Google Inc.

Alcatel Lucent

Lucent Technologies Inc.

Alcatel-lucent USA Inc.

Foley & Lardner Llp

Sarvar M Patel

Kevin Yeo

Giuseppe Persiano

Marcel M M Yung

Karn Seth

Benjamin Kreuter

Umesh Shankar

Mariana Raykova

Robin Jeffrey Thompson

Shobhit Saxena

Andrei Kulik

Bodo Moller

Ganapathy Subramanian Sundaram

Todd Cartwright Morgan

Peter Bosch

Alistair Urie

Nicolas Lidzborski

Laetitia Estelle Baudoin

Ahmet Erhan Nergiz

Binyamin Pinkas

Joon Young Seo

Gang Wang

Semyon B Mizikovsky

Marcel M Moti Yung

Philip Andrew McDonnell

David Erb

Brian N Bershad

Kevin Wei Li Yeo

Phillipp Schoppmann

Zulfikar Amin Ramzan

Lily H Zhu

Adam L Berenzweig

Vinod Kumar Ramachandran

Ruoming Pang

Amin Charaniya

Ajay Rajkumar

Anshul Mohan Gupta

Zhibi Wang

Eric Henry Grosse

Uri Blumenthal

Alec Brusilovsky

Donna Michaels Sand

Sachin Kulkarni

Philip Douglas MacKenzie

Craig Wright

Hong Xie

Thai Duong

Darrell Kindred

Michael Marcovici

David Owen Shanahan

Eli Simon Fox-Epstein

Srinivasan Seshadri

Steven Kent Meier

Tancrède Lepoint

Ananth Raghunathan

Benjamin Valerian Pflanz

Asra Ali

Daniel Rebolledo Samper

Karl Mack

Tancrede Lepoint

Tania Godard

Vinay Goel

Patrick McDonald

Victor Vladimir Boyko

Mihaela Ion

Margo Narayan

Raimundo Mirisola

A method for providing response-hiding searchable encryption includes receiving a search query for a keyword from a user device associated with a user. The keyword appears in one or more encrypted documents within a corpus of encrypted documents stored on an untrusted storage device. The method also includes accessing a document oblivious key-value storage (OKVS) to obtain a list of document identifiers associated with the keyword. Each document identifier in the list of document identifiers associated with a respective keyword identifier is concatenated with the keyword and uniquely identifies a respective one of the one or more encrypted documents that the keyword appears in. The method also includes returning the list of document identifiers obtained from the document OKVS to the user device.

Response-hiding searchable encryption

This document relates to using secure MPC to select digital components in ways that preserve user privacy and protects the security of data of each party that is involved in the selection process. In one aspect, a method includes receiving, by a first computing system of a secure MPC system and from a client device, a digital component request and a nonce. The first computing system generates, based on the nonce and a function, an array including a share of a Bloom filter representing user group identifiers for user groups that include a user of the client device as a member. For each of multiple user group identifiers, the first computing system calculates, in collaboration with one or more second computing systems of the secure MPC system and using the array, a respective first secret share of one or more user group membership condition parameters.

Enhanced performance of secure multi-party computation

A method includes initializing a client state on a client device be executing a private batched sum retrieval instruction to compute c sums O of data blocks from an untrusted storage device. Each computed sum O stored on memory hardware of the client device and including a sum of a corresponding subset S of exactly k data blocks. The method also includes a query instruction to retrieve a query block Bstored on the untrusted storage device by iterating through each of the c sums O of data blocks to identify one of the c sums O that does not include the query block B, instructing a service to pseudorandomly partition the untrusted storage device into partitions and sum the data blocks in each partition to determine a corresponding encrypted data block sum.

Private information retrieval with sublinear public-key operations

A method for sharing read access to a document stored on memory hardware. The method includes receiving a shared read access command from a sharor sharing read access to a sharee for a document stored on memory hardware in communication with the data processing hardware, and receiving a shared read access request from the sharee. The shared read access command includes an encrypted value and a first cryptographic share value based on a write key, a read key, a document identifier, and a sharee identifier. The method also includes multiplying the first and second cryptographic share values to determine a cryptographic read access value. The cryptographic read access value authorizes read access to the sharee for the document. The method also includes storing a read access token for the sharee including the cryptographic read access value and the encrypted value in a user read set of the memory hardware.

Encrypted search cloud service with cryptographic sharing

Encrypted information retrieval can include generating a database that is partitioned into shards each having a shard identifier, and database entries in each shard that are partitioned into buckets having a bucket identifier. A batch of client-encrypted queries are received. The batch of client-encrypted queries are processed using a set of server-encrypted data stored in a database. The processing includes grouping the client-encrypted queries according to shard identifiers of the client-encrypted queries, executing multiple queries in the group of client-encrypted queries for the shard together in a batch execution process, and generating multiple server-encrypted results to the multiple queries in the group of client-encrypted queries. The multiple server-encrypted results for each shard are transmitted to the client device.

Encrypted information retrieval

A method includes executing an instruction to execute a query for a data block, the data block associated with a corresponding memory level of a logarithmic number of memory levels (l) of memory, each memory level (l) including physical memory (RAM) residing on memory hardware of a distributed system. The method also includes retrieving a value associated with the data block from an oblivious hash table using a corresponding key, and extracting un-queried key value pairs from the oblivious hash table associated with un-queried data blocks after executing a threshold number of queries for data blocks. The method also includes a multi-array shuffle routine on the extracted key value pairs from the oblivious hash table to generate an output array containing the un-queried key value pairs.

