International Business Machines Corporation

Other

Sean William Smith

Ronald Perez

Stephen M Matyas

Steve Harris Weingart

Mark John Lindemann

Elaine Rivette Palmer

Jeffrey P Gambino

Jason Paul Gill

Jean E Wynne

Robert J Von Gutfeld

Chai Wah Wu

Charles Philippe Tresser

David Michael Chess

Vincenzo Condorelli

Pradeep Kumar Dubey

Robert Alan Flavin

Marco Martens

Gaurav Aggarwal

Bruce A Scott

Perwaiz Nihal

Charles Campbell Palmer

Nabil M Amer

Michel Henri Theodore Hack

Ashutosh Kulshreshtha

Jeff Kenneth Kravitz

Vernon Ralph Austel

Jeffrey Kenneth Kravitz

Gianluca Pedrina

Joan Dyer

Naomaru Itoi

Mario Bizzaro

A system for executing a symmetric key cryptographic method includes a processor selecting data paths, a key, an initialization vector, a memory storing batched operation parameters, a bus connected to the processor and the memory, a cryptographic processor connected to the bus and controlled by the processor for performing a plurality of operations according to the operations parameter, wherein data for each operation is received individually and separately from the batched operation parameters, wherein an output for each operation is transmitted separately, and a pair of first-in-first-out (FIFO) state machines controlled by the processor and selectably connected to one of the cryptographic processor and the bus, bypassing the cryptographic processor.

DES hardware throughput for short operations

An interconnect structure which includes a metal-containing cap located atop each conductive feature that is present within a dielectric material is provided in which a surface region of the metal-containing cap is oxidized prior to the subsequent deposition of any other dielectric material thereon. Moreover, metal particles that are located on the surface of the dielectric material between the conductive features are also oxidized at the same time as the surface region of the metal-containing cap. This provides a structure having a reduced leakage current. In accordance with the present invention, the oxidation step is performed after electroless plating of the metal-containing cap and prior to the deposition of a dielectric capping layer or an overlying interlayer or intralevel dielectric material.

Low leakage metal-containing cap process using oxidation

A symmetric key cryptographic method is provided for short operations. The method includes batching a plurality of operation parameters (), and performing an operation according to a corresponding operation parameter (). The symmetric key cryptographic method is a Data Encryption Standard (DES) method. The short operations can be less than about 80 bytes. The short operations can be between 8 and 80 bytes. The method includes reading the batched parameters from a dynamic random access memory (), and transmitting each operation through a DES engine according to the operations parameter ().

A trusted co-server, and a method of using a trusted co-server, for a service provider. The co-server executes a program such that: for multiple parties P&#x2013;P(where Pis said co-server), each party Pmay (optionally) provide input I, and then said co-server carries out N functions: F(i. . . I) describes what the co-server returns to party P. The preferred embodiment of the invention raises the trust level of the computation and data storage at the server. For instance, this invention may be witness to authenticity of certain data coming back to the client. This data can include assertions from the trusted co-server about the server content and configuration. The invention, also, can provide privacy of data going back to the server, by keeping it encrypted between the client and the co-server, and then re-encrypting it before inserting it into the server. With this invention, the user can trust the integrity of the computation occurring at the co-server&#x2014;even if the server operator might be motivated to subvert it. The co-server also provides a trusted haven for computation relevant to third parties who may also have an interest in the client-server interaction.

Used trusted co-servers to enhance security of web interaction

A method (and system) for guaranteeing authenticity of an object, includes providing a sample of material obtainable only by at least one of chemical and physical processes such that the sample is random and not reproducible, associating a number reproducibly to the sample by using a specific reader, and forming at least one coded version of the number, the at least one coded version being obtained by a key signature, and the version being recorded into an area of the object.

Method and apparatus for producing duplication- and imitation-resistant identifying marks on objects, and duplication- and duplication- and imitation-resistant objects

An online coupon issuing and redemption system and method receives requests for coupons from consumers, presents advertisements and issues coupons to consumers electronically. The system presents advertisements before issuing the coupons, such that an issuer may be assured its targeted consumer are receiving its advertisements. The coupons are issued on a smart card, thereby eliminating a need for paper coupons. The coupons are digitally signed in order to prevent fraud. In order to prevent further fraudulent tampering of coupons, the redemption station includes a tamper-protected coprocessor for performing operations on the coupons. The system further includes capability for the redemption station to link to an issuing station for electronic reimbursements.

