Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC

Stefan Thom

Robert Karl Spiger

Erik Lee Holt

Paul England

Ronald Aigner

Brian Clifford Telfer

Torsten Stein

Valerie Kathleen Bays

Merzin Kapadia

Mark Fishel Novak

Carl Melvin Ellison

Shivaram H Mysore

David Rudolph Wooten

David John Linsley

Himanshu Soni

Magnus Nyström

Kenneth D Ray

Russell Humphries

Stuart Hillary Schaefer

Jonathan D Schwartz

James Anthony Schwartz, Jr

Jamie Hunter

David Garfield Thaler, Iii

Dennis James Mattoon

Magnus Nystrom

Shon Eizenhoefer

Marcus Peinado

Alastair Wolman

David G Thaler

Octavian Tony Ureche

Stefan Saroiu

Andrew Layman

Marc R Barbour

Himanshu Raj

Scott Daniel Anderson

David Michael Robinson

Kirk Shoop

Kevin M Litwack

Nick Voicu

Jeremiah J Cox

Yash Gandhi

Xintong Zhou

Rob Spiger

Scott Field

Cristian Marius Ilac

Anil Francis Thomas

Gerardo Diaz-Cuellar

Preston Derek Adam

Sai Vinayak

Deepu Chandy Thomas

Nicolae Voicu

Daniel Stelian Mihai

Joerg-Thomas Pfenning

Artem Zhurid

Sangho Lee

Magnus NystrÖm

Christopher G Kaler

Innokentiy Basmov

Nathan Jeffrey Ide

Vijay G Bharadwaj

Ning Zhang

Magnus Bo Gustaf Nyström

Charles Glenn Jeffries

Hakki Tunc Bostanci

Xiaohong Su

Yair Tor

Kinshuman Kinshumann

Victor W Heller

Dan Sledz

Dayi Zhou

Son VoBa

Tony Ureche

Nils Dussart

Anoosh Saboori

Navin Narayan Pai

Amos Ortal

Mikael P Horal

Daniel Bakalars Shumow

Kevin Patrick Kane

Alexey Efron

Vandana Gunupudi

Douglas M Maclver

Alessandro Contenti

Robert Solomon

James Hugh Morgan

Bo Gustaf Magnus Nyström

Eric Holt

Yash Ashok Kumar Gandhi

Son Voba

Charles G Jeffries

Andrew John Layman

James Anthony Schwartz Jr

Magnus Bo Gustaf NYSTRÖM

Trusted execution of a workload payload is brokered among multiple trusted execution platforms. The workload payload is received from a source computing system and includes input data, trusted execution code, and one or more trusted execution policies. At least one of the multiple trusted execution platforms is selected based on the one or more trusted execution policies. A brokered payload is generated to include executable trusted execution code and the input data. The brokered payload is communicated to the selected at least one trusted execution platform. A brokered result generated from the brokered payload by the selected at least one trusted execution platform is received. A workload result based on the brokered result is returned to the source computing platform.

Trusted execution broker

A device is equipped with a public/private key pair. The private key is stored in a secure location on the device and the public key is utilized to track ownership of the device by a manufacturer, vendor, and/or one or more provisioning services. When a user purchases the device, a transaction involving the public key associated with the device and the user is recorded. The one or more provisioning services, which are provided access to user information, prepare a configuration payload for the device specific to the user and the device. The configuration payload is encrypted using the device's public key. When the device is powered on, the configuration payload is sent to the device. The device decrypts the configuration payload using the device's private key and adjusts one or more configuration parameters based on the configuration payload.

Device provisioning

A brownfield security gateway is configured to support a trusted execution environment (TEE) that employs cryptographic and physical security—which forms a trusted cyber physical system—to protect sensitive transmissions on route to a controllable device. The gateway may be implemented with a System on Chip (SoC) that utilizes an application layer gateway to filter content within a transmission. When the application layer gateway authorizes the transmission, the transmission is forwarded to a trusted peripheral device that is configured with communication transport protocols, and the trusted peripheral device transfers the transmission to the controllable device. The trusted peripheral device and the controllable device are physically protected by, for example, protected distribution systems. Accordingly, the trusted peripheral device functions as a gateway between the SoC and the controllable device.

Trusted cyber physical system

A storage device for booting a host computing device includes a first storage memory region having a first storage memory controller, a second storage memory region having a second storage memory controller, and a resilient boot controller. The resilient boot controller is configured to store boot code in the first storage memory region, prevent write access by the host computing device through the first storage memory controller to the first storage memory region, detect a reset of the host computing device through the input/output interface, copy at least a portion of the boot code from the first storage memory region to the second storage memory region, responsive to detection of the reset of the host computing device, and enable read access of the copied boot code by the host computing device through the second storage memory controller of the second storage memory region, responsive to the copy operation.

