Cisco Technology, Inc.

Siemens Information & Communication Networks, Inc.

Higherground, Inc.

Journey.ai

Avaya Inc.

Siemens Communications, Inc.

Juniper Networks, Inc.

Siemens Business Communication Systems, Inc.

Siemens Rolm Communications Inc.

Siemens Information and Communication Systems, Inc.

Siemens Information

Other

Siemens Aktiengesellschaft

Siemens Enterprise Communications, Inc.

Communication Networks, Inc.

Shmuel Shaffer

William Joseph Beyda

Labhesh Patel

Mukul Jain

Joseph Khouri

Shantanu Sarkar

Jean-Philippe Vasseur

Sanjeev Kumar

Sandeep Shetty

James M Behmke

Steven L Christenson

Alexander John Shockley

Michael Joseph Frendo

Brett Shockley

Robert S Reis

Kenneth Keiter

Gebran George Chahrouri

Larry Raymond Metzger

Kittur V Nagesh

Shah Talukder

Michael E Knappe

Amit Prakash Barave

Darren Robert Reis

Douglas J Hall

Robert T Bell

Yogesh Kalley

David Alexander Reuss

Bich Nguyen

Michael P O'Brien

Ramanathan T Jagadeesan

Gregory Pelton

Robert E Gleichauf

Bruce Leonard McKinley

Charles J Bedard

Jonathan W Hui

Cullen F Jennings

Alan Darryl Gatzke

Mark Evan Russell

Neal Dante Castagnoli

Scott A McDermott

James C Frauenthal

Bruce D Moon

Mark Skrzynski

James A Aviani, Jr

Randall Paul Joseph Ethier

Sravan Vadlakonda

David Weiss

Markku Korpi

Aseem Asthana

Ashish P Chotai

Peter J Kozdon

George E Carter

Denise G Caballero-McCann

Marcelo Oliveira

Sheldon Joseph Davis

Valentine C Matula

Tony McCormack

Reinhard P Klemm

Randall Bernard Baird

Cary W FitzGerald

Patrick Tendick

Eli Jacobi

Leroy Edwin Gilbert

Thiyagesan Ramalingam

Pascal Thubert

Patrick Wetterwald

Stefano Benedetto Previdi

Johnny Hsienchow Lee

Michael Anthony Ramalho

Christopher Edwin Pearce

Robert J Friday

Rajneesh Kumar

Jisheng Wang

John F Wakerly

Arijit Mukherji

Martin Cieslak

John James Musante

Seamus Hayes

Laurent Philonenko

Xiaoying Wu

Gary Skrabutenas

Michael Sassin

Joshua Rosenthal

Oscar S Ernohazy

Guido Jouret

Navindra Yadav

Arturo A Rodriguez

John Albert Toebes

Paul D'Arcy

Thomas J Moran

Arthur Gerald Howarth

Fadi Ramzi Jabbour

Wen-Hua Ju

Keith M Ponting

Alex Yiu-Man Chan

Ebrahim S Safavi

Stephen Levy

Michael James Krack

Chellury R Sastry

Aaron Tong

In one embodiment, a method herein may comprise: receiving, at a first device, an encrypted private key of a second device encrypted using a public key of the first device, wherein the second device encrypted data into encrypted data using a public key of the second device and stored the encrypted data on a storage server; and decrypting, by the first device, a private key of the second device from the encrypted private key using a private key of the first device; and accessing, by the first device, the encrypted data on the storage server by utilizing the private key of die second device.

Storing encrypted data for access by a trusted device

The techniques herein are directed generally to a 'zero-knowledge' data management network. Users are able to share verifiable proof of data and/or identity information, and businesses are able to request, consume, and act on the data—all without a data storage server or those businesses ever seeing or having access to the raw sensitive information (where server-stored data is viewable only by the intended recipients, which may even be selected after storage). In one embodiment, source data is encrypted with a source encryption key (e.g., source public key), with a rekeying key being an encrypting combination of a source decryption key (e.g., source private key) and a recipient's public key. Without being able to decrypt the data, the storage server can use the rekeying key to re-encrypt the source data with the recipient's public key, to then be decrypted only by the corresponding recipient using its private key, accordingly.

Receiving information through a zero-knowledge data management network

Sourcing information for a zero-knowledge data management network

According to one or more of the embodiments herein, systems and techniques for satellite relaying for geolocation and mitigation of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) denial are provided. In one embodiment, a method comprises: receiving, at a processing device from a communication satellite along a communication path, a message initiated by a transmitting device and indicating a transmission time, the communication path having a target device with an unknown distance to the communication satellite; determining a reception time upon receiving the message, (the processing device and the transmitting device have synchronized clocks); determining a time difference between the transmission time and the reception time; calculating a distance between the communication satellite and the target device based on a portion of the determined time difference associated with only traversal of a portion of the communication path between the communication satellite and the target device; and performing action(s) based on the distance.

