Infineon Technologies Ag

Stefan Seidl

Joel Hatsch

Artur Wroblewski

David Alvarez

Christoph Saas

A bit generation circuit having a plurality of signal chains, where for each chain, a first input of an input multiplexer is connected to another of the signal chains and the multiplexer is configured so that, if a control signal indicating a normal operating mode is fed to the multiplexer, the multiplexer connects the first input to the path input of the signal chain. The second input of each multiplexer is connected to the output of a bit generation trigger circuit and, for each signal chain, the multiplexer is configured so that, if a control signal indicating a secret generation mode is fed to the multiplexer, it connects the second input to the path input of the signal chain. The bit generation circuit furthermore comprises an arbiter circuit connected to the path outputs of at least two signal chains and configured to output a secret bit depending on their states.

Integrated circuit and method for protecting an integrated circuit against reverse engineering

A semiconductor device including a carrier having two main surfaces situated opposite one another, a circuit, having at least one resistance element, in and/or on the carrier, wherein the at least one resistance element has a longitudinal axis extending vertically between the main surfaces of the carrier, and a current limiting circuit configured to limit a current flowing through the resistance element to a value at which it is ensured that an electrical resistance of the resistance element remains substantially unchanged.

Semiconductor device and method of forming a semiconductor device

A method for protecting an integrated circuit against reverse engineering including predefining a secret bit, forming a first clocked memory element having a first data input, a first data output and a first clock input in the integrated circuit, forming a second clocked memory element having a second data input, a second data output and a second clock input in the integrated circuit, forming a logic path in the integrated circuit and coupling the first data output to the second data input via the logic path and forming a clock signal line in the integrated circuit and coupling the first clock input to the second clock input via the clock signal line. The logic path and the clock signal line are formed such that their delays are such that, depending on a value of the secret bit, a logic level change of the first clocked memory element with a clock edge of a clock signal on the clock signal line affects a logic level output by the second clocked memory element with the same clock edge of the clock signal, or a logic level change of the first clocked memory element with a clock edge of a clock signal on the clock signal line affects a logic level output by second clocked memory element with any clock edge coming after the next clock edge of the clock signal.

Integrated circuit protection against reverse engineering

Techniques for electrostatic discharge (ESD) protection that apply a negative voltage to an MOS power clamp during an ESD event. The power clamp may be initially turned on by a short positive pulse to the gate to trigger the power clamp to switch into a parasitic bipolar mode, to quickly shunt the electrical energy from the ESD event around other circuitry. However, repeatedly triggering an NMOS power clamp into bipolar mode may cause the power clamp performance to degrade. For example, the NMOS power clamp may develop an increase in leakage current. The techniques of this disclosure apply a negative voltage to the gate of the power clamp which may reduce the holding and triggering voltage during the ESD event as well as improve leakage degradation of the power clamp after repeated ESD events.

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Munich, Germany

Stefan Seidl