University of California

Rahul Jain

Ram Rajagopal

Pravin Varaiya

Charis Kaskiris

Jun Shu

Nisha Sivasankara Pillai

A double-sided exchange may be an exchange wherein both buyers and sellers provide bids for matching via the exchange. A first interface receives buy bids from buyers and a second interface receives sell bids from sellers. A controller matches the sell bids with the buy bids, yielding matched buy bids and matched sell bids in response thereto so that allocations of the matched buy bids and the matched sell bids maximize a surplus of the exchange. An allocation that substantially maximizes an auctioneer's profit and/or announces payments based on sell bids is provided. The announced allocations and prices can be shown to be a substantially competitive equilibrium in some applications.

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Berkeley, CA, United States of America

Rahul Jain