Sap Ag

Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation

Sachar M Paulus

Cristina Buchholz

Achim Braemer

Guido Wagner

Tsuyoshi Takagi

Gunter Bitz

Ingrid Biehl

Methods and apparatus, including computer program products, for risk assessment and analysis. Asset data representing a set of assets is received. Threat data representing a set of threats is received. Measures data representing a set of measures is received. A loss expectancy based upon the value of the assets, the potential reduction of value caused by the threats, and the protection of the value caused by the measures is automatically calculated. Project data representing a simulated project is received. A revised loss expectancy is automatically calculated based upon the value of the assets, the potential reduction of value caused by the threats, and the protection of the value caused by the measures as modified by the simulated project. A savings caused by the simulated project is automatically calculated based upon the loss expectancy and revised loss expectancy.

Enterprise integrity simulation

Systems, methods, and apparatus, including computer program products, for securing access to a server computer that is operable to process client requests from a client computer. A firewall is located between a dispatcher and the server computer. The firewall prevents requests from the dispatcher's side of the firewall from crossing through the firewall. The dispatcher is operable to establish a static connection with the server computer through the firewall, to receive a client request transmitted from the client computer, and to transmit the client request to the server computer through the static connection.

Network architecture using firewalls

A framework for comprehensive auditing of applications involved in business processes in distributed application landscapes, including local, distributed and collaborative audit, is based on the concept of a collaborative 'audit warehouse' that enables a central, tool-supported audit of cross-enterprise business processes. The interface for the audit data warehouse is defined in an intermediate format language with verification capabilities, such as XML (Extensible Markup Language). Applications in effect write audit data to audit data pools in the warehouse, e.g., in XML format transferred via http over the Internet. Alternatively, data is pulled from the applications by the warehouse automatically or on command. In one preferred paradigm individual enterprises have their own central audit data warehouses, each collecting data from applications both within and outside of the enterprise that owns the warehouse, in order to aggregate audit data for a given business process spanning potentially several distinct enterprises.

Collaborative audit framework

An efficient undeniable digital signature scheme based on a quadratic field is disclosed. Public keys (D, P, k, t) and secret keys (D1, q) are defined by generating two primes p, q (p, q&#x3e;4, p=3 mod 4, &#x221a;{square root over (p/3)}&#x3c;q), computing D1=&#x2212;p and D=D1q, obtaining a bit length k of &#x221a;{square root over (|D1|)}/4 and a bit length t of q&#x2212;(D1/q) where (D1/q) denotes Kronecker symbol, and generating a kernel element P of a map from a class group Cl(D) to a class group Cl(D1). Then the signature verification is realized by first checking whether a norm N(S) of the signature S is smaller than k bits or not, and judging that the signature S is illegal when the norm N(S) is larger than k bits, or generating a challenge C when the norm N(S) is not larger than k bits, by computing the message ideal M of the message m, generating a random integer r smaller than t bits, computing H=(M/S), generating a random ideal B whose norm is smaller than k&#x2212;1 bits, and computing the challenge C=BH, at a verifier side; then computing a response W by mapping the challenge C to the class group Cl(D1) and pulling the mapped challenge C back to the class group Cl(D) and squaring a result of mapping and pulling back, using the secret keys (D1, q), at the signer side; and then checking whether W=Bholds or not, and judging that the signature S is legal when W=Bholds or that the signature S is illegal otherwise, at the verifier side.

Growing community of inventors

Weinheim, Germany

Sachar M Paulus