Qualcomm Incorporated

Silvair Sp. Z O.o.

Ravi Kiran Bamidi

Chirag Manojkumar Kharvar

Piotr Winiarczyk

Sourabh Jana

Ravi Shekhar

Jianlong Cao

Yusheng Yang

Huafen Lv

A technique for processing Bluetooth Mesh packets that comprise erroneous cyclic redundancy check (CRC) values. The disclosed mesh node receives packets, each of which comprising a Protocol Data Unit (PDU) and a cyclic redundancy check (CRC) field. The PDU comprises an AD Data field with multiple octets; the AD Data field itself comprises a Network Identifier (NID) field. After determining the value of the CRC field in a first packet to be invalid, and subject to further checks, the mesh node selects a selected set of one or more NID values, based on the validity of the value of the NID field in the first packet. The mesh node then processes at least some of the multiple octets in the AD Data field in the first packet in accordance with a set of network keys that hash to the one or more NID values in the selected set.

Processing of mesh network data packets having invalid cyclic redundancy check (CRC) values

Systems and methods of managing a Bluetooth SigMesh network involve a supervisor configured to monitor one or more network parameters of the SigMesh network, such as topology, message identity, transmit count, transmit interval, relay retransmit count, or relay retransmit interval. The supervisor determines whether one or more of the network parameters are to be adjusted for improving transmission efficiency, reducing traffic congestion, avoiding flooding of packets on the mesh network, or ensuring injection of packets in the SigMesh network. The supervisor provides feedback to one or more nodes with the adjusted network parameters to improve transmission efficiency and reduce traffic in the SigMesh network.

Supervised traffic management in SigMesh networks

A mesh device for receiving and processing a private beacon message, which can be represented by one or more Bluetooth Low Energy mesh packets. Upon receiving the private beacon message, the mesh device decrypts a first portion of the private beacon by using a first encryption key corresponding to a first subnet, wherein the first portion comprises an initialization vector (IV), in the form of an index or other indicator. The decrypting using the first encryption key results in a first decrypted value for the IV index. The mesh device then determines whether the first decrypted value for the IV index is valid or invalid. If the mesh device determines the first decrypted value to be valid, the mesh device proceeds with authenticating the data contained in the private beacon message.

System and method for processing of private beacons in a mesh network

Disclosed are techniques for detecting a security threat in a wireless mesh network. In an aspect, a monitoring device in the wireless mesh network detects a first message transmitted by a source node in the wireless mesh network to a destination node in the wireless mesh network via at least one relay node in the wireless mesh network, collects information from the first message as it is transmitted in the wireless mesh network, determines that the first message has been corrupted based on analysis of the information from the first message, and detects the security threat in the wireless mesh network based on the first message being corrupted.

Detection of security threats in a mesh network

A method by a mesh device is described. The method includes de-obfuscating first information of a received packet with a privacy key that matches a network identifier (NID) of the packet. The method also includes determining whether to decrypt second information of the packet based on the de-obfuscated first information.

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Bengaluru, India

Ravi Kiran Bamidi