Robert Boschgmbh

Shalabh Jain

Jorge Guajardo Merchan

Sekar Kulandaivel

Sven Trieflinger

Stefan Gehrer

Qian Wang

Xinxin Fan

Md Tanvir Arafin

Thomas Huber

Samarjit Das

Timo Lothspeich

Attila Altay Yavuz

Qingji Zheng

Jan Holle

Indrasen Raghupatruni

Sebastian Becker

Vadim Raskin

Mesbah Uddin

Santosh Purushothama

Robert Lock

Saraswathy Ramanathapuram Vancheeswaran

Christian Matthias Didong

Pradeep Pappachan

Tanvir Arafin

Jorge Merchan

Systems and methods relate to pairing a first electronic control unit (ECU) to a second ECU. First identification data of the first ECU is transmitted to the second ECU. Second identification data of the second ECU is received from the second ECU. After a request to pair, the first ECU receives session data from a server. The session data includes a session identifier (ID) to identify the pairing, a master session key (MSK), a first token, and security information of the second ECU. The first ECU derives session keys based on the MSK. The session ID and the first token's encryption first token are transmitted to the second ECU. The first ECU receives and decrypts encryption of a second token from the second ECU. Secure communication is established between the first ECU and the second ECU via the session keys after the first ECU validates the second token.

System and method for secure and performant ECU pairing

A system that includes memory and a microcontroller including an analog-to-digital converter (ADC) and in communication with the memory. The microcontroller is configured to define a fingerprint that includes a baseline measurement of side-channel traces of a side-channel retrieved from the ADC, during an enrollment period of the system, wherein the enrollment period includes measuring voltage prior to runtime operation, receive a runtime measurement from the ADC that includes voltage of at least the separate microcontroller during runtime, compare the runtime measurement to the fingerprint, and in response to the measurement exceeding a threshold, executing a countermeasure operation against software ran by the separate processor.

System and method for intrusion detection on a physical level using an internal analog to digital converter

A computer-implement method includes receiving one or more messages at a secure processor from a first node on a communication bus, monitoring the one or more messages from the first node, wherein the one or more messages include a request to a change a state of the one or more nodes, in response to the one or more messages including the request to the change of state, initiating a timer to initiate monitoring of the communication bus for a second sequence of messages, and in response to the second sequence of messages not being found within a database including information associated with the one or more latency values associated with the change of state, outputting a signal indicating an alert.

System and method to detect malicious use of diagnostic state changes in a vehicle

A system comprising a microcontroller located on a communication bus, a power consumption circuit configured to determine power consumption of the microcontroller, wherein a processor is programmed to determine if a clock associated with the microcontroller is paused and whether an average operational power has exceeded a power threshold, and in response to the average operational power exceeding the power threshold and in response to identifying an attacked message or attacked electronics control unit, in response to determining the microcontroller is under the suspected attack, output an alert associated with an event causing change in the bit patterns of messages on the communication bus.

System and method to detect malicious can controller behavior from adversarial clock control

An electronic control unit (ECU) includes a processor, a Controller Area Network (CAN) controller, clock gating logic, and security gating logic. The CAN controller having a status and configured to receive data and control signals from the processor, and a clock signal, package the data to create a CAN protocol frame held in at least one transmit buffer, and shift the CAN protocol frame to a CAN transceiver that is configured to transmit the CAN protocol frame to a CAN bus. The security gating logic configured to, in response to the status of the CAN controller being active, inhibit disabling the clock signal.

Clock control to increase robustness of a serial bus interface

A system includes a memory and a processor in communication with the memory. The processor is programmed to receive a runtime measurement from a sensor regarding the physical attribute of at least the separate processor during runtime; compare the runtime measurement of the physical attribute to a fingerprint that includes a baseline measurement of a physical attribute of at least a separate processor during an evaluation period of the system, and in response to the measurement exceeding a threshold, executing a countermeasure operation against software ran by the separate processor.

System and method for network intrusion detection based on physical measurements

A backend computer and methods of using the backend computer are described. The method may comprise: receiving, at a first backend computer, sensor data associated with a vehicle; determining a labeling of the sensor data, comprising: determining personal data and determining non-personal data that is separated from the personal data, wherein each of the personal and non-personal data comprise labeled data, wherein the personal data comprises information relating to at least one identified or identifiable natural person; and performing via the personal data and the non-personal data that is separated from the personal data, at the first backend computer, data processing associated with collecting sensor data associated with the vehicle.