Oblivious RAM with logarithmic overhead

A method including at each of a number of client devices receiving a data item, receiving a public key from a second computing system, encrypting the data item using the public key to produce a singly encrypted data item, engaging in an oblivious pseudorandom function protocol with a first computing system using the singly encrypted data item to produce a seed, generating an encrypted secret share using a threshold secret sharing function under which the encrypted secret share cannot be decrypted until a threshold number of encrypted secret shares associated with the same singly encrypted data item are received, and transmitting the encrypted secret share to the first computing system and at the first computing system receiving a number of encrypted secret shares from the number of client devices, processing the number of encrypted secret shares to produce processed data, and transmitting the processed data to a second computing system.

Methods for protecting privacy

A method for outsourcing exponentiation in a private group includes executing a query instruction to retrieve a query element stored on an untrusted server by selecting a prime factorization of two or more prime numbers of a modulus associated with the query element stored on the server, obtaining a group element configured to generate a respective one of the prime numbers, generating a series of base values using the prime factorization and the group element, and transmitting the series of base values from the client device to the server. The server is configured to determine an exponentiation of the group element with an exponent stored on the server using the series of base values. The method also includes receiving a result from the server based on the exponentiation of the group element with the exponent.

Outsourcing exponentiation in a private group

A method includes obtaining, from a server, a filter including a set of encrypted identifiers each encrypted with a server key controlled by the server. The method includes obtaining a request that requests determination of whether a query identifier is a member of a set of identifiers corresponding to the set of encrypted identifiers. The method also includes transmitting an encryption request to the server that requests the server to encrypt the query identifier. The method includes receiving, from the server, an encrypted query identifier including the query identifier encrypted by the server key and determining, using the filter, whether the encrypted query identifier is not a member of the set of encrypted identifiers. When the encrypted query identifier is not a member of the set of encrypted identifiers, the method includes reporting that the query identifier is not a member of the set of identifiers.

Privately querying a database with private set membership using succinct filters

A method for searchable encryption with a public key includes receiving an operation request from a user device associated with a user requesting that encryption of data associated with the user. The data includes a corpus of documents stored on a remote storage device. The method also includes receiving a public key associated with the user. The public key includes an asymmetric cryptographic public key. The method also includes generating a random data key. The data key includes a symmetric cryptographic key. The method also includes encrypting, using the data key, a search index for the corpus of documents based on keywords within the corpus of documents. The method also includes encrypting, using the public key, the data key and sending the encrypted data key to a user device associated with the user.

Encrypted search with a public key

A method disclosed herein may include receiving, at a first computing system, encrypted identifiers and encrypted values, performing, by the first computing system, a concealing operation on the encrypted identifiers to produce concealed encrypted identifiers, wherein the concealing operation conceals the encrypted identifiers from the first computing system and a second computing system but enables matching between the concealed encrypted identifiers, decrypting, by the second computing system, the concealed encrypted identifiers to produce concealed identifiers, and performing, by the second computing system, an aggregation operation using the concealed identifiers and the encrypted values to produce an encrypted aggregate value without accessing personally identifiable information associated with the encrypted values.

Methods for aggregating credit across interactions

Systems and methods may be used for establishing a link between user identifiers of different systems without disclosing specific user identifying information. One method includes generating a matching relationship based on double encrypted one or more first data sets of a first party system and double encrypted one or more second data sets of a second party system. The matching relationship indicates one or more links between match keys associated with the first party system and the match keys associated with the third party system. The method includes assigning bridge identifiers for user identifiers associated with the first party system and the user identifiers associated with the third party system based on the matching relationship.

Systems and methods for establishing a link between identifiers without disclosing specific identifying information

A method executing an instruction () to execute a query (q) for a data block () and determining whether the data block is stored in a block stash (). When the data block is stored in the block stash during a download phase, the method includes removing the data block from the block stash, sending a fake query () to a distributed system () to retrieve a random data block stored in memory () of a distributed system (), and discarding the random data block. When a current version of the data block is stored in the block stash during an overwrite phase, the method includes sending a fake query to the distributed system to retrieve another random data block stored in the memory of the distributed system, decrypting and re-encrypting the random data block with fresh randomness, and re-uploading the re-encrypted random data block onto the distributed system.

Oblivious access with differential privacy

A method for providing encrypted search includes receiving, at a user device associated with a user, a search query for a keyword that appears in one or more encrypted documents stored on an untrusted storage device and accessing a count table to obtain a count of documents that include the keyword. The method also includes generating a delegatable pseudorandom function (DPRF) based on the keyword, a private cryptographic key, and the count of documents. The method also includes evaluating a first portion of the DPRF and delegating a remaining second portion of the DPRF to the untrusted storage device which causes the untrusted storage device to evaluate the DPRF and access an encrypted search index associated with the documents. The untrusted storage device determines one or more encrypted documents associated with DPRF and returns, to the user device, an identifier for each encrypted document associated with the DPRF.

Encrypted search with no zero-day leakage

Growing community of inventors

Wheaton, IL, United States of America

Sarvar M Patel