Westinghouse Electric Company LLC

Abb Combustion Engineering Nuclear Power, Inc.

Combustion Engineering, Inc.

Ce Nuclear Power LLC

Stephen J Wilkosz

Raymond Robert Senechal

Robert E Bryan

Donald D Zaccara

Deva R Chari

Stephen G Bransfield

Glenn J McCloskey

Arthur G King

Paul L Yanosy

Gary D Althenhein

James E Robertson

Frank J Safryn

Gary D Altenhein

A communication network for nuclear plant protection systems includes monitoring and control channels, including a first pair of channels having first and second channels, the first pair of channels communicating through fiber optic data paths with a second pair of channels having third and fourth channels; a plurality of engineered safety feature trains, including first and second trains, the first train communicating directly with the first pair of channels and the second train, the second train communicating directly with the second pair of channels and the first train; a first vital power bus powering the first channel; a second vital power bus powering the second channel, and redundantly powering the first train and first vital power bus; a third vital power bus powering the third channel; and a fourth vital power bus powering the fourth channel, and redundantly powering the second train together with the third vital power bus.

Dual optical communication network for class 1E reactor protection systems

An interface between a Plant Protection System and Engineered Safety Features in a nuclear power plant is disclosed for continuously monitoring the plant protection system initiation circuit for each remotely actuated Engineered Safety Feature system to effect remedial action in the event that the Plant Protection System generates a 'trip' signal. By using actuation inputs from the Plant Protection System and manual, operator implemented inputs, controls are provided for remote equipment components, such as solenoid valves, motor operated valves, pumps, fans and dampers.

Digital engineered safety features actuation system

An automatic self-testing system includes a plurality of sensor processing channels or paths each having a sensor for providing, either directly or indirectly, a digital value to a comparator which compares the measured value with predetermined value that is, in turn, provided to coincidence logic that evaluates the output of its comparator with the output of the comparators of the other paths to provide an output indicative of a pass/fail condition. Each sensor processing path includes two sub-paths that can be associated with or switched into the processing path while the disassociated sub-path undergoes off-line testing by a test processor. Testing is effected by providing a digital value to the sub-path under test while sensing the output to determine the functional validity of the sub-path under test. The combinational logic state of the system is monitored and converted into a decimal value that is compared with the set of decimal values corresponding to the finite known-good logic states of the system. The appearance of a decimal value that is not a member of the set of decimal values for the known-good logic states is thus an indication of a failure.

Automatic self-test system utilizing multi-sensor, multi-channel

A digital plant protection system for use in nuclear power plants of the pressurized water type includes cross-connected sensed-parameter processing channels that provide a suitably conditioned digital value to a digital comparator that tests the conditional digital value against a predetermined value to determine whether or not the sensed parameter has been exceeded. A comparator is associated with each of the plural channels and receives a separate measurement of the sensed parameter for each channel. If a sensed-parameter is determined to be out-of-specification by 2 of 4 or more channels, a `trip` signal is generated to effect remedial action.

Digital plant protection system

A feedwater control system and method for a pressurized water reactor steam generating system having first and second output signals. The first output signal is determined by first and second input signals, and, when combined with a third input signal automatically controls at least one feedwater pump and first designated valves which regulate water flow from the one or more feedwater pumps to a steam generator when a steam generator steam load and reactor are operating at a first predetermined power level. The first input signal is determined by a downcomer feedwater flow differential pressure. The second input signal is determined by a reactor power level. The third input signal is determined by a steam generator level. The second output signal, determined by a steam generator water level, automatically controls at least one startup feedwater control valve when the steam generator steam load and the reactor are operating at a second predetermined power level. In a preferred embodiment, the first designated valves include at least one economizer feedwater control valve and at least one downcomer feedwater control valve. Also, in a preferred embodiment, the first predetermined power level is between about 5 and about 20 percent, and the second predetermined power level is between zero and about 5 percent.

Feedwater control over full power range for pressurized water reactor

The operator of a nuclear steam supply system manually selects a lineup of either one, two, or three main feedwater pumps for normal reactor operation to generate power. This selection sets or resets a status latch for each pump, representative of intended pump operation. A system (RPCS) for implementing a step reduction in the power output of the reactor, includes an associated logic circuit which combines signals indicative of tripping of one or more pumps, with the pump status latches, to achieve the following outcomes: (a) with one pump selected, a trip of this one pump does not produce an RPCS trip demand signal (because the reactor will be tripped); (b) with two pumps selected, (i) a trip of one pump will produce an RPCS trip demand signal, whereas (ii) a trip of these two pumps will not produce an RPCS trip demand signal; (c) with three pumps selected, (i) a trip of one pump will not produce an RPCS trip demand signal (because the transient can be handled by the basic control system), (ii) a trip of two pumps will produce an RPCS trip demand signal, and (iii) a trip of three pumps will not produce an RPCS trip demand signal.

Growing community of inventors

Vernon, CT, United States of America

Stephen J Wilkosz