Certicom Corporation

Pitney Bowes Inc.

Etas Embedded Systems Canada Inc.

Etas Embedded System Canada Inc.

Gallant, Robert P.

Vanstone, Scott A.

Brown, Daniel R.l.

Struik, Marinus

Robert Philip Gallant

Scott Alexander Vanstone

Robert John Lambert

Marinus Struik

Ashok Vadekar

Adrian Antipa

Daniel R L Brown

Daniel Richard L Brown

Daniel Richard Brown

Frederick W Ryan, Jr

Leon A Pintsov

Alfred John Menezes

Ari P Singer

Ronald C Mullin

Aleksandar Jurisic

Daniel Rl Brown

Ashok V Vadekar

Rick Ryan

Frederick W Ryan

A system and method are provided for enabling a password reset mechanism for a secured device that verifies a digital signature on a password reset message. The password reset message has been generated by a password reset service for an authorized administrator associated with the secured device. The password reset mechanism allows the authorized administrator to make a request to the password reset service for a password reset, and receive the password reset message such that a password reset can be performed at the secured device. In this way, the secured device's password can be reset absent a connection to a command and control center or other service.

System and method for resetting passwords on electronic devices

Accelerated computation of combinations of group operations in a finite field is provided by arranging for at least one of the operands to have a relatively small bit length. In a elliptic curve group, verification that a value representative of a point R corresponds the sum of two other points uG and vG is obtained by deriving integers w,z of reduced bit length and that v=w/z. The verification equality R=uG+vQ may then be computed as &#x2212;zR+(uz mod n)G+wQ=O with z and w of reduced bit length. This is beneficial in digital signature verification where increased verification can be attained.

Accelerated verification of digital signatures and public keys

A system and method are provided for having a device in a communication system update an operational policy for the device by encoding a policy update in a virtual machine language used by a virtual machine on the device, having the policy update signed by a trusted entity, and sending a message comprising the signed policy update to the device to enable the device to implement the policy update using the virtual machine on the device. A system and method are also provided for updating an operational policy on a device in a communication system by receiving, at the device, a message comprising a signed policy update that has been signed by a trusted entity, the policy update being encoded in a virtual machine language used by a virtual machine on the device, verifying the signed policy update, and implementing the policy update using the virtual machine on the device when the policy update is verified.

Management and distribution of security policies in a communication system

Accelerated computation of combinations of group operations in a finite field is provided by arranging for at least one of the operands to have a relatively small bit length. In a elliptic curve group, verification that a value representative of a point R corresponds the sum of two other points uG and vG is obtained by deriving integers w,z of reduced bit length and so that v=w/z. The verification equality R=uG+vQ may then be computed as &#x2212;zR+(uz mod n) G+wQ=O with z and w of reduced bit length. This is beneficial in digital signature verification where increased verification can be attained.

A signature scheme is provided in which a message is divided in to a first portion which is hidden and is recovered during verification, and a second portion which is visible and is required as input to the verification algorithm. A first signature component is generated by encrypting the first portion alone. An intermediate component is formed by combining the first component and the visible portion and cryptographically hashing them. A second signature component is then formed using the intermediate component and the signature comprises the first and second components with the visible portion. A verification of the signature combines a first component derived only from the hidden portion of the message with the visible portion and produces a hash of the combination.

Hybrid signature scheme

A new trapdoor one-way function is provided. In a general sense, some quadratic algebraic integer z is used. One then finds a curve E and a rational map defining [z] on E. The rational map [z] is the trapdoor one-way function. A judicious selection of z will ensure that [z] can be efficiently computed, that it is difficult to invert, that determination of [z] from the rational functions defined by [z] is difficult, and knowledge of z allows one to invert [z] on a certain set of elliptic curve points.

Trapdoor one-way functions on elliptic curves and their application to shorter signatures and asymmetric encryption

Improper re-use of a static Diffie-Hellman (DH) private key may leak information about the key. The leakage is prevented by a key derivation function (KDF), but standards do not agree on key derivation functions. The module for performing a DH private key operation must somehow support multiple different KDF standards. The present invention provides an intermediate approach that neither attempts to implement all possible KDF operations, nor provide unprotected access to the raw DH private key operation. Instead, the module performs parts of the KDF operation, as indicated by the application using the module. This saves the module from implementing the entire KDF for each KDF needed. Instead, the module implements only re-usable parts that are common to most KDFs. Furthermore, when new KDFs are required, the module may be able to support them if they built on the parts that the module has implemented.

Secure interface for versatile key derivation function support

Methods for choosing groups for a static Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol to inhibit active attacks by an adversary are provided. In mod p groups, an even h is chosen of value approximately ( 9/16)(logn), values r and n are determined using sieving and primality testing on r and n, and a value t is found to compute p=tn+1 wherein p is prime. In elliptic curve groups defined over a binary filed, a random curve is chosen, the number of points on the curve is counted and this number is checked for value of 2n wherein n is prime and n&#x2212;1 meets preferred criteria. In elliptic curve groups defined over a prime field of order q, a value n=hr+1 is computed, wherein n is prime and n&#x2212;1 meets preferred criteria, and a complex multiplication method is applied on n to produce a value q and an elliptic curve E defined over q and having an order n.

Custom static Diffie-Hellman groups

A potential bias in the generation of a private key is avoided by selecting the key and comparing it against the system parameters. If a predetermined condition is attained it is accepted. If not it is rejected and a new key is generated.

Method of public key generation

The present invention provides a new trapdoor one-way function. In a general sense, some quadratic algebraic integer z is used. One then finds a curve E and a rational map defining [z] on E. The rational map [z] is the trapdoor one-way function. A judicious selection of z will ensure that [z] can be efficiently computed, that it is difficult to invert, that determination of [z] from the rational functions defined by [z] is difficult, and knowledge of z allows one to invert [z] on a certain set of elliptic curve points. Every rational map is a composition of a translation and an endomorphism. The most secure part of the rational map is the endomorphism as the translation is easy to invert. If the problem of inverting the endomorphism and thus [z] is as hard as the discrete logarithm problem in E, then the size of the cryptographic group can be smaller than the group used for RSA trapdoor one-way functions.

Growing community of inventors

Corner Brook, Canada

Robert Philip Gallant