Rambus Inc.

Cryptography Research, Inc.

Cypress Semiconductor Corporation

Scott C Best

Frederick Abbott Ware

Frank Lambrecht

John Eric Linstadt

Ely K Tsern

Ming Chu Li

Suresh Rajan

Thomas J Giovannini

Richard E Warmke

David B Roberts

Ian P Shaeffer

Brent Steven Haukness

John Wood Poulton

Abhijit Mukun Abhyankar

Craig Edward Hampel

Kun-Yung Chang

Carl William Werner

Mark Evan Marson

Mark A Horowitz

Paul William Roukema

Richard E Perego

Stefanos Sidiropoulos

Pak Shing Chau

Lei Luo

Helena Handschuh

William N Ng

Winthrop Wu

Chiping Yang

Kenneth Lee Wright

Gary Bela Bronner

Catherine Yuhjung Chen

Thomas Vogelsang

Steven Cameron Woo

Jade M Kizer

Elad Alon

Matthew Evan Orzen

Timothy Chang

Catherine Chen

Philip Yeung

John Yan

David Leung

Anthony Koon Wong

Kun Yung Chang

Jeff Mitchell

Deepak Chandra Sekar

Jared L Zerbe

Huy M Nguyen

Wayne Frederick Ellis

Paul Carl Kocher

Donald Victor Perino

Kambiz Kaviani

William Franklin Stonecypher

Stephen G Tell

Reza Navid

Bryan Jason Wang

John Cronan Eble, Iii

Marufa Kaniz

Xudong Shi

Guilherme Ozari De Almeida

Joel Patrick Wittenauer

Jason Chia-Jen Wei

Michael Hutter

Frank Lembrecht

Joel Wittenauer

Thomas A Giovannini

Christopher Leigh Rodgers

Hanson Quan

Brian L Leibowitz

Ming Li

Winthrop John Wu

A request to perform a memory operation addressed to a first address corresponding to a first logical unit of logical units of a memory is received. Address mask data that corresponds to the logical units is identified. Multiple transformed addresses are determined using the first address and the address mask data. The transformed addresses can include a target address corresponding to the first logical unit and additional addresses corresponding to other logical units. The memory operation is performed at the target address corresponding to the first logical unit and dummy memory operations are performed at the additional addresses corresponding to the additional logical units.

Obfuscation of data in a memory

A value corresponding to a physical variation of a device may be received. Furthermore, helper data associated with the physical variation of the device may be received. A result data may be generated based on a combination of the value corresponding to the physical variation of the device and the helper data. An error correction operation may be performed on the result data to identify one or more code words associated with the error correction operation. Subsequently, a target data may be generated based on the one or more code words.

Generating a target data based on a function associated with a physical variation of a device

A prover chip uses a key multiplier value generated by a proof-of-work function from a challenge value, a random number, and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) techniques to generate a one-time (or ephemeral) use private key. Similarly, a verifier chip uses the key multiplier value generated by an equivalent proof-of-work function, a public key received from the prover, and ECC techniques to derive a one-time use public key that corresponds to the ephemeral private key generated by the prover chip. The prover chip uses the ephemeral private key to sign the second challenge value and send this signed second challenge value to the verifier chip. The verifier verifies the value it receives using the one-time use public key and if the signature on the second challenge value is valid, authenticates the prover chip to a system.

Authentication using an ephemeral asymmetric keypair

A memory module with multiple memory devices includes a buffer system that manages communication between a memory controller and the memory devices. The memory module additionally includes a command input port to receive command and address signals from a controller and, also in support of capacity extensions, a command relay circuit coupled to the command port to convey the commands and addresses from the memory module to another module or modules. Relaying commands and addresses introduces a delay, and the buffer system that manages communication between the memory controller and the memory devices can be configured to time data communication to account for that delay.

Memory systems, modules, and methods for improved capacity

Described herein are technologies for application authentication and/or data encryption without stored pre-shared keys. In one resource controller, a processing device receives an application identifier (ID) from the application. The processing device provides a current nonce responsive to the application ID and provides the application access to the system resource responsive to determining that a hash of a current key received from the application equals a current tag. The current key is generated by the application based on code of the application and the current nonce. The current tag was previously provided from the application to the resource controller. The current tag can also be hashed by the application using the current key.

Application authentication and data encryption without stored pre-shared keys

A method of controlling a memory device is disclosed. The method includes receiving an address value that indicates a range of addresses within the memory device, each address within the range of addresses corresponding to storage locations within each of two distinct storage dice within the memory device. The address value is stored within a programmable register within the memory device.

