Certicom Corporation

Blackberry Corporation

Motorola Corporation

Pitney Bowes Inc.

Other

Malikie Innovations Limited

Research in Motion Corporation

Infosec Global Inc.

Etas Embedded Systems Canada Inc.

Certicon Corp.

Gallant, Robert P.

Vanstone, Scott A.

Brown, Daniel R.l.

Struik, Marinus

Scott Alexander Vanstone

Donald B Johnson

Minghua Qu

Robert Philip Gallant

Robert John Lambert

Alfred John Menezes

Daniel Richard L Brown

Daniel Richard Brown

Marinus Struik

Ashok Vadekar

Matthew John Campagna

Daniel R L Brown

Ronald C Mullin

Adrian Antipa

James Douglas Dworkin

Michael J Torla

Anthony Rosati

Herbert Anthony Little

Frederick W Ryan, Jr

Leon A Pintsov

Ari P Singer

Neil Patrick Adams

Mark Pecen

Mingua Qu

P Michael Glaser

Mihal Lazaridis

Gregory Marc Zaverucha

Brian Neill

Keelan Smith

Sherry E Shannon-Vanstone

Gordon B Agnew

Darryl L Parisien

Minghua Ou

Mark E Pecen

Daniel Brown

Robert P Gallant

Daniel Rl Brown

Walter Lee Davis

Robert A Cordery

Walter L Davis

Christopher Labrador

Douglas I Ayerst

Dinah Lea Marie Davis

Rodney C Tesch

Tony Rosati

Rob Gallant

Ivan M Onyszchuk

Sherry E Vanstone

Leon A Pinstov

John A Proos

Robert Phillip Gallant

Aleksandar Jurisic

Rene Struik

Robert Gallant

Robert Lambert

Frederick W Ryan

An elliptic curve random number generator avoids escrow keys by choosing a point Q on the elliptic curve as verifiably random. An arbitrary string is chosen and a hash of that string computed. The hash is then converted to a field element of the desired field, the field element regarded as the x-coordinate of a point Q on the elliptic curve and the x-coordinate is tested for validity on the desired elliptic curve. If valid, the x-coordinate is decompressed to the point Q, wherein the choice of which is the two points is also derived from the hash value. Intentional use of escrow keys can provide for back up functionality. The relationship between P and Q is used as an escrow key and stored by for a security domain. The administrator logs the output of the generator to reconstruct the random number with the escrow key.

Elliptic curve random number generation

An elliptic curve random number generator avoids escrow keys by choosing a pointon the elliptic curve as verifiably random. An arbitrary string is chosen and a hash of that string computed. The hash is then converted to a field element of the desired field, the field element regarded as the x-coordinate of a pointon the elliptic curve and the x-coordinate is tested for validity on the desired elliptic curve. If valid, the x-coordinate is decompressed to the point, wherein the choice of which is the two points is also derived from the hash value. Intentional use of escrow keys can provide for back up functionality. The relationship between P andis used as an escrow key and stored by for a security domain. The administrator logs the output of the generator to reconstruct the random number with the escrow key.

Accelerated computation of combinations of group operations in a finite field is provided by arranging for at least one of the operands to have a relatively small bit length. In a elliptic curve group, verification that a value representative of a point R corresponds the sum of two other points uG and vG is obtained by deriving integers w,z of reduced bit length and that v=w/z. The verification equality R=uG+vQ may then be computed as &#x2212;zR+(uz mod n)G+wQ=O with z and w of reduced bit length. This is beneficial in digital signature verification where increased verification can be attained.

Accelerated verification of digital signatures and public keys

A method of verifying a pair of correspondents in electronic transaction, the correspondents each including first and second signature schemes and wherein the first signature scheme is computationally more difficult in signing than verifying and the second signature scheme is computationally more difficult in verifying than signing. The method comprises the step of the first correspondent signing information according to the first signature scheme and transmitting the first signature to the second correspondent, the second correspondent verifying the first signature received from the first correspondent, wherein the verification is performed according to the first signature scheme. The second correspondent then signs information according to the second signature scheme and transmits the second signature to the first correspondent, the first correspondent verifies the second signature received from the second correspondent, wherein the verification is performed according to the second signature algorithm; the transaction is rejected if either verification fails. The method thereby allows one of the correspondents to participate with relatively little computing power while maintaining security of the transaction.

Data card verification system

A method and system for distributed security for a plurality of devices in a communication network, each of the devices being responsible for generating, distributing and controlling its own keys for access to the communication network and using the keys to establish a trusted network, each device's membership to the communication network being checked periodically by other devices by using a challenge response protocol to establish which devices are allowed access to the communication network and the trusted network.

Local area network

A system, device and method for authenticating a user. The system, device and method may employ a computing device for providing credentials required for access to an on-line resource available over a network. The computing device may connect to the on-line resource to register a user. The computing device may receive from the on-line resource at least one request for a credential to identify the user. In response to the request, the computing device may generate a random credential, store the random credential in association with an on-line resource identifier and the request in a data store accessible to the computing device and, submit the random credential to the on-line resource to register the user.

System, device, and method for authentication of a user accessing an on-line resource

An implicit certificate cryptosystem uses an implicit certificate that includes a pair of certificate components. One of the certificate components includes a public key reconstruction data that is the combination of ephemeral public keys of two entities, one of which is a trusted entity and the other of which is associated with the implicit certificate. The public key reconstruction data is then combined with the identity of the other entity and the combination encrypted to form a first certificate component. A second certificate component is generated by using the first certificate component as a message in a signature scheme and generating a signature of the trusted entity on the message. The two certificate components are provided to the other entity to permit the other entity to generate a private key using one of the certificate components. The corresponding public key can be derived from the remaining certificate component.

Verifiable implicit certificates

Methods, systems, and computer programs for trusted communication among mobile devices are described. In some aspects, information is wirelessly transmitted from a first mobile device to a second mobile device. The information permits the second mobile device to detect proximity of the first mobile device. In some implementations, the information can be wirelessly transmitted by a proximity-activated wireless interface, such as, for example, a Near Field Communication (NFC) interface. In response to the information, the first mobile device receives a message and a first authentication value wirelessly transmitted from the second mobile device to the first mobile device. A second authentication value is generated at the first mobile device based on the message and the shared secret value. Integrity of the message is verified based on comparing the first authentication value and the second authentication value.

Data integrity for proximity-based communication

A protocol appropriate for smartcard purchase applications such as those that might be completed between a terminal or ATM and a users personal card is disclosed The protocol provides a signature scheme which allows the card to authenticate the terminal without unnecessary signature verification which is an computationally intense operation for the smart card. The only signature verification required is that of the terminal identification (as signed by the certifying authority, or CA, which is essential to any such protocol). In the preferred embodiment, the protocol provides the card and terminal from fraudulent attacks from impostor devices, either a card or terminal.

Transaction verification protocol for smart cards

Methods, systems, and computer programs for trusted communication among mobile devices are described. In some aspects, an authentication value is generated at a first mobile device based on a message and a shared secret value stored on the first mobile device. In response to detecting proximity of a second mobile device, the message and the authentication value are wirelessly transmitted from the first mobile device to the second mobile device. In some implementations, the message and the authentication value can be wirelessly transmitted by a proximity-activated wireless interface, such as, for example, a Near Field Communication (NFC) interface.

The present invention relates to data communication systems and protocols utilized in such systems.

Key agreement protocol

A method and system is operable to provide credentials by generating a first credential that conforms to a first specified format. A second credential conforming to a second specified format is included in the first credential so that the second credential may be distributed through the cryptosystem using the first specified format. The credential may be a digital certificate.

System and method for providing credentials

Growing community of inventors

Campbellville, Canada

Scott Alexander Vanstone