International Business Machines Corporation

Intel Corporation

Advanced Micro Devices Corporation

Cryptography Research, Inc.

Rambus Inc.

Ronald Perez

Reiner Sailer

Stefan Berger

Trent Ray Jaeger

Kenneth Alan Goldman

Enriquillo Valdez

Charles Philippe Tresser

Ambuj Kumar

Sean William Smith

Pankaj Rohatgi

Shai Halevi

Grant W Wagner

Paul Ashley Karger

Pau-Chen Cheng

Michael Steiner

Angela Marie Schuett

Paul Andrew Moskowitz

Paul Carl Kocher

Xuan Liu

Steven A Bade

Sastry Duri

Michael Alexander Hamburg

Denis Alexandrovich Pochuev

Edith Gail Schonberg

Moninder Singh

William Craig Rawlings

Mark John Lindemann

Siddhartha Chhabra

David J Harriman

Zhen Liu

Kapil Sood

Reshma Lal

Baiju V Patel

Raghunandan Makaram

Anton Viktorovich Riabov

Ioannis T Schoinas

Genady Grabarnik

Andrew Gregory Kegel

Nagui Halim

Mark David Feblowitz

Matthew Eldon Hoekstra

Leendert Peter Van Doorn

Kay Schwendimann Anderson

Jung-Mu Tang

Yu-Yuan Chen

Marco O Gruteser

Michael I Shub

Francis M Lacan

David M Durham

Geoffrey S Strongin

Wei T Huang

Alexander J Branover

Dimitrios Pendarakis

David A Kaplan

David Michael Chess

Elaine Rivette Palmer

Ramon Caceres

Robert Alan Flavin

Thomas R Woller

Andrew William Lueck

Helmut H Weber

Sonu Arora

Paul Edward Kitchin

Perwaiz Nihal

Deepa Srinivasan

Jeff Kenneth Kravitz

Brian You

Krishna Sai Bernucho

Manjula Peddireddy

Hsing-Min Chen

Trenton Ray Jaeger

John L Griffin

Joan Dyer

Naomaru Itoi

Wei Huang

Thomas Roy Woller

In one embodiment, an apparatus comprises a processor to: receive a request to configure a secure execution environment for a first workload; configure a first set of secure execution enclaves for execution of the first workload, wherein the first set of secure execution enclaves is configured on a first set of processing resources, wherein the first set of processing resources comprises one or more central processing units and one or more accelerators; configure a first set of secure datapaths for communication among the first set of secure execution enclaves during execution of the first workload, wherein the first set of secure datapaths is configured over a first set of interconnect resources; configure the secure execution environment for the first workload, wherein the secure execution environment comprises the first set of secure execution enclaves and the first set of secure datapaths.

Composable trusted execution environments

A container corresponding to executable code may be received. The container may be executed in a secure computation environment by performing one or more operations specified by the executable code of the container. An instruction to terminate the executing of the container may be received from a high level operating system (HLOS) that is external to the secure computation environment. A determination may be made as to whether the container is associated with a preemption privilege and the executing of the container may be terminated after receiving the instruction from the HLOS based on the determination of whether the container is associated with the preemption privilege.

Preemption of a container in a secure computation environment

A secret key value that is inaccessible to software is scrambled according to registers consisting of one-time programmable (OTP) bits. A first OTP register is used to change the scrambling of the secret key value whenever a lifecycle event occurs. A second OTP register is used to undo the change in the scrambling of the secret key. A third OTP register is used to affect a permanent change to the scrambling of the secret key. The scrambled values of the secret key (whether changed or unchanged) are used as seeds to produce keys for cryptographic operations by a device.

Cryptographic management of lifecycle states

A host Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) operates 'blindly,' without the host VMM having the ability to access data within a guest virtual machine (VM) or the ability to access directly control structures that control execution flow of the guest VM. Guest VMs execute within a protected region of memory (called a key domain) that even the host VMM cannot access. Virtualization data structures that pertain to the execution state (e.g., a Virtual Machine Control Structure (VMCS)) and memory mappings (e.g., Extended Page Tables (EPTs)) of the guest VM are also located in the protected memory region and are also encrypted with the key domain key. The host VMM and other guest VMs, which do not possess the key domain key for other key domains, cannot directly modify these control structures nor access the protected memory region. The host VMM, however, using VMPageIn and VMPageOut instructions, can build virtual machines in key domains and page VM pages in and out of key domains.

Secure public cloud using extended paging and memory integrity

A write request causes controller circuitry to write an encrypted data line and First Tier metadata portion including MAC data and a first portion of ECC data to a first memory circuitry portion and a second portion of ECC data to a sequestered, second memory circuitry portion. A read request causes the controller circuitry to read the encrypted data line and the First Tier metadata portion from the first memory circuitry portion. Using the first portion of the ECC data in the First Tier metadata portion, the controller circuitry determines if an error exists in the encrypted data line. If no error is detected, the controller circuitry decrypts and verifies the data line using the MAC data in the First Tier metadata portion. If an error in the data line is detected, the Second Tier metadata portion, is fetched from the sequestered, second memory circuitry portion and the error corrected.

Memory in integrity performance enhancement systems and methods

Composable trustworthy execution environments

A method, system, and program product for remotely attesting to a state of computing system is provided. Specifically, the present invention allows a remote system to establish trust in the properties of the computer system. The properties to be trusted are expanded from the usual system software layers and related configuration files to novel types of data such as static data specific to the computer system, dynamic data determined at system startup, or dynamic data created as the computer system runs applications.

Method, system, and program product for remotely attesting to a state of a computer system

A processor employs a hardware encryption module in the processor's memory access path to cryptographically isolate secure information. In some embodiments, the encryption module is located at a memory controller (e.g. northbridge) of the processor, and each memory access provided to the memory controller indicates whether the access is a secure memory access, indicating the data associated with the memory access is designated for cryptographic protection, or a non-secure memory access. For secure memory accesses, the encryption module performs encryption (for write accesses) or decryption (for read accesses) of the data associated with the memory access.

Cryptographic protection of information in a processing system

Boot configuration information is stored to a volatile memory of a processing system during a low-power state. When resuming from the low-power state, a processor device accesses configuration information for a memory controller from a non-volatile memory and restores the memory controller using the configuration information so as to permit access to the volatile memory. The processor device then configures the initial contexts one or more processor cores using the core state information maintained by the volatile memory during the low-power state and accessed via the configured memory controller, and the one or more processor cores completes the boot process by executing resume boot code maintained by the volatile memory during the low-power state and accessed via the configured memory controller, rather than accessing boot code from a non-volatile memory.

Reintialization of a processing system from volatile memory upon resuming from a low-power state

Growing community of inventors

Mount Kisco, NY, United States of America

Ronald Perez