Qualcomm Incorporated

Other

Soo Bum Lee

Gavin Bernard Horn

Anand Palanigounder

Adrian Edward Escott

Stefano M Faccin

John Nasielski

George Cherian

Santosh Paul Abraham

Keiichi Kubota

Ozcan Ozturk

Abhishek Pramod Patil

Miguel Griot

Hong Cheng

Lenaig Genevieve Chaponniere

Karl Georg Hampel

Ravi Agarwal

Haris Zisimopoulos

Jay Rodney Walton

Alireza Raissinia

Vincent Douglas Park

Jouni Kalevi Malinen

Linhai He

Karthika Paladugu

Naga Bhushan

John Edward Smee

Rajesh K Pankaj

Thomas Rouse

Rajat Prakash

Aziz Gholmieh

Mungal Singh Dhanda

Sebastian Speicher

Hongil Kim

Huilin Xu

Hung Dinh Ly

Peter Pui Lok Ang

Jing Lei

Hwan Joon Kwon

Xipeng Zhu

Masato Kitazoe

Sai Yiu Duncan Ho

Luis Fernando Brisson Lopes

Ajay Gupta

Huichun Liu

Cogol Tina

Tao Luo

Kapil Gulati

Wooseok Nam

Alexandros Manolakos

Gabi Sarkis

Shuanshuan Wu

Ahmed Elshafie

Anantharaman Balasubramanian

Peng Cheng

Olufunmilola Omolade Awoniyi-Oteri

Weimin Duan

Mahmoud Watfa

Shailesh Maheshwari

Dan Vassilovski

Gene Wesley Marsh

Amer Catovic

Philip Michael Hawkes

Yu-Ting Yu

Vanitha Aravamudhan Kumar

Mark Bapst

Jangwon Lee

Jouni Malinen

Reference signals used in location estimation of a user equipment (UE) in a wireless data network can be secured against a man-in-the-middle attack by a transmitting device withholding the conveyance of transmission parameters for decoding portions of a reference signal until after the portions are transmitted. Thus, receiving devices can buffer received signals and, after receiving the transmission parameters, process the buffered signals. To further prevent an attacker device from attacking future reference signals, transmission parameters can be nondeterministic such that an attacker device obtaining a parameter at a certain period of time is unable to use the decoded parameter predict or determine subsequent transmission parameters.

Positioning reference signal (PRS) securitization in user equipment (UE) positioning

Apparatus, methods, and computer program products for disaggregated UE are provided. An example method includes establishing, with a second UE, a connection session based on a configuration profile, the configuration profile including a mapping of an upper-layer protocol to a lower-layer protocol, one or more security policies, and a routing for one or more services associated with the second UE to a protocol stack. The example method further includes managing a connection between the second UE and a third device via the connection session.

Disaggregated UE architecture

Aspects relate to user equipment (UE) to user equipment (UE-to-UE) relaying in a communication system. At least two remote UEs and a UE-to-UE relay receive provisioned security information from the wireless communication network, where the security information includes discovery parameters and relay security information. The security information provisioned by the wireless communication network is used to establish a connection between the two UEs and the UE-to-UE relay device including discovery of the UE-to-UE relay by the remote UEs. Furthermore, the provisioned security information is used to establish a secure connection between the two remote UEs via the UE-to-UE relay device.

Secure communication link establishment for a UE-to-UE relay

Certain aspects of the present disclosure provide techniques for controlling access and use of network resources and services by user equipment based on user equipment capabilities. In one aspect, a method for wireless communication by a network entity, includes: receiving, from a user equipment, a request to connect to a network, the request comprising a user equipment identifier and a reduced capability indication; determining a validity of the reduced capability indication based on at least one of: subscription data associated with the user equipment; or one or more capabilities associated with the user equipment; and making a connection decision based on the validity of the reduced capability indication.

Restricted access and use control for user equipment with reduced capabilities

Apparatus, methods, and computer-readable media for facilitating self-managed trust in Internet-of-Things networks are disclosed herein. An example method of trust management at a network manager includes enrolling a network endpoint with a network managed by the network manager. The example method also includes receiving trusted reference information for the network endpoint based on enrolling the network endpoint. Additionally, the example method includes performing verification of the network endpoint based on at least one of the trusted reference information or an attestation received from the network endpoint. Further, the example method includes enforcing policies to the network endpoint based on a result of the verification. Such trust management may improve privacy and security at the network, as well as reduce latency in responding to trust incidents.

Self-managed trust in internet of things networks

Methods, systems, and devices for communications are described. A device or a group of devices may generate data. The group of devices may receive a group profile from a node that identifies the devices to be included, and the group profile may include a function to be evaluated at each of the devices. The node may also provision evaluation parameters which may allow the device to provide authenticated aggregate data to a requesting third party, without sharing the data between the devices, thus concurrently maintaining individual data privacy and data provenance.