Data privacy system

A Software in the Loop (SiL) system and method is disclosed which may include a simulator operable to provide an environment to simulate dynamic systems, enable rapid development, validation of systems, and testing of complex systems. The system and method may include assembling one or more unsecured models operable to simulate the real-world system. The system and method may then encrypt and generate at least one secured model from the one or more unsecured models using a first cryptographic key. The at least one secured model may be decrypted using a sealed decryption key. The decrypted secured model may then be executed within the one or more TEEs. The at least one secured model may be operable to process incoming data and outgoing data.

System and method for confidential multi-party software in the loop simulation

An electronic control unit (ECU) includes a processor, a Controller Area Network (CAN) controller, clock gating logic, and security gating logic. The CAN controller having a status and configured to receive data and control signals from the processor, and a clock signal, package the data to create a CAN protocol frame held in at least one transmit buffer, and shift the CAN protocol frame to a CAN transceiver that is configured to transmit the CAN protocol frame to a CAN bus. The clock gating logic may be configured to selectively disable a clock signal to the CAN controller based on a control signal from the processor. The security gating logic configured to, in response to the status of the CAN controller being active, inhibit disabling the clock signal.

A method for implementing a secure multiparty computation protocol between a plurality of parties for a multiparty computation includes performing an offline phase of an SPDZ protocol for each of the parties participating in the multiparty computation. A secret share redistribution phase is then performed wherein the secret shares of the parties are redistributed to a subset of the parties. A secret share recombination phase is performed during which the subset of the parties recombines the redistributed secret shares to recover the secret shares of the parties not in the subset. An online phase of the SPDZ protocol is then performed during which the function is computed with respect to the private inputs of the parties and using the secret shares of all the parties.

Method and system for fault tolerant and secure multiparty computation with SPDZ

A computer system for performing control of an electronic control unit (ECU) having a processor for executing computer-readable instructions and a memory for maintaining the computer-executable instructions, the computer-executable instructions when executed by the processor perform the following functions by a processor. The functions include configuring a communication controller to while operating in a secure mode, transiting to an unsecure mode, executing a program in the unsecure mode that utilizes the communication controller; and in response to detecting a clock off request while a transmit buffer of the communication controller is not empty, inhibiting the clock off request until the transmit buffer is empty.

A method of operating at least one node in a communication network that uses a shared communication medium has been developed. The method includes adjusting, with a controller in a first node, a resistance of a first potentiometer in the first node to a first resistance level that the controller in the first node determines randomly, the first potentiometer in the first node being connected to an output of a transceiver in the first node and to a shared communication medium, and transmitting, with the transceiver in the first node, a first data bit through the output that is connected to the shared communication medium with the first potentiometer producing the first resistance level.

Method to mitigate voltage based attacks on key agreement over controller area network (CAN)

A method for shared secret agreement with forward secrecy includes generating a first plurality of bits of data using a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator applied to a node seed value and at least one index value, transmitting the first plurality of bits of data through a shared communication medium simultaneously to transmission of a second plurality of bits of data from a second node, identifying shared secret data with the second node using a portion of the first plurality of bits of data that are logical complements of the second plurality of bits of data, generating a shared seed value using a cryptographically secure one-way function applied to the shared secret data, and generating an updated node seed value using the cryptographically secure one-way function applied to the node seed value to replace the node seed value.

Methods and systems for linear key agreement with forward secrecy using an insecure shared communication medium

A method of operating at least one node in a communication network that uses a shared communication medium has been developed to reduce or eliminate timing side-channel attacks performed by an adversary that is connected to the shared communication medium. The method includes generating, with a controller in a first node, a first jitter time offset randomly generated from within a predetermined time range, and transmitting, with a transceiver in the first node, a first data bit through an output of the transceiver that is connected to a shared communication medium, the first data bit being transmitted at a first time corresponding to the first jitter time offset added to a first predetermined transmission time.

Method to mitigate timing based attacks on key agreement schemes over controller area network

A method for operation of a communication network reduces leakage of data to an adversary that can observe signals transmitted through the communication network. The method includes generating a ranking to order operation of a plurality of nodes that exchange data in a group cryptographic key exchange process based on a leakage map of the nodes. The ranking minimizes leakage of data through a shared communication medium during the group cryptographic key exchange process. The method includes transmitting the ranking to the plurality of nodes through the shared communication medium, and performing, with the plurality of nodes, the group cryptographic key exchange process in an order of operation specified in the ranking to enable the plurality of nodes to exchange a shared cryptographic key through the shared communication medium while minimizing leakage of data.

Growing community of inventors

Pittsburgh, PA, United States of America

Shalabh Jain