Certicom Corporation

Blackberry Corporation

Pitney Bowes Inc.

Etas Embedded Systems Canada Inc.

Robert Boschgmbh

Motorola Corporation

Other

Huawei Technologies Co., Limited

Malikie Innovations Limited

Blackberry Limited and Certicom Corp.

Certicon Corp.

Etas Embedded System Canada Inc.

Robert John Lambert

Scott Alexander Vanstone

Ashok Vadekar

Robert Philip Gallant

Nevine Maurice Nassif Ebeid

Michael Eoin Buckley

Daniel Richard L Brown

Adrian Antipa

Frederick W Ryan, Jr

Marinus Struik

Alfred John Menezes

Daniel Richard Brown

Michael Charles Hollatz

Ari P Singer

Farhad Pezeshki

Matthew John Campagna

Leon A Pintsov

Atsushi Yamada

James Douglas Dworkin

Michael J Torla

Ronald C Mullin

P Michael Glaser

Neil Patrick Adams

Donald B Johnson

James Robert Alfred

Michael S Brown

Ravi Singh

Christopher Lyle Bender

Robert Henderson Wood

Roger Paul Bowman

Yuri Poeluev

Yin Tan

Robert Kaster

Anthony Rosati

Brian Lamb

Salvatore Federico Barbieri

Nikolay Gigov

Robert Phillip Gallant

Aleksandar Jurisic

Andrew Inwood

Tobias Klein

Jay Peter Gallant

Mark Gregory Elkins

Nevine Ebeid

Leon A Pinstov

Rob Gallant

Rick Ryan

Ashok V Vadekar

James Alfred

Navine Maurice Nassif Ebeid

Robert Gallant

Nevine Maurice Ebeid

Matthew J Campagna

Navine Maurice Ebeid

Michael Stephen Brown

Frederick W Ryan

A method for certificate chain validation is disclosed for memory-efficient execution inside a secure execution environment of a hardware security module (HSM), despite very limited memory being inside the HSM. This is achieved by allocating enough HSM memory for at least the root certificate, a signer certificate, and a certificate to be validated, and replacing the signer certificate as the certificate chain is traversed. Revalidation of data is implemented by computing secure tags that enable the HSM to quickly recognize previously validated data. Chain validation is only considered provisional until checked against a CRL, which can be provided to the HSM in a streaming fashion, and each received serial number in the CRL is checked against the list of serial numbers representing the provisionally verified chain.

HSM-memory-efficient means of providing HSM-based PKI operations for vehicle controllers

A method is presented for secure communication, the method including generating a signature using a private key, a nonce, and at least one of an identifier and a key component; and transmitting the signature, the nonce, a security parameter, and the at least one of the identifier and the key component, wherein the security parameter associates a user identity with a public key, the public key being associated with the private key.

Securing method for lawful interception

A method for operating a pseudorandom generator is disclosed. The method may be implemented by a processor of a mobile computing device. The method includes: collecting raw sensor data from at least one sensor associated with the mobile computing device; selecting a subset of the raw sensor data; retrieving first representation representing accumulated entropy associated with one or more previously acquired raw sensor data sets for the at least one sensor; and generating a seed for a pseudorandom generator based on combining the first representation and the selected subset of raw sensor data.

System and method for operating pseudorandom generators

A method of processing a notification that is broadcast by a source server is disclosed. The method includes: receiving, at the computing device, the notification, the notification containing a first message; storing the first message in a message store; determining that the first message is a repeated message of a previous message that was received at the computing device prior to receiving the notification; and associating a message counter value of the first message with the previous message and a message counter value associated with the previous message in the message store.

Method for validating messages

A system and method are provided for enabling a password reset mechanism for a secured device that verifies a digital signature on a password reset message. The password reset message has been generated by a password reset service for an authorized administrator associated with the secured device. The password reset mechanism allows the authorized administrator to make a request to the password reset service for a password reset, and receive the password reset message such that a password reset can be performed at the secured device. In this way, the secured device's password can be reset absent a connection to a command and control center or other service.

System and method for resetting passwords on electronic devices

Systems and methods for confirming a cryptographic key. The system includes an electronic controller configured to generate an electronic message in response to an installation of a secret key on the electronic controller, the electronic message comprising information about the installation of the secret key, digitally sign the electronic message using a manufacturer private key, encrypt the electronic message, store the electronic message in a memory, access the stored electronic message in response to a request by a user, decrypt the electronic message, confirm a digital signature of the electronic message using a manufacturer public key, generate a confirmation message, and send the confirmation message to a user.

Systems and methods for confirming a cryptographic key

Methods and systems for providing an endpoint device with access to a remote resource are disclosed. A first secure tunnel with the endpoint device is established from an intermediate device, the first tunnel terminating within a trusted execution environment (TEE) in the intermediate device. At least one credential is received within the TEE and via the first secure tunnel from the endpoint device. The at least one credential is transmitted from the intermediate device to the remote resource via a second secure tunnel, the second tunnel located between the remote resource and the intermediate device and originating within the TEE. In response to the at least one credential being accepted by the remote resource, communications between the endpoint device and the remote resource via the TEE in the intermediate device through the first and second secure tunnels are enabled.

Securing delegated credentials in third-party networks

A communication system involving an access point, a vehicle and a user is provided. The vehicle and user possess a registration code, the user possesses a public and private key pair, and the access point and vehicle possess certificates and associated private keys. The access point issues a certificate to the user associated with the user's public and private keys, and the certificate of the access point is known and trusted by the vehicle. The access point signs a message granting ownership of the vehicle to the user, and the identity of the user indicates the user's certificate. The vehicle conditionally accepts the ownership registration request of the user.

System and method for digital key sharing for access control

Accelerated computation of combinations of group operations in a finite field is provided by arranging for at least one of the operands to have a relatively small bit length. In a elliptic curve group, verification that a value representative of a point R corresponds the sum of two other points uG and vG is obtained by deriving integers w,z of reduced bit length and that v=w/z. The verification equality R=uG+vQ may then be computed as &#x2212;zR+(uz mod n)G+wQ=O with z and w of reduced bit length. This is beneficial in digital signature verification where increased verification can be attained.

Accelerated verification of digital signatures and public keys

There is provided a method for secure communications. The method includes a computing device receiving a notification comprising a message, a counter value, a signature signed by a signer and based on the message and the counter value, and an indication of the signer. The device obtains a current counter value based on an identity of the signer, checks the signature and compares the counter value with the current counter value; and, if the counter comparison and the signature checking is successful, accepting the message.

In some aspects, an encryption method comprises encrypting a first portion of a message using a first secret key. The first secret key is generated based on the public key of an entity. A one-way function is used to generate a second secret key from the first secret key, and the first secret key is subsequently discarded. A second portion of the message is encrypted using the second secret key. The encrypted first portion of the message and the encrypted second portion of the message are provided to the entity.

Public key encryption algorithms for hard lock file encryption

Growing community of inventors

Cambridge, Canada

Robert John Lambert