Authenticated electronic coupon issuing and redemption

Authentication is provided for secure devices with limited cryptography, particularly for devices which do not have the capability to do public-key cryptography and generate random numbers. An initialization process is disclosed for limited-power Devices which are unable to perform public-key cryptography and generate random-numbers, as well as for full-power Devices which have the capability to do public-key cryptography and generate random numbers. A Challenge-Response procedure is also disclosed for ensuring the secure state of a device.

Authentication for secure devices with limited cryptography

An apparatus for permitting access to protected code, protected data or protected devices only when a computer system is in a trusted state, where said trusted state occurs only when said system is executing trusted code under a set of preselected conditions. This apparatus also has a device for exiting the trusted state and for preventing access to protected code, data and devices when the trusted state is exited. The computer system is also programmed to automatically generate a disabling signal upon the completion of execution of trusted code, and this disabling signal will result in the prevention of access to protected devices or code.

Hardware access control locking

A method and apparatus is presented for establishing provable integrity or untampered state in secure devices. It employs active tamper response; generating authentication secrets inside the device via real hardware randomness to minimize risk of compromised factory machines; activating tamper response at a trusted point of trust to protect against attacks and/or continually certify the integrity of the device along shipping channels and at user sites; and allowing for all keys to be regenerated so that in accordance with sound cryptographic practice no one needs to depend on permanent keys. The point of trust is a central authority that is trusted by all parties that need to trust the provable untampered state of the secure device. At any point the certifying authority authenticates the integrity and/or untampered state of the device, and re-issues a new certificate for that device. Alternate embodiments enable the device to be shipped without its tamper-response enabled, and/or to re-initialize and certify devices that have been erased or zeroized. Particular methods are used to restrict access of the device's central private key only to trustworthy code in the device. This invention minimizes the parties that one must trust in order to trust in the alleged integrity and/or untampered state of a device, while providing disaster protection with simplicity of device shipping, use and installation.

Establishing and employing the provable untampered state of a device

A computer watchdog system monitors and controls distribution content sent form producers, through distributors, to subscribers. The computer watchdog system acting to ensure the just execution of agreements between a producer of content and a distributor of content. The computer watchdog system serving as an agent trusted by both producers and distributors. The computer watchdog system may be equipped with tamper protection for resisting exogenous attempts to gain unauthorized access to the system. The computer watchdog system may be installed entirely within distributor's sites. Alternatively, the computer watchdog system may reside partially within distributor's sites and partially within subscriber's sites. The computer watchdog system logs and reports on information relating to the distribution of content. Further, the computer watchdog system may selectively transform content provided by a producer, customizing the content for distributors and subscribers.

Watchdog for trusted electronic content distributions

An apparatus, system and method for secure code-downloading and information exchange, in the full generality of complex code dependencies while considering the implications of mutual distrust and hot-swapping. Included are secure techniques wherein an authority signs code from another party upon which that authority depends in order to establish that a trusted execution environment, is being preserved. Trusted code is employed to ensure that proprietary data is destroyed, disabled, and/or made unreadable, when a change causes the trusted execution environment to cease holding to a certain security level. A carefully constructed key structure is employed to ensure that communications allegedly from particular code in a particular environment can be authenticated as such. Authenticity of code that decides the authenticity of public-key signatures, and/or the authenticity of other code is cared for. In particular, the loading code that performs these tasks may itself be reloadable. Authenticity is maintained in physically secure coprocessors with multiple levels of dependent software that is independently downloadable by mutually suspicious authorities, and in physically secure coprocessors whose software has sufficient richness and complexity so as to be certainly permeable. Recoverability is provided for physically secure coprocessors from code of arbitrary evil running at arbitrary privilege.

Growing community of inventors

Hanover, NH, United States of America

Sean William Smith