Selective boot sequence controller that cryptographically validating code package for resilient storage memory

A system manages access to an asset using a separate physical cryptographically-secure key device. A memory stores a public key as an unalterable record. An access configuration controller reads the public key from the memory to control the access to the asset. The public key is cryptographically paired with a private key securely recorded in the separate physical cryptographically-secure key device. The access configuration controller receives an access control change instruction signed by the private key and verifies a valid signing of the access control change instruction by the private key using the public key read from the memory. A storage system secured by the access configuration controller stores access authorization records managing access to the asset. The access configuration controller alters access authorization records according to the access control change instruction, responsive to verification of the valid signing of the access control change instruction.

Cyber physical key

Inducements are provided to customers to regularly connect back to a service provider and report usage that is expressed using a count of requests from a local computing device for cloud-based operations such as packet routing, container instantiation, virtual machine (VM) utilization, calls to a service or application, and the like. The count information is reported within a secure context, such as a trusted execution environment (TEE), using public-private key pair cryptography by which key derivation is dependent on some form of counting. For example, a customer computing device that is subject to a usage license encrypts an operation count and reports it to the service provider.

Secure count in cloud computing networks

Selective boot sequence controller for resilient storage memory

A brownfield security gateway is configured to support a trusted execution environment (TEE) that employs cryptographic and physical security&#x2014;which forms a trusted cyber physical system&#x2014;to protect sensitive transmissions on route to a controllable device. The gateway may be implemented with a System on Chip (SoC) that utilizes an application layer gateway to filter content within a transmission. When the application layer gateway authorizes the transmission, the transmission is forwarded to a trusted peripheral device that is configured with communication transport protocols, and the trusted peripheral device transfers the transmission to the controllable device. The trusted peripheral device and the controllable device are physically protected by, for example, protected distribution systems. Accordingly, the trusted peripheral device functions as a gateway between the SoC and the controllable device.

Trusted agents operating within a trusted execution environment (TEE) of a client computing device are configured with complex computational puzzles (e.g., hash functions or other proof of work puzzles) for a remote service to solve before the trusted agent executes an operation. The trusted agent may have a policy that the puzzle is associated with, in which the policy defines a statistically defined time period over which puzzles are solved. The statistically defined time period is effectuated through parameters which control a complexity of the puzzle. Malware or bad actors that attempt to misuse the trusted agent are throttled until the remote service solves the puzzle, which is configured with a level of complexity that takes the statistically defined time period.

Measured execution of trusted agents in a resource constrained environment with proof of work

A computing device's trusted platform module (TPM) is configured with a cryptographic watchdog timer which forces a device reset if the TPM fails to solve a cryptographic challenge before the expiration of the timer. The computing device's TPM is configured to generate the cryptographic challenge, to which the computing device does not possess the cryptographic token for resolution. While the watchdog timer counts down, the computing device requests a cryptographic token from a remote service to solve the challenge. The remote service transmits the cryptographic token to the computing device so long as the remote service identifies no reason to withhold the token, such as the computing device being infected with malware. The interoperability of the computing device and remote service enables the remote service to exercise control and reset capabilities over the computing device.

Cryptographic hardware watchdog

A provisioning service operating on a remote server is configured to handle provisioning of Internet of Things (IoT) devices, in which IoT devices are configured to execute policies provided by the provisioning service to self-regulate access to an IoT portal. The provisioning service generates an access token and policy which are unique to a trusted platform module (TPM) for a respective IoT device. The TPM executes the policy upon each instance in which the IoT device requires authorization to perform an operation or access the IoT portal. The policy may be configured according to a prepaid or postpaid model. In both models a local counter within the TPM of the IoT device may increment upon each instance of authorization. Under the prepaid model the IoT device may acquire a set number of uses, and under the postpaid model a statement may be generated based on prior usage.

Trusted platform module-based prepaid access token for commercial IoT online services

Before a composition is ingested into a runtime environment at a runtime device, the composition may be verified at an authoring trusted execution environment (TEE) operating on an authoring device. A user can operate an untrusted computing platform (e.g., a personal computer, laptop computer, tablet computer, etc.) to write code, generate data, or create some other composition. Since this composition is created on an untrusted device, the authoring TEE may output the composition on a trusted peripheral device to a user for review and approval. Responsive to receiving approval at the trusted peripheral device, the authoring TEE can sign the composition with a local key and forward the composition for execution by the runtime device. The signature can be utilized by the runtime device to prove that it was reviewed and verified by an authorized user operating the authoring device.

Secure policy ingestion into trusted execution environments

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Stefan Thom