Bitdefender Ipr Management Ltd.

Sandor Lukacs

Andrei V Lutas

Dan H Lutas

Raul V Tosa

Adrian V Colesa

Ionel C Anichitei

Gheorghe F Hajmasan

Paul D Boca

Cristian B Sirb

Radu I Ciocas

Daniel I Ticle

Dan-Horea Lutas

Gheorghe-Florin Hajmasan

Bogdan C Dumitru

Vlad I Topan

Botond Fulop

Daniel-Ioan Ticle

Radu-Ioan Ciocas

Ionel-Cristinel Anichitei

Raul-Vasile Tosa

Paul-Daniel Boca

Andrei-Vlad Lutas

Dan-Cristian Turicu

Cristian-Bogdan Sirb

Described systems and methods enable performing software audits remotely and automatically, on a relatively large number of client systems (e.g., a corporate network, a virtual desktop infrastructure system, etc.) An audit engine executes on each client system, in a hardware virtualization configuration wherein the audit engine executes outside an audited virtual machine. When receiving an audit request from an audit server, some embodiments of the audit engine drop an audit agent into the audited virtual machine, and remove the audit agent upon completion of the audit.

Systems and methods for auditing a virtual machine

In some embodiments, a protected client operates a live introspection engine and an on-demand introspection engine. The live introspection engine detects the occurrence of certain events within a protected virtual machine exposed on the respective client system, and communicates the occurrence to a remote security server. In turn, the server may request a forensic analysis of the event from the client system, by indicating a forensic tool to be executed by the client. Forensic tools may be stored in a central repository accessible to the client. In response to receiving the analysis request, the on-demand introspection engine may retrieve and execute the forensic tool, and communicate a result of the forensic analysis to the security server. The server may use the information to determine whether the respective client is under attack by malicious software or an intruder.

Dual memory introspection for securing multiple network endpoints

Described systems and methods enable enforcing application control remotely and automatically, on a relatively large number of client systems (e.g., a corporate network, a virtual desktop infrastructure system, etc.). An application control engine executes outside a virtual machine exposed on a client system, the application control engine configured to enforce application control within the virtual machine according to a set of control policies. When a policy indicates that a specific process is not allowable on the respective client system, the app control engine may prevent execution of the respective process. To assist in data gathering and/or other activities associated with application control, some embodiments temporarily drop a control agent into the controlled virtual machine.

Systems and methods of application control in virtualized environments

Described systems and methods enable an efficient detection and analysis of software events, especially in hardware virtualization configurations. In some embodiments, certain types of events are analyzed asynchronously, in the sense that the triggering entity is allowed to continue execution while the respective event is added to a queue for later processing. Some embodiments modify the instruction set architecture of the processor by adding a processor instruction dedicated to delivering event notifications. Such notification instructions allow for complex and flexible event detection without some of the disadvantages of conventional methods such as hooking.

Systems and methods of asynchronous analysis of event notifications for computer security applications

Described systems and methods allow protecting a host computer system from malicious software, such as return-oriented programming (ROP) and jump-oriented programming (JOP) exploits. In some embodiments, a processor of the host system is endowed with two counters storing a count of branch instructions and a count of inter-branch instructions, respectively, occurring within a sequence of instructions. Exemplary counted branch instructions include indirect JMP, indirect CALL, and RET on x86 platforms, while inter-branch instructions consist of instructions executed between two consecutive counted branch instructions. The processor may be further configured to generate a processor event, such as an exception, when a value stored in a counter exceeds a predetermined threshold, and/or when a branch instruction redirects execution to a critical OS function. Such events may be used as triggers for launching a malware analysis to determine whether the host system is subject to a code reuse attack.

Hardware-accelerated prevention of code reuse attacks

Systems and methods for application control in virtualized environments

Described systems and methods allow conducting computer security operations, such as detecting malware and spyware, in a bare-metal computer system. In some embodiments, a first processor of a computer system executes the code samples under assessment, whereas a second, distinct processor is used to carry out the assessment and to control various hardware components involved in the assessment. Such hardware components include, among others, a memory shadower configured to detect changes to a memory connected to the first processor, and a storage shadower configured to detect an attempt to write to a non-volatile storage device of the computer system. The memory shadower and storage shadower may be used to inject a security agent into the computer system.

Anti-malware systems and methods using hardware-assisted code injection

Described systems and methods enable an efficient analysis of security-relevant events, especially in hardware virtualization platforms. In some embodiments, a notification handler detects the occurrence of an event within a virtual machine, and communicates the respective event to security software. The security software then attempts to match the respective event to a collection of behavioral and exception signatures. An exception comprises a set of conditions which, when satisfied by an &#x3c;event, entity&#x3e; tuple, indicates that the respective entity is not malicious. In some embodiments, a part of exception matching is performed synchronously (i.e., while execution of the entity that triggered the respective event is suspended), while another part of exception matching is performed asynchronously (i.e., after the triggering entity is allowed to resume execution).

Computer security systems and methods using asynchronous introspection exceptions

Described systems and methods enable a host system to efficiently perform computer security activities, when operating in a hardware virtualization configuration. A processor is configured to generate a VM suspend event (e.g., a VM exit or a virtualization exception) when a guest instruction executing within a guest VM performs a memory access violation. In some embodiments, the processor is further configured to delay generating the VM suspend event until the execution stage of the pipeline for the guest instruction is complete, and to save results of the execution stage to a specific location (e.g. a specific processor register readable by security software) before generating the event.

Systems and methods for exposing a result of a current processor instruction upon exiting a virtual machine

Described systems and methods enable a computer security module to protect a set of guest virtual machines against computer security threats. In some embodiments, the computer security module receives introspection notifications from the protected VM, each such notification indicating that a particular trigger event (e.g., a system call) has occurred during execution of guest software within the respective VM. In some embodiments, delivering a notification comprises suspending execution of guest software and switching the processor to executing a notification handler forming part of the computer security module. Some embodiments enable a context-specific delivery of notifications, wherein the set of events triggering notifications may vary from one guest process to another.

Systems and methods for delivering context-specific introspection notifications

A client system, such as a computer or a smartphone, securely exchanges sensitive information with a remote service provider computer system such as a bank or an online retailer. The client system executes a commercially available operating system in an untrusted virtual machine (VM), which may be affected by malware. A hypervisor is configured to launch a trusted, malware-free VM from an authenticated image stored on computer-readable media used by the untrusted VM. The trusted VM executes a thin operating system with minimal functionality, to manage a secure communication channel with the remote server system, wherein sensitive communication is encrypted. Data from the trusted VM is forwarded via the hypervisor to a network interface driver of the untrusted VM for transmission to the remote service provider. The service provider may perform a remote attestation of the client system to determine whether it operates a trusted VM.

Secure communication using a trusted virtual machine

Described systems and methods allow a host system, such as a computer or a smartphone, to enable a secure environment, which can be used to carry out secure communications with a remote service provider, for applications such as online banking, e-commerce, private messaging, and online gaming, among others. A hypervisor oversees a switch between an insecure environment and the secure environment, in response to a user input, or in response to an event such as receiving a telephone call. Switching from the insecure to the secure environment comprises transitioning the insecure environment to a sleeping state and loading the secure environment from a memory image (snapshot) saved to disk, after checking the integrity of the snapshot. Switching from the secure to the insecure environment comprises transitioning the secure environment into a sleeping state and waking up the insecure environment.

Enabling a secure environment through operating system switching

Described systems and methods enable a computer security module to protect a set of guest virtual machines against computer security threats. In some embodiments, the computer security module receives introspection notifications from the protected VM, each such notification indicating that a particular trigger event (e.g., a system call) has occurred during execution of guest software within the respective VM. In some embodiments, delivering a notification comprises suspending execution of guest software and switching the processor to executing a notification handler forming part of the computer security module. In some embodiments, the computer security module may indicate to the processor a selected subset of events which trigger introspection notifications.

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Floresti, Romania

Sandor Lukacs