Satellite relaying for geolocation and mitigation of GNSS denial

Controlling transmission of information through a zero-knowledge data management network

The techniques herein are directed generally to a 'zero-knowledge' data management network. Users are able to share verifiable proof of data and/or identity information, and businesses are able to request, consume, and act on the data-all without a data storage server or those businesses ever seeing or having access to the raw sensitive information (where server-stored data is viewable only by the intended recipients, which may even be selected after storage). In one embodiment, source data is encrypted with a source encryption key (e.g., source public key), with a rekeying key being an encrypting combination of a source decryption key (e.g., source private key) and a recipient's public key. Without being able to decrypt the data, the storage server can use the rekeying key to re-encrypt the source data with the recipient's public key, to then be decrypted only by the corresponding recipient using its private key, accordingly.

Securing attestation using a zero-knowledge data management network

A system includes a plurality of access point devices (APs) configured to provide a wireless network at a site, each of the plurality of APs having a known location, and a network management system comprising one or more processors and a memory comprising instructions that when executed by the one or more processors cause the one or more processors to: determine, based on a known location of a first AP of the plurality of APs, a known location of a second AP of the plurality of APs, and received signal strength measurements of wireless signals originating at one or more antennas of the first AP and received by one or more antennas of the second AP, an orientation angle of the second AP; and generate an output indicative of the orientation angle of the second AP.

Determining orientation of deployed access points

Satellite relaying for geolocation and mitigation of GNSS denial are provided, where a method comprises: receiving, by a processing device from a communication satellite along a communication path, a message initiated at a transmission time by a transmitting device, the communication path having a target device with an unknown distance to the communication satellite; determining, by the device, a reception time upon receiving the message; determining, by the device, a time of travel of the message associated with only traversal of a portion of the communication that is path between the communication satellite and the target device based on a difference between the transmission time and the reception time; calculating, by the device, a distance between the communication satellite and the target device based on the time of travel; and performing, by the device, one or more actions based on the distance between the communication satellite and the target device.

Performing concealed transactions using a zero-knowledge data management network

A network management system (NMS) is configured to control roaming in a wireless network using a variable mobility threshold. For a first wireless device associated with a current location, the NMS obtains at least one performance metric of a first wireless signal received by the first wireless device at the current location from a first AP of a plurality of APs, compares the at least one parameter of the first wireless signal to at least one performance metric of a second wireless signal received by at least one other wireless device at the current location from a second AP of the plurality of APs, and triggers a roaming operation of the first wireless device from the first AP to the second AP if the comparison satisfies a mobility threshold that varies based on the at least one performance metric of the first wireless signal.

Control of roaming in a wireless network using a variable mobility threshold

Embodiments are generally directed to managing power consumption of powered devices. In some embodiments, the powered devices draw power from a common source of power, which is limited. Under certain circumstances, exceeding the power limits can cause interruption of power to one or more of the devices, thus introducing a source of communication failures. To ensure reliable communications, an attempt to increase a power consumption of a first powered device in a power group is first reviewed to determine if the increase will cause a supplied power of the group to exceed a maximum power of the group. If the increase will cause the maximum power to be exceeded, the increase is modified, in some circumstances, to fit within the maximum power level. Alternatively, power consumption of a lower priority device is reduced to accommodate the requested power consumption increase.

Cooperative power management

Disclosed are embodiments that determine a location of a first wireless device based on estimates of two other wireless devices. Each of the other wireless devices is assigned or defines its own plurality of regions. Each wireless device estimates a location of the first wireless device with respect to its assigned or defined plurality of regions. One of the estimates is then translated to the other device's plurality of regions. The two estimates are then combined to estimate the location of the first wireless device.

Multi-wireless device location determination

Satellite echoing for geolocation and mitigation of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) denial are provided herein, where an example method comprises: transmitting, by a processing device, an echo message along a communication path having a communication satellite and a target device with an unknown distance to the communication satellite; receiving, by the processing device, a return of the echo message from the communication satellite over the communication path; determining, by the processing device, a time of travel of the echo message associated with only a single traversal of a portion of the communication path that is between the communication satellite and the target device; calculating, by the processing device, a distance between the communication satellite and the target device based on the time of travel; and performing, by the processing device, one or more actions based on the distance between the communication satellite and the target device.

Satellite echoing for geolocation and mitigation of GNSS denial

Growing community of inventors

Palo Alto, CA, United States of America

Shmuel Shaffer