Qualcomm Incorporated

Steven Mark Millendorf

Seung Hyuk Kang

Xiaochun Zhu

Matthew Michael Nowak

Kangho Lee

David Merrill Jacobson

Xu Guo

Xia Li

Jungwon Suh

Hari Rao

Wah Nam Hsu

Asaf Ashkenazi

Tae Hyun Kim

Nicholas K Yu

Wuyang Hao

Jung Pill Kim

Thomas Andrew Sartorius

Sei Seung Yoon

Jeffrey Todd Bridges

Chulmin Jung

Esin Terzioglu

Michael Kevin Batenburg

Cameron A McDonald

Sarath Chandra Kasarla

Jung Pil Kim

A mask-programmed read-only memory (MROM) has a plurality of column line pairs, each having a bit line and a complement bit line. The MROM includes a plurality of memory cells corresponding to a plurality of intersections between the column line pairs and a plurality of word lines. Each memory cell includes a high Vt transistor and a low Vt transistor.

Mask-programmed read only memory with enhanced security

One feature pertains to a method of implementing a physically unclonable function. The method includes initializing an array of magnetoresistive random-access memory (MRAM) cells to a first logical state, where each of the MRAM cells have a random transition voltage that is greater than a first voltage and less than a second voltage. The transition voltage represents a voltage level that causes the MRAM cells to transition from the first logical state to a second logical state. The method further includes applying a programming signal voltage to each of the MRAM cells of the array to cause at least a portion of the MRAM cells of the array to randomly change state from the first logical state to the second logical state, where the programming signal voltage is greater than the first voltage and less than the second voltage.

Physically unclonable function based on programming voltage of magnetoresistive random-access memory

One feature pertains to a method of implementing a physically unclonable function that includes providing an array of metal-insulator-metal (MIM) devices, where the MIM devices are configured to represent a first resistance state or a second resistance state and a plurality of the MIM devices are initially at the first resistance state. The MIM devices have a random breakdown voltage that is greater than a first voltage and less than a second voltage, where the breakdown voltage represents a voltage that causes the MIM devices to transition from the first resistance state to the second resistance state. The method further includes applying a signal line voltage to the MIM devices to cause a portion of the MIM devices to randomly breakdown and transition from the first resistance state to the second resistance state, the signal line voltage greater than the first voltage and less than the second voltage.

Physically unclonable function based on breakdown voltage of metal-insulator-metal device

One feature pertains to a method for implementing a physically unclonable function (PUF). The method includes providing an array of magnetoresistive random access memory (MRAM) cells, where the MRAM cells are each configured to represent one of a first logical state and a second logical state. The array of MRAM cells are un-annealed and free from exposure to an external magnetic field oriented in a direction configured to initialize the MRAM cells to a single logical state of the first and second logical states. Consequently, each MRAM cell has a random initial logical state of the first and second logical states. The method further includes sending a challenge to the MRAM cell array that reads logical states of select MRAM cells of the array, and obtaining a response to the challenge from the MRAM cell array that includes the logical states of the selected MRAM cells of the array.

Physically unclonable function based on the initial logical state of magnetoresistive random-access memory

One feature pertains to a method of implementing a physically unclonable function (PUF). The method includes exposing an array of magnetoresistive random access memory (MRAM) cells to an orthogonal external magnetic field. The MRAM cells are each configured to represent one of a first logical state and a second logical state, and the orthogonal external magnetic field is oriented in an orthogonal direction to an easy axis of a free layer of the MRAM cells to place the MRAM cells in a neutral logical state that is not the first logical state or the second logical state. The method further includes removing the orthogonal external magnetic field to place each of the MRAM cells of the array randomly in either the first logical state or the second logical state.

Physically unclonable function based on the random logical state of magnetoresistive random-access memory

A method herein is for encryption key update in a station. In the method, a first data block is encrypted using a first plurality of round keys over a first plurality of rounds to generate a first encrypted data block, wherein the first plurality of round keys are generated based on an initial block key. A round key of the first plurality of round keys is retained for use as a basis for a first derived block key. A second data block is encrypted using a second plurality of round keys over a second plurality of rounds to generate a second encrypted data block, wherein the second plurality of round keys are generated based on the first derived block key. A round key of the second plurality of round keys may be retained for use as a basis for a second derived block key.

Apparatus and method for key update for use in a block cipher algorithm

A memory device includes a magnetic tunnel junction (MTJ) bitcell. The MTJ bitcell includes a first MTJ and a second MTJ. The memory device further includes programming circuitry configured to generate a non-reversible state at the bitcell by applying a program signal to a selected one of the first MTJ and the second MTJ of the bitcell. The non-reversible state corresponds to a value of the MTJ bitcell that is determined by comparing a first value read at the first MTJ and a second value read at the second MTJ.

Non-reversible state at a bitcell having a first magnetic tunnel junction and a second magnetic tunnel junction

Methods and systems to guard against attacks designed to replace authenticated, secure code with non-authentic, unsecure code and using existing hardware resources in the CPU's memory management unit (MMU) are disclosed. In certain embodiments, permission entries indicating that pages in memory have been previously authenticated as secure are maintained in a translation lookaside buffer (TLB) and checked upon encountering an instruction residing at an external page. A TLB permission entry indicating permission is invalid causes on-demand authentication of the accessed page. Upon authentication, the permission entry in the TLB is updated to reflect that the page has been authenticated. As another example, in certain embodiments, a page of recently authenticated pages is maintained and checked upon encountering an instruction residing at an external page.

Methods and systems for checking run-time integrity of secure code cross-reference to related applications

Systems and methods are provided for verifying the integrity of test functionality for an integrated circuit design. This may be achieved, for example, by analyzing the integrated circuit design to identify a driver element that outputs a security signal for controlling the test functionality, analyzing the integrated circuit design to identify an input stage of one or more elements that feed the driver element, monitoring the security signal over a range of values for the input stage, and determining that an error exists in the test functionality if a change in the security signal is detected during the monitoring.

Test functionality integrity verification for integrated circuit design

A method of generating a non-reversible state at a bitcell having a first magnetic tunnel junction (MTJ) and a second MTJ includes applying a program voltage to the first MTJ of the bitcell without applying the program voltage to the second MTJ of the bitcell. A memory device includes a bitcell having a first MTJ and a second MTJ and programming circuitry configured to generate a non-reversible state at the bitcell by applying a program signal to a selected one of the first MTJ and the second MTJ of the bitcell.

Generating a non-reversible state at a bitcell having a first magnetic tunnel junction and a second magnetic tunnel junction

A system and method to control a power on reset signal is disclosed. In a particular embodiment, a power on reset circuit includes a first linear feedback shift register and a second linear feedback shift register. The first linear feedback shift register is configured to operate at least partially in parallel with the second linear feedback shift register.

Growing community of inventors

San Diego, CA, United States of America

Steven Mark Millendorf