Cryptography Research, Inc.

Lockheed Martin Corporation

Sami James Saab

Craig Edward Hampel

Pankaj Rohatgi

Peter H Chang

Elke De Mulder

Winthrop Wu

Jeremy Cooper

Natarajan Shankar

John A Koontz

Mark S Ptak

Systems and methods for performing cryptographic data processing operations in a manner resistant to external monitoring attacks. An example method may comprise: executing, by a processing device, a first data manipulation instruction, the first data manipulation instruction affecting a state of the processing device; executing a second data manipulation instruction, the second data manipulation instruction interacting with said internal state; and breaking a detectable interaction of the first data manipulation instruction and the second data manipulation instruction by executing a third data manipulation instruction utilizing an unpredictable data item.

Performing cryptographic data processing operations in a manner resistant to external monitoring attacks

Embodiments herein facilitate resisting side channel attacks through various implementations and combinations of implementations. In embodiments, this is accomplished by preventing sensitive data from consecutively following other data through potentially vulnerable resources which otherwise may cause data to leak. Where such vulnerabilities to attacks are known, suspected, or as a proactive precaution, a cleaner can be used to inhibit the sensitive data from passing through the vulnerable areas consecutively and thus inhibit the leakage. Embodiments also envision utilizing certain types of circuits to assist in preventing leakage. By using such circuits one can reduce or even potentially eliminate the requirement for cleaners as mentioned previously.

Enhancements to improve side channel resistance

Systems and methods for performing cryptographic data processing operations in a manner resistant to external monitoring attacks. An example method may comprise: executing, by a processing device, a first data manipulation instruction, the first data manipulation instruction affecting an internal state of the processing device; executing a second data manipulation instruction, the second data manipulation instruction interacting with said internal state; and breaking a detectable interaction of the first data manipulation instruction and the second data manipulation instruction by executing a third data manipulation instruction utilizing an unpredictable data item.

An adaptive optics system is provided, comprising a spatial light modulator configured to modulate an incoming beam with an aberrated wavefront, a beamsplitter configured to receive the modulated beam from the spatial light modulator and to divide the modulated beam into a measurement beam and a reference beam, a spatial filter configured to spatially filter the reference beam, and to interfere the spatially filtered reference beam with the measurement beam to form an interferogram, an imaging device configured to capture an image of the interferogram, and a processor configured to determine the aberrated wavefront and to provide control signals to the spatial light modulator to mitigate aberrations in the aberrated wavefront.

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San Francisco, CA, United States of America

Sami James Saab