circuit (FPLC) is disclosed. Operation of the FPLC includes a configuration state and a cryptographic processing state. Switching between states is controlled by a state machine. Each state has one or more images. Transferring between states causes some or all images from the other state being overwritten.

Growing community of inventors

San Diego, CA, United States of America

Stuart N Shanken