Secure multiparty computation for internet of things communications

This disclosure provides methods, devices and systems related multi-link wireless communication. A method may include establishing, between the first WLAN device and a second WLAN device, a multi-link association that enables a first wireless communication link and a second wireless communication link. The method may include determining a temporal key for the multi-link association. The method may include encrypting a first and second media access control (MAC) protocol data unit (MPDU) based on the temporal key. The method may include preparing a first frame including the encrypted first MPDU and a second frame including the encrypted second MPDU. The method may include assigning packet numbers from a set of sequential packet numbers to the first and second frames. The method may include transmitting the first frame over the first wireless communication link and the second frame over the second wireless communication link.

Security for multi-link operation in a wireless local area network (WLAN)

Some aspects described herein relate to provisioning aerial vehicles with identifiers, certificates, or other credentials for communicating based on a mobile network. The UAV can transmit a request to register with the mobile network, where the request includes at least a hardware identifier of the UAV. The UAV may receive, from a component of the mobile network, a response to the request, where the response includes a unique UAV identifier, a UAV certificate, and a network certificate generated by at least one of the component of the mobile network or a unmanned aircraft system service supplier (USS).

Techniques for identifying aerial vehicles in mobile networks

The present disclosure provides techniques that may be applied, for example, for providing network policy information in a secure manner. In some cases, a UE may receive a first message for establishing a secure connection with a network, wherein the first message comprises network policy information, generate a first key based in part on the network policy information, and use the first key to verify the network policy information.

Incorporating network policies in key generation

Methods, systems, and devices for wireless communications are described. A user equipment (UE) may receive synchronization messages from a public cell that indicates synchronization information. The UE may input information received from the one or more synchronization messages into one or more functions provisioned at the UE to derive a set of control resources associated with a private cell. The UE may monitor the set of control resources to receive encrypted system information from the private cell. The UE may decrypt the system information of the private cell by deriving a cell specific broadcast key associated with the private cell. In some examples, the UE may derive the cell specific broadcast key based on the one or more functions provisioned at the UE. As such, the UE may transmit to the private cell via the set of control resources a random access message indicating successful decryption of the system information.

Cell access for hiding network presence and operation

Methods, systems, and devices for wireless communications are described. Private keys may be maintained upstream in a network at a more secure location. For example, when a signature is needed, a base station may transmit a signing request to a signing function within the core network and may transmit system information (SI) to be protected. The signing function may use a private key to generate a signature for the SI and returns the signature to the base station. The base station may transmit the SI and the signature to user equipment (UEs) within a coverage area of the base station. The UEs may obtain a public key corresponding to the private key and may use the public key to verify that the signature for the SI is valid and from the base station. The public key, and hence the signature, may correspond to a particular tracking area.

System information protection at a network function in the core network

Techniques for secure control plane communications between a User Equipment (UE) and a gNB are provided. A RAN network entity decides to handover a UE from a source base station (BS) to a target BS, wherein the RAN network entity controls a plurality of BSs including at least one of the source BS or the target BS, and wherein at least a portion of a control plane (CP) protocol layer is implemented at the target BS. The network entity generates at least one key specific to the target BS, based on a master key and a freshness parameter, the master key associated with the network entity. The network entity transmits an indication of the at least one key to the target BS, wherein the target BS exchanges control signaling with the UE based on the CP protocol layer using the at least one key.

Access stratum (AS) security for a centralized radio access network (C-RAN)

Methods, systems, and devices are provided for supporting user plane integrity protection (UP IP) for communications with a radio access network (RAN). Various embodiments may include indicating whether or not a wireless device supports UP IP over Evolved Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) Terrestrial Radio Access (eUTRA) by including UP IP support indications in user equipment (UE) security capability information elements (IEs).

User plane integrity protection (UP IP) capability signaling in 5G/4G systems

Methods, systems, and devices for wireless communications are described. A target user equipment (UE) may receive an indication of a session key from an initiator UE in a sidelink communications system, from a network entity (e.g., a base station), or the like. In some cases, the target UE may also receive an indication of a nonce in a message of a PRS procedure. The target UE may select a positioning reference signal (PRS) sequence for the PRS procedure using the session key and optionally the nonce, such as by using a defined function at the target UE with the session key and the nonce as an input. Once the target UE selects the PRS sequence, the target UE may encode the PRS sequence and may transmit the PRS sequence to the initiator UE.

Methods for secure sidelink positioning

Various aspects of the present disclosure generally relate to wireless communication. In some aspects, a user equipment (UE) may determine, based at least in part on a key derivation function and a set of physical layer parameters, a secret key for encrypting a unicast physical channel at a physical layer, wherein the secret key is a UE-specific secret key. The UE may transmit, to a base station, an encrypted transmission over the unicast physical channel based at least in part on the secret key. Numerous other aspects are described.

Physical channel encryption using secret keys

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San Diego, CA, United States of America

Soo Bum Lee