Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corporation

Stephen Howard Craven

Jeffrey Donald Kernwein

Matthew Vrba

Ann K Grimm

Danial Rice

Rebecca W Dreasher

James H Moore

William Christopher Hall

Bryan Clay Burke

Bryan C Burke

William C Hall

A communication system includes communication units onboard a vehicle system. A first unit receives satellite positioning data and correction data based on phase measurements of satellite signals. A second unit receives the satellite positioning data. One or more processors determine a first geographical position of the first unit based on the position correction data and the satellite positioning data. The processors communicate the position correction data or a copy thereof to the second unit. The processors determine second geographical position data of the second unit based on the position correction data and the satellite positioning data. The one or more processors communicate the second geographical position data that is determined to the first communication unit.

Real-time kinematics for a vehicle system

A system for determining a location of a rail vehicle based on a radio frequency (RF) signal includes at least one processor programmed or configured to receive an RF signal transmitted by at least one radio transmitter device, where the RF signal includes location data associated with the location of the at least one radio transmitter device, determine a location of the at least one radio transmitter device based on the location data associated with the location of the at least one radio transmitter included in the RF signal, and determine a location of a rail vehicle based on the location of the at least one radio transmitter device. A method and computer program product are also disclosed.

Determining location of a rail vehicle based on a radio frequency signal

A system and method for a secure key exchange between two trains operating within a track network may include generating a first or second public key based on a secret random number, generating a shared secret key based on the first or second public key, authenticating one or more key exchange communications by a remote server based on a digital signature established with an on-board key associated with the first train, authenticating a communication by a remote server based on the digital signature of the second train signed with an on-board key associated with the second train, and establishing secure train-to-train communication between the two trains by generating a shared secret key based on a public key received from the other train, the secure key exchange protecting the two trains from a man-in-the-middle attack.

Secure vehicle to vehicle communication

A method and a communication system includes establishing a communication link between a first vehicle and an off-board database. The first vehicle and the off-board database are communicatively linked via a first communication system. A message from a second vehicle may be received via the off-board database. The second vehicle and the off-board database are communicatively coupled via a second communication system. A response may be communicated from the first vehicle to the second vehicle via the off-board database.

Communication system

A method of determining geographic positions of a head of train (HOT) unit and an end of train (EOT) unit of a train includes receiving, by the HOT, first satellite radio position data and position correction data; determining, by the HOT, a first geographic location of the HOT based on the first satellite radio position data and the position correction data received by the HOT; receiving, by the EOT, second satellite radio position data; receiving, by the EOT from the HOT via a communication link, a copy of the position correction data received by the HOT; determining, by the EOT, a second geographic location of the EOT based on the second satellite radio position data and the position correction data received by the EOT; and receiving, by the HOT from the EOT, a copy of second geographic location of the EOT.

Real-time kinematics for end of train

Systems and methods of verifying train integrity may include generating EOT operation information based on sensor data from one or more sensors located at the end of a train, monitoring train integrity by periodically determining if the EOT operation information correlates to HOT operation information in a head of the train associated with a status of one or more sensors in the head of the train within a predetermined range, generating an integrity notification based at least partially on monitoring the predetermined range between EOT operation information and HOT operation information, and communicating a notification of an integrity event to at least one of the following: an on-board computer, an EOT device, a remote server associated with a specified entity, or any combination thereof.

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Cedar Rapids, IA, United States of America

Stephen Howard Craven