Nec Corporation

Sivabalan Arumugam

Anand Raghawa Prasad

Hironori Ito

Sheeba Backia Mary Baskaran

Sivakamy Lakshminarayanan

Andreas Kunz

Takahito Yoshizawa

Sander De Kievit

Pradheepkumar Singaravelu

Hisashi Futaki

Toshiyuki Tamura

Naoaki Suzuki

Nivedya Parambath Sasi

Rohini Rajendran

Pradheep Kumar Singaravelu

Takihito Yoshizawa

A communication terminal capable of preventing a reduction in security level that is caused at the time of establishing multiple connections via 3GPP Access and Non-3GPP Access. A communication terminal according to the present disclosure includes: a communication unit configured to communicate with gateway devices disposed in a preceding stage of a core network device via an Untrusted Non-3GPP Access; and a key derivation unit configured to derive a second security key used for security processing of a message transmitted using a defined protocol with the gateway device, from a first security key used for security processing of a message transmitted using a defined protocol with the core network device.

Communication terminal, core network device, core network node, network node, and key deriving method

A communication terminal () according to the present disclosure includes: a control unit () configured to, in a case of a movement from a communication area formed by the 5GS to a communication area formed by the EPS or a movement from a communication area formed by the EPS to a communication area formed by the 5GS, determine whether or not a communication system forming a communication area at a movement destination can satisfy requirements of services; and a communication unit () configured to, when it is determined that the communication system forming the communication area at the movement destination can satisfy the requirements of the services, send a connection request message to the communication system forming the communication area at the movement destination.

Communication terminal, network device, communication method, and non-transitory computer readable medium

The present disclosure provides a User Equipment (UE) comprising a transceiver circuit; and a controller configured to control the transceiver circuit to send, to an Access and mobility Management Function (AMF) of a communication node, an identifier, wherein upon successful authentication of a network access function of the UE in the communication node, the controller is configured to maintain a secure connection with the communication node.

Method for establishing a secure connection between a UE and a network, a user equipment and a communication system

The method includes: generating, by a source base station, a UE specific Anonymity Challenge Parameter to the UE based on sensitive information from the UE, cell information, source base station information and initial Anonymity Challenge Parameter assigned to the particular base station; and sending, by the source base station, a measurement command message including the UE specific Anonymity Challenge Parameter to the UE. Further, the method includes receiving, by the source base station, an Anonymity Challenge Parameter acknowledgement as a response from the UE; and negotiating, by the source base station, the UE specific Anonymity Challenge Parameter with the UE to prevent the UE from attaching to the false base station.

Source base station, UE, method in wireless communication system

The present disclosure relates to authentication methods supported by the User Equipment (UE) to the core network and authentication method (selected by the core network) to the UE. These can be used for negotiating any primary or secondary (or any) authentication method and are applicable when multiple authentication methods are supported at the UE and the network (authentication server). Further, the present disclosure also offers security solution to prevent modification or tampering of the parameters in the mechanisms in order to prevent attacks such as bidding-down, Denial of Service (DoS) and Man-In-The-Middle (MITM).

Authentication method for next generation systems

A method for providing a key derivation function (KDF) negotiation in a 5G network is provided. The method which includes: selecting a specific KDF at a UE and at the network for at least one security related key derivation; and transmitting, said selected KDF to the UE and to other network functions to indicate said selected KDF for generating specific security key at a receiver side.

Method, UE, and network for providing KDF negotiation

Provided is an authentication device capable of generating a master key suited to a UE in a 5GS. The authentication device () includes a communication unit () configured to, in registration processing of user equipment (UE), acquire UE key derivation function (KDF) capabilities indicating a pseudo random function supported by the UE, a selection unit () configured to select a pseudo random function used for generation of a master key related to the UE by use of the UE KDF capabilities, and a key generation unit () configured to generate a master key related to the UE by use of the selected pseudo random function.

Authentication device, network device, communication system, authentication method, and non-transitory computer readable medium

A communication terminal () includes control means for generating a subscription concealed identifier (SUCI) including a subscription permanent identifier (SUPI) concealed using a predetermined protection scheme, and a protection scheme identifier identifying the protection scheme, and transmission means for sending the SUCI to a first network apparatus during a registration procedure, the SUCI being sent for a second network apparatus to de-conceal the SUPI from the SUCI based on the protection scheme used to generate the SUCI.

Communication terminal, network apparatus, communication method, and de-concealment method

A method for integrity protection scheme by a mobile communication device or a core network entity according to a first exemplary aspect of the present disclosure includes configuring settings and parameters for integrity protection for user data with another party; receiving user plane data from the other party, calculating Message Authentication Code for Integrity (MAC-I) for a part of the data and checking integrity of the part of the data.

Growing community of inventors

Chennai, India

Sivabalan Arumugam