International Business Machines Corporation

Trusteer, Ltd.

Shmuel Regev

Amit Klein

Ron Peleg

Zohar Basil

Eldan Ben-Haim

Shahar Kohanim

Oleg Izmerly

Alexandra Shulman-Peleg

Ehud Aharoni

Tamer Salman

Michael Boodaei

Amir Ronen

Shai Barlev

A security manager configured to generate a plurality of learned security policies and provide at least one learned security policy and a security agent to a client machine for enforcement of the at least one learned security policy by the security agent on the client machine. The security manager configured to receive alerts from the security agent indicating anomalous behavior on the client machine.

Intrusion detection and mitigation in data processing

A computer security method including preventing access by a computer in a first computer network to a resource at a location within the first computer network responsive to the computer accessing a computer-readable document retrieved from a second computer network, wherein a reference to the resource is associated with the computer-readable document.

Computer network cross-boundary protection

A computer security method including detecting access, by a computer in a first computer network, to a computer-readable document, determining whether the computer-readable document was retrieved from a second computer network, identifying a reference, associated with the computer-readable document, to a resource at a location within the first computer network, and preventing access by the computer to the resource at the location within the first computer network responsive to determining that the computer-readable document was retrieved from the second computer network.

Detecting heap spraying on a computer by determining that values of characteristics of a plurality of requests to allocate portions of heap memory are consistent with benchmark values of the characteristics, wherein the benchmark values of the characteristics are associated with heap spraying; and performing a computer-security-related remediation action responsive to determining that the values of the characteristics are consistent with the benchmark values of the characteristics.

Detecting heap spraying on a computer

Detecting computer anomalies by determining probabilities of encountering call stack configurations at various depths, the call stacks being associated with software application instances on computers having the same operating system, where snapshots of the call stacks are recorded on the computers responsive to detecting predefined software application events, determining entropies of call stack configurations at various call stack depths using their associated probabilities, determining stack frame rarity scores of call stack configurations at various depths based on their associated stack frame entropies in accordance with a predefined rarity function, determining a call stack rarity score of any given call stack configuration as the maximum stack frame rarity score of the given configuration, and detecting an anomaly associated with any given one of the computers where any of the snapshots recorded on the given computer is of a call stack whose call stack rarity score meets a predefined anomaly condition.

Using call stack snapshots to detect anomalous computer behavior

Protecting a computer security application by executing the computer security application on a computer in a first namespace associated with an operating system of the computer, and creating a second namespace associated with the operating system of the computer, where the second namespace is accessible to the computer security application, and where the first namespace is inaccessible from the second namespace.

Protecting computer security applications

Dynamic verification of a computer software application execution path by detecting execution of a target instruction of a computer software application, wherein the computer software application is configured to generate a token at an instruction near a waypoint instruction of the computer software application, and wherein the waypoint instruction lies along an execution path that leads to the target instruction. Determining, responsive to detecting execution of the target instruction, whether a token exists. Performing a computer-security-related remediation action responsive to determining that the token does not exist.

Dynamic verification of a computer software application execution path

Detecting heap spraying on a computer by detecting a plurality of requests to allocate portions of heap memory, measuring the plurality of requests to determine a value of a characteristic of the plurality of requests, identifying an activity consistent with heap spraying by determining that the value of the characteristic is consistent with a benchmark value of the characteristic, wherein the benchmark value of the characteristic is associated with heap spraying, and performing a computer-security-related remediation action responsive to determining that the value of the characteristic is consistent with the benchmark value of the characteristic.

A method for protecting a browser from malicious processes, comprises providing at least one process-proxy object and at least a browser-proxy object, interposed between the browser and a process, such that when the process invokes one of the DOM entry points, the process-proxy object isolates it from the real browser implementation and executes the process-proxy object's code instead.

Remote DOM access

A method for preventing malicious attacks on software, using the patching method, includes providing a database of malicious known patches (malware). The database contains characteristic signatures of the malware. The method also includes detecting whether a patch is malicious by comparing it with a signature in the database and performing one or more activities needed to prevent the malicious patch from performing undesired activities.

Functional patching/hooking detection and prevention

A method for preventing malicious attacks on software, using the patching method, includes providing a database of legitimate and known patches, the database contains characteristic code paths of said legitimate patches. The method also includes detecting whether a patch is malicious by inspecting one or more characteristic paths of the patch and matching one or more code paths against the database of legitimate and known patches. An activity needed to prevent the malicious patch from performing undesired activities is then performed.

Growing community of inventors

Tel Aviv, Israel

Shmuel Regev