Hybrid volatile and non-volatile memory device

A first device transmits a first message to a second device as part of a challenge-response protocol in order to authenticate the second device. A power limited power supply coupled to the second device limits power consumption by the second device during the second device's challenge-response protocol calculations. The first device measures a response time of the second device during the challenge-response protocol. The authentication of the second device is based on the response time of the second device while it has limited power consumption.

Authentication timers

A block of data is provided from a verifier module to an authenticator module, the size of the block being correlated with one or more desired characteristics of the authenticator module. The verifier module receives a response from the authenticator module, the response comprising data result derived from a calculation involving the challenge value and the block of data. The verifier module verifies whether the response is indicative of the one or more desired characteristics of the authenticator module.

Anti-counterfeiting applications for advanced memories

Hardware masking may be used as a countermeasure to make power analysis attacks more difficult. Masking attempts to decouple the secret and/or processed values of a cryptographic algorithm from its intermediate values. One method of masking probabilistically splits each bit of a computation into multiple shares. Mask-share domains (i.e., the wires and gates that perform a computation on a share) are physically spaced to reduce coupling between mask-share domains. The mask-share domains may be connected to the same power supply network. The physical distance between mask-share domains along the power-supply network may be selected to reduce coupling between mask-share domains that may occur via the power supply network. The mask-share domains may each be connected to different on-chip power supply networks.

Share domain arrangements for masked hardware implementations

Described are motherboards with memory-module sockets that accept legacy memory modules for backward compatibility or accept a greater number of configurable modules in support of increased memory capacity. The configurable modules can be backward compatible with legacy motherboards. Equipped with the configurable modules, the motherboards support memory systems with high signaling rates and capacities.

High-performance, high-capacity memory systems and modules

During system initialization, each data buffer device and/or memory device on a memory module is configured with a unique (at least to the module) device identification number. In order to access a single device (rather than multiple buffers and/or memory devices), a target identification number is written to all of the devices using a command bus connected to all of the data buffer devices or memory devices, respectively. The devices whose respective device identification numbers do not match the target identification number are configured to ignore future command bus transactions (at least until the debug mode is turned off.) The selected device that is configured with a device identification number matching the target identification number is configured to respond to command bus transactions.

Memory module register access

In a data transmission system, one or more signal supply voltages for generating the signaling voltage of a signal to be transmitted are generated in a first circuit and forwarded from the first circuit to a second circuit. The second circuit may use the forwarded signal supply voltages to generate another signal to be transmitted back from the second circuit to the first circuit, thereby obviating the need to generate signal supply voltages separately in the second circuit. The first circuit may also adjust the signal supply voltages based on the signal transmitted back from the second circuit to the first circuit. The data transmission system may employ a single-ended signaling system in which the signaling voltage is referenced to a reference voltage that is a power supply voltage such as ground, shared by the first circuit and the second circuit.

Forwarding signal supply voltage in data transmission system

A memory module is disclosed. The memory module includes a substrate, and respective first, second and third memory devices. The first memory device is of a first type disposed on the substrate and has addressable storage locations. The second memory device is also of the first type, and includes storage cells dedicated to store failure address information associated with defective storage locations in the first memory device. The third memory device is of the first type and includes storage cells dedicated to substitute as storage locations for the defective storage locations.

Memory module with dedicated repair devices

This application is directed to a stacked semiconductor device assembly including a plurality of identical stacked integrated circuit (IC) devices. Each IC device further includes a master interface, a channel master circuit, a slave interface, a channel slave circuit, a memory core, and a modal pad configured to receive a selection signal for the IC device to communicate data using one of its channel master circuit or its channel slave circuit. In some implementations, the IC devices include a first IC device and one or more second IC devices. In accordance with the selection signal, the first IC device is configured to communicate read/write data via the channel master circuit of the first IC device, and each of the one or more second IC devices is configured to communicate respective read/write data via the channel slave circuit of the respective second IC device.

Stacked semiconductor device assembly in computer system

The embodiments described herein describe technologies for using the memory modules in different modes of operation, such as in a standard multi-drop mode or as in a dynamic point-to-point (DPP) mode (also referred to herein as an enhanced mode). The memory modules can also be inserted in the sockets of the memory system in different configurations.

High capacity memory system using standard controller component

Growing community of inventors

Palo Alto, CA, United States of America

Scott C Best