Cisco Technology, Inc.

Shwetha Subray Bhandari

Frank Brockners

Eric Albin Voit

Sujal Sheth

William F Sulzen

Carlos M Pignataro

Nagendra Kumar Nainar

Selvaraj Mani

Rakesh Reddy Kandula

Saiprasad Reddy Muchala

David Delano Ward

Samer Salam

Atri Indiresan

Eric G Vyncke

Santhosh N

Venkata Krishna Sashank Dara

Andrew Yourtchenko

Kannan Jayaraman

Pascal Thubert

Reshad Rahman

Robert Stephen Rodgers

Chennakesava Reddy Gaddam

Jesse Daniel Backman

Joseph Eryx Malcolm

Arvind Saproo

Manoj N Kumar

Hendrikus G P Bosch

Louis Gwyn Samuel

Zafar Ali

Alessandro Duminuco

Enzo Fenoglio

Jeffrey Michael Napper

Surendra M Kumar

Humberto Jose La Roche

Eliot Lear

Sape Jurriën Mullender

Lionel Florit

Craig Thomas Hill

Jose Antonio Liste

Swapna Yelamanchi

Srihari Raghavan

Amarender R Musku

Akshaya Nadahalli

Shrirang Arvind Bage

Deep Preet Singh

Pallavi Kalapatapu

Wenqin Shao

Annu Singh

Gaurav Kumar

Sashank Venkata Krishna Dara

Srinivasu Angadala

Swapna Gopalkrishna Shingre

Andrei M Iourtchenko

Eric Vyncke

A verifier peer system transmits a request to an application of another peer system to obtain integrity data of the application. In response to the request, the verifier peer system obtains a response that includes kernel secure boot metrics of the other peer system and integrity data of the application and of any application dependencies. If the verifier peer system determines that the response is valid, the verifier peer system evaluates the integrity data and the kernel secure boot metrics against a set of Known Good Values to determine whether the integrity data and the kernel secure boot metrics are valid. If the integrity data and the kernel secure boot metrics are valid, the verifier peer system determines that the other peer system is trustworthy.

Attestation-based scheme for validating peering setups for critical infrastructure protocols

Systems, methods, and computer-readable media for assessing reliability and trustworthiness of devices operating within a network. An ARP responder can receive an ARP request from an ARP requestor for performing address resolution between the ARP requestor and the ARP responder in a network environment. The ARP responder can build an ARP response including attestation information of the ARP responder. Further, the ARP responder can provide, to the ARP requestor, the attestation information for verifying the ARP responder using the ARP response and the attestation information of the ARP responder.

Verifying the trust-worthiness of ARP senders and receivers using attestation-based methods

This disclosure describes various methods, systems, and devices related to identifying path changes of data flows in a network. An example method includes receiving, at a node, a packet including a first signature. The method further includes generating a second signature by inputting the first signature and one or more node details into a hash function. The method includes replacing the first signature with the second signature in the packet. The packet including the second value is forwarded by the node.

Path signatures for data flows

Techniques to facilitate verification of in-situ network telemetry data of data packet of data traffic of packet-switched networks are described herein. A technique described herein includes a network node obtaining a data packet of data traffic of a packet-switched network. The data packet includes an in-situ network telemetry block. The network node obtains telemetry data and cryptographic key. The cryptographic key confidentially identifies the network node. The node encrypts at least a portion of the telemetry data based on the cryptographic key to produce signed telemetry data and updates telemetry-data entry of the in-situ network telemetry block. The telemetry data and signed telemetry data is inserted into the telemetry-data entry. The node forwards the data packet with the updated telemetry-data entry to another network node of the packet-switched network.

Verification of in-situ network telemetry data in a packet-switched network

Systems, methods, and computer-readable media for discovering trustworthy devices through attestation and authenticating devices through mutual attestation. A relying node in a network environment can receive attestation information from an attester node in the network environment as part of a unidirectional push of information from the attester node according to a unidirectional link layer communication scheme. A trustworthiness of the attester node can be verified by identifying a level of trust of the attester node from the attestation information. Further, network service access of the attester node through the relying node in the network environment can be controlled based on the level of trust of the attester node identified from the attestation information.

