Koninklijke Philips Corporation N.v.

Sauvik Bhattacharya

Ludovicus Marinus Gerardus Maria Tolhuizen

Oscar Garcia Morchon

Ronald Rietman

Jose Luis Torre Arce

Mauro Barbieri

Falk Uhlemann

Sebastiaan Jacobus Antonius De Hoogh

Oscar Garcia-Morchon

Tiblets Zeray Demewez

In a method of locating medical equipment to be serviced, a map of a medical facility is accessed using an electronic processing device. The map includes a plurality of medical equipment each having a tag indicative of a location thereof. A user input is received which is indicative of a selection of a medical equipment of the plurality of medical equipment. A list of service actions to be performed for the selected medical equipment is displayed on a display device of the electronic processing device.

Real-time proximity-based device overview dashboard

Some embodiments are directed to a system with a first cryptographic device () and second cryptographic device (). The devices may compute a final seed from a preshared secret known to the devices, and on a pre-seed that exchanged between them. The final seed may be used to derive a common object (a).

Authenticated lattice-based key agreement or key encapsulation

Some embodiments relate to a first electronic network node is provided () configured for a cryptographic operation. The first network node is configured to receive as input a difficulty parameter (d), and a structure parameter (n), and to obtain a shared matrix (A), the shared matrix being shared a second network node through a communication interface, entries in the shared matrix A being selected modulo a first modulus (q), the shared matrix (A) being a square matrix (k×k) of dimension (k) equal to the difficulty parameter (d) divided by the structure parameter (n), the entries in the shared matrix (A) being polynomials modulo a reduction polynomial (ƒ) of degree equal to the structure parameter (n), said cryptographic operation using the shared matrix.

Configurable cryptographic device

Some embodiments are directed to a public-key encryption device () and a private-key decryption device (). The public-key encryption device is configured to compute a second public-key matrix (u), the second public-key matrix (u) having fewer matrix elements than the first public-key matrix (b) of the private-key decryption device. This reduces computation and bandwidth requirements at the side of the public-key encryption device.

Public/private key system with decreased public key size

An electronic key pre-distribution device for configuring multiple network nodes with local key information is provided. The key pre-distribution device applies at least a first hash function and a second hash function to a digital identifier of a network node. The first and second hash functions map the digital identifier to a first public point and a second public point on a first elliptic curve and second elliptic curve. A first and second secret isogeny are applied to the first and second public elliptic curve points, to obtain a first private elliptic curve point and second private elliptic curve point that are part of private key material for the network node.

Elliptic curve isogeny based key agreement protocol

Some embodiments relate to a first electronic network node is provided () configured for a cryptographic operation. The first network node is configured to receive as input a difficulty parameter (d), and a structure parameter (n), and to obtain a shared matrix (A), the shared matrix being shared a second network node through a communication interface, entries in the shared matrix (A) being selected modulo a first modulus (q), the shared matrix (A) being a square matrix (k&#xd7;k) of dimension (k) equal to the difficulty parameter (d) divided by the structure parameter (n), the entries in the shared matrix (A) being polynomials modulo a reduction polynomial (&#x192;) of degree equal to the structure parameter (n), said cryptographic operation using the shared matrix.

Configurable device for lattice-based cryptography

Some embodiments are directed to a cryptographic device (). A reliable bit function may be applied to a raw shared key (k*) to obtain reliable indices, indicating coefficients of a raw shared key, and reliable bits derived from the indicated coefficients. Reconciliation data (h) may be generated for the indicated coefficients of the raw shared key. A code word may be encapsulated using the reliable bits by applying an encapsulation function, obtaining encapsulated data (c) which may be transferred.

Key encapsulation protocols

A network node () is provided configured for a cryptographic protocol based on a shared matrix. The network node is arranged to construct the shared matrix (A) in accordance with the selection data and a shared sequence of values. Multiple entries of the shared matrix are assigned to multiple values of the sequence of data as assigned by the selection data. The shared matrix is applied in the cryptographic protocol.

Device and method sharing a matrix for use in a cryptographic protocol

A first electronic network node () is provided configured for goo a key exchange (KEX) protocol, the first network node is configured to&#x2014;obtain a shared matrix (A) shared with a second network node, entries in the shared matrix A being selected modulo a first modulus q, generate a private key matrix (S), entries in the private key matrix being bounded in absolute value by a bound (s) generate a public key matrix (P) by computing a matrix product between the shared matrix (A) and the private key matrix (S) modulo the first modulus (q) and scaling the entries in the matrix product down to a second modulus (p).

Key exchange devices and methods

A first electronic network node () is provided configured for a key exchange (KEX) protocol, the first network node is configured to obtain a shared polynomial (a) shared with a second network node, coefficients of the shared polynomial a being selected modulo a first modulus q, generate a private key polynomial (sk), coefficients of the private key polynomial being bounded in absolute value by a bound (s) generate a public key polynomial (pk) by computing a polynomial product between the shared polynomial (a) and the private key polynomial (sk) modulo the first modulus (q) and scaling the coefficients of the polynomial product down to a second modulus (p).

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Eindhoven, Netherlands

Sauvik Bhattacharya