Emc Corporation

Emc IP Holding Company LLC

Sean Francis Parkinson

Peter Robinson

Eric Young

David Paul Makepeace

Mark Hibberd

Christopher Ronald Scott

Aaron Matthew Marks

Kanchan Kaur

Techniques are provided for protection of private keys in message signing based on elliptic curve cryptography. One method comprises obtaining a private key to generate a signature for a message; selecting a random integer as an internal private key in a predefined range based on an elliptic curve order; computing an internal public key as an elliptic curve point using a scalar multiply operation based on (i) the internal private key blinded using a random blinding value, (ii) an elliptic curve base point, and (iii) an inverse value for the random blinding value added to a result of the scalar multiply operation; generating a first signature portion based on the elliptic curve point; generating a second signature portion based on an inverse of the selected random integer generated from a message-dependent value and the first signature portion; and forming a signed message using the first and second signature portions.

Blinding techniques for protection of private keys in message signing based on elliptic curve cryptography

A computer-implemented method of protecting digital data includes applying a key derivation function to a first value to generate a first derived key, the first value being equal to or derived from a first input password. The first derived key is combined with the digital data to generate a protected record stored in the computer. Subsequently, the key derivation function is applied to a second value to generate a second derived key, the second value being equal to or derived from a second input password. The protected record is processed using the second derived key to permit access to the digital data when the second derived key matches the first derived key. The key derivation function includes iterations of a two-stage hashing operation creating and using an array of memory blocks whose size is specified independently of the number of iterations to decouple processing and memory requirements.

Computer data protection using tunable key derivation function

A method includes receiving a first input value and a second input value, and obtaining a set of pre-computed values, wherein each pre-computed value is computed as the first input value multiplied by a given multiple in a set of multiples comprising powers of 2. A cryptographic process is performed to generate a cryptographic value based on the first and second input values, and one or more of the pre-computed values, wherein the cryptographic value that is generated is usable to generate a secure message or digital signature. The cryptographic process includes performing an iterative scalar multiplication process in which each step of the iterative scalar multiplication process is performed using a single point add operation to multiply a bit of the second input value with one of the pre-computed values in the set of pre-computed values.

Ladder-based cryptographic techniques using pre-computed points

A blinding function is generated. The blinding function is applied to a random value to generate a blinded random value. The blinded random value is utilized for one or more scalar multiplications in an elliptic curve cryptographic operation.

Blinding function in elliptic curve cryptography

Methods, computer program products, and systems are provided for using a single shared secured connection among all servers in a cluster by efficiently establishing and securely disseminating a shared key between the servers. In particular, this is done by using a Diffie-Hellman key agreement scheme among the servers using an ordered list of servers generated on-the-fly.

Message bus key agreement scheme

Embodiments relate to a method for generating a set of authentication certificates by a set of certificate authority devices. The method includes receiving, by the set of certificate authority devices, a set of certificate requests from a user device. The method includes generating, by the set of certificate authority devices, a set of crosschecked certificates, each crosschecked certificate of the set of crosschecked certificates being configured to cryptographically verify the remaining crosschecked certificate of the set of crosschecked certificates. The method includes transmitting, by the set of certificate authority devices, the set of crosschecked certificates to the user device, the set of crosschecked certificates configured to be utilized by the user device in establishing a secured communication channel over a network between the user device and a client device.

Certificate crosschecking by multiple certificate authorities

A method, integrated circuit chip, and computer program product for cryptographically processing an input value with Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) using ECC scalar multiplication are provided. The ECC scalar multiplication is performed with the use of an enhanced acceleration table (EAT). The EAT uses multiple running totals with multiples above 2. The EAT, in some embodiments, uses reference values other than 0 and 2^window size.

[object Object]

A method, integrated circuit chip, and computer program product for cryptographically processing an input value with Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) using ECC scalar multiplication are provided. The ECC scalar multiplication is performed with the use of an enhanced acceleration table (EAT). The EAT uses multiple running totals, at least one of which has a multiplier above 2.

Using multiples above two with running totals in elliptic curve cryptography scalar multiplication acceleration tables

A computer program product and method are provided for optimizing the size of an Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) scalar multiplication table. Steps include (a) receiving, from a user interface, a set of integer multipliers, (b) choosing a subset of a given set of target integers, the chosen subset defining an index set, such that elements of the index set generate all elements of the given set of target integers using a target generation function, and (c) modifying the index set by removing an element from the index set which is not necessary to generate an element of the given set of target integers using the target generation function. Additional steps are also included depending on the embodiment.

Growing community of inventors

Indooroopilly, Australia

Sean Francis Parkinson