Discovering trustworthy devices using attestation and mutual attestation

Technologies for attestation techniques, systems, and methods to confirm the integrity of a device for establishing and/or maintaining a trustworthy encrypted network session. An example method can include sending, via a server and using a cryptographic security protocol, a message associated with establishing an encrypted network session; receiving a response from a client device; identifying a level of trust of the client device based on the response; determining whether to perform a next step in the cryptographic security protocol based on the level of trust, wherein the cryptographic security protocol comprises at least one of a Secure Shell (SSH) protocol, a Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, a Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol, and an Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) protocol.

Network security by integrating mutual attestation

Systems, methods, and computer-readable media for assessing reliability and trustworthiness of devices operating within a network. A recipient node in a network environment can receive a neighbor discovery (ND) message from an originating node in the network environment that are both implementing a neighbor discovery protocol. Trustworthiness of the originating node can be verified by identifying a level of trust of the originating node based on attestation information for the originating node included in the ND message received at the recipient node. Connectivity with the recipient node through the network environment can be managed based on the level of trust of the originating node identified from the attestation information included in the ND message.

Establishing trust relationships of IPv6 neighbors using attestation-based methods in IPv6 neighbor discovery

Technologies for proving packet transit through uncompromised nodes are provided. An example method can include receiving a packet including one or more metadata elements generated based on security measurements from a plurality of nodes along a path of the packet; determining a validity of the one or more metadata elements based on a comparison of one or more values in the one or more metadata elements with one or more expected values calculated for the one or more metadata elements, one or more signatures in the one or more metadata elements, and/or timing information associated with the one or more metadata elements; and based on the one or more metadata elements, determining whether the packet traversed any compromised nodes along the path of the packet.

Technologies for proving packet transit through uncompromised nodes

This disclosure describes various methods, systems, and devices related to identifying path changes of data flows in a network. An example method includes receiving, at a node, a packet including a first value. The method further includes generating a second value by inputting the first value and one or more node details into a hash function. The method includes replacing the first value with the second value in the packet. The packet including the second value is forwarded by the node.

Systems, methods, and computer-readable media for authenticating access control messages include receiving, at a first node, access control messages from a second node. The first node and the second node including network devices and the access control messages can be based on RADIUS or TACACS+ protocols among others. The first node can obtain attestation information from one or more fields of the access control messages determine whether the second node is authentic and trustworthy based on the attestation information. The first node can also determine reliability or freshness of the access control messages based on the attestation information. The first node can be a server and the second node can be a client, or the first node can be a client and the second node can be a server. The attestation information can include Proof of Integrity based on a hardware fingerprint, device identifier, or Canary Stamp.

Authentication of network devices using access control protocols

Techniques for utilizing a communication system that provides access to a representation of a virtual environment to participants. The communication system may establish connections between personal communication bridge(s) associated with participant(s) interacting within a virtual proximity radius of one another's virtual indicator in the virtual environment. The communication system may cause conversation data to be sent each personal communication bridge associated with a participant that is within the virtual proximity radius of the sender, and cause conversation data to be received via the personal communication bridge of a participant that is within the virtual proximity radius of the sender. The communication system may also analyze data associated with the participant profile(s) and transcribed conversation data from the communication bridges(s) to recommend potential conversations of interest to participant(s).

Virtual proximity radius based web conferencing

A methodology for requesting at least one signed security measurement from at least one module is provided. The methodology includes receiving the at least one signed security measurement from the at least one module; validating the at least one signed security measurement; generating a signed dossier including all validated signed security measurements in a secure enclave, the signed dossier being used by an external network device for remote attestation of the device.

Remote attestation of modular devices with multiple cryptoprocessors

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Bengaluru, India

Shwetha Subray Bhandari