Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC

Samuel John Wenker

Andrew Lee Jenks

Yongjun Wu

Shyam Sadhwani

Brian Patrick Evans

John Carl Simmons

Hany Farag

Isha Sharma

Rebecca Nicole Burke-Aguero

Paul England

Quintin Swayne Burns

Ning Lin

Lucia Darsa

Kevin M Kane

Fedir Yuriyovych Kyslov

Lightweight mechanisms provide a way to assert provenance when live streaming media content and establish provenance upon playback. For example, a provenance claim generator generates a key pair including a live-stream private key and live-stream public key. The claim generator signs, with a long-term private key reliably associated with a sender, manifest metadata including the live-stream public key, thereby producing a manifest signature. During live streaming, the claim generator signs respective portions of media content with the live-stream private key, producing portion signatures for the respective portions. A provenance claim validator receives the manifest signature and manifest metadata. The claim validator verifies the manifest metadata using a long-term public key (reliably associated with the sender) and the manifest signature. During live streaming, the claim validator verifies the respective portions of the media content using the live-stream public key and the portion signatures for the respective portions.

Asserting and establishing provenance of media content during live streaming

Described herein is a system and method for validating media integrity using asymmetric key cryptography utilizing a public/private cryptographic key pair. The private key is kept secret and is known to an originator and/or publisher of a media file. The public key is added to the media file and is used to validate integrity of the media file, that is, that content of the media file (e.g., portion(s), frame(s)) has not been altered since publication of the media file. By validating integrity of the media file, strong proof that the media file came from an owner of the keypair (e.g., had possession of the private key) can be obtained, for example, resolving issues of trust and/or authenticity common in altered content. In some embodiments, information regarding an origin of the content can further be determined.

Cryptographic validation of media integrity

Examples are disclosed related to presenting on a client device configured for a first digital rights management technology (DRM-1) content that is protected by a second digital rights management technology (DRM-2). One example provides a computing device configured to receive a request from an application for a DRM-2 license acquisition challenge, forward the request to a DRM-2 license acquisition challenge generator, receive a DRM-2 license acquisition challenge and DRM-2 state information, send the DRM-2 license acquisition challenge to the application, receive, from the application, a DRM-2 license acquisition response, generate a DRM-1 license acquisition challenge incorporating the DRM-2 license acquisition challenge, the DRM-2 license acquisition response, and the DRM-2 state information, send the DRM-1 license acquisition challenge to a remote DRM-1 license acquisition server, receive a DRM-1 license acquisition response comprising a key and a license policy, enforce the license policy for content protection, and decrypt content using the key.

Presenting content protected by multiple DRMS

Lossy data stream decoder techniques are described herein. In response to a request for decoded content from a consuming application, a decoder may validate headers and identify portions of the data that are considered pertinent to the request. The decoder then performs lossy extraction to form incomplete data that is provided to the consuming application in response to the request. The full data for the data stream is not exposed to the consuming application or other downstream components. In this way, the consuming application is provided data sufficient to perform requested graphics processing and resource management operations, while at the same time the risk of piracy is mitigated since the consuming application is unable to get a full version of the data in the clear and the data have been validated by the decoder.

Lossy data stream decoder

Innovations in the area of hardware-protected digital rights management ('DRM') systems are presented. For example, a hardware-protected DRM system includes a trusted layer and untrusted layer. In the untrusted layer, a control module receives source media data that includes encrypted media data. The control module processes metadata about the media data. The metadata, possibly exposed by a module in the trusted layer, is not opaque within the untrusted layer. In the trusted layer, using key data, a module decrypts encrypted media data, which can be the encrypted media data from the source media data or a transcripted version thereof. A module in the trusted layer decodes the decrypted media data. A host decoder in the untrusted layer uses the metadata to manage at least some aspects of the decoding, rendering and display in the trusted layer, without exposure of decrypted media data or key data within the untrusted layer.

Media decoding control with hardware-protected digital rights management

Growing community of inventors

Kirkland, WA, United States of America

Samuel John Wenker