General Dynamics Decision Systems, Inc.

Motorola Corporation

Richard Allen Perona

Clifford Andrew Williams

Erwin Perry Comer

James T Lynn

Jonathan G Wootten

Gregory Ralph Osborn

Donald B Harbin

Ronald Glen Feigen

Karl Krummel

The integrity of a remote communication unit () in a communication system is verified by comparing a hash value generated within the remote unit () to a hash value generated within a local unit (). An interrogation message is generated within an interrogating entity () that includes a random seed value, memory range information identifying a memory range within the remote unit that is to be hashed, and position information identifying a position at which the random seed value is to be located within a data stream generated within the remote unit (). The interrogation message is then delivered to the remote unit () which then performs a hashing operation based upon the parameters within the interrogation message to generate a hash value. The hash value is then returned to the interrogating entity () for comparison with a control value.

Remote system integrity verification

A data security system ( ) provides cryptographic services in a multiprocessor platform ( ) supporting a distributed application ( ). The distributed application ( ) includes a cryptographic object ( ) that is executable exclusively on the data security system ( ). An input interface object ( ), a cryptographic function ( ), and an output interface objection ( ) form the cryptographic object ( ). The data security system ( ) includes a first processor element ( ) for executing the input interface object ( ), a second processor element ( ) for executing the cryptographic function ( ), and a third processor element ( ) for executing the output interface object ( ). The combination of data security system ( ) and cryptographic object ( ) ensures the separation of plain text data ( ) from cipher text data ( ).

Method and system for providing cryptographic services in a distributed application

Software execution control in which a series of two-way rule checks is performed between software-defined communications system component records to ensure and maintain system security and integrity. A system platform ( ) performs a series of two-way rule checks between records of a system platform ( ) and an application ( ) called by the platform ( ), between records of the called application ( ) and a module ( ) that defines the called application ( ), and between the records of the module ( ) that defines the called application ( ) and the platform ( ). Both the called application ( ) and the module ( ) that defines the called application ( ) are then instantiated if the two-way rule checks are successful. Because the rule checks are performed in a two-way manner, restrictions such as licensing and source restrictions may be placed not only on system modules ( ), but also on the applications ( ) using the modules ( ), thereby enabling higher levels of system security to be achieved. In addition, the present invention minimizes processing overhead by providing for load-time rule checking rather than run-time checking associated with conventional enforcement systems.

Software-defined communications system execution control

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Gilbert, AZ, United States of America

Richard